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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
TASTERS' LTD., INC., 
Petitioner, 
vs. Case No. 920659-CA 
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT Category 7 
SECURITY, 
Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has jurisdiction over this Petition for 
Review pursuant to Article 8, Section 3 of the Utah 
Constitution; Utah Code Annotated, Sections 35-4-10(i) and 
63-46b-16; and Rule 14 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Were the Board of Review's Findings of Fact based on 
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record? 
2* Was the Board of Reviewfs decision that Tasters1 
demonstrators are employees as opposed to independent 
contractors reasonable and rational? 
3. Is the Board of Review1s decision within the scope of 
authority of the Court of Appeals' remand order? 
STATUTORY AND REGULATORY PROVISIONS AT ISSUE 
The statutes and rules which are determinative in this 
matter are set forth verbatim in Appendix A, and include the 
following: 
Section 35-4-2, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
as amended (1991). 
Section 35-4-10(i), Utah Code Annotated 
1953, as amended (1991). 
Section 35-4-22.1(6), Utah Code Annotated 
1953 (Supp. 1992). 
Section 35-4-22(j)(5) [35-4-22.3(3)], Utah 
Code Annotated 1953 (Supp. 1989). 
Section 63-46b-16, Utah Code Annotated 
1953, as amended (1991). 
Rule 14, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This proceeding was initiated by Tasters who sought a 
ruling from the Utah Department of Employment Security as to 
the status of its demonstrators under the Utah Employment 
Security Act as a result of the 1989 change in the statutory 
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test to determine whether a worker is an employee or an 
independent contractor under Section 35-4-22(j)(5) [presently 
35-4-22.3(3)]. The Department issued a determination dated 
August 31, 1989 that Tasters1 demonstrators were not 
independent contractors but employees of Tasters pursuant to 
Section 35-4-22(j)(5) [35-4-22.3(3)] of the Utah Employment 
Security Act. (See Appendix B) Tasters appealed the 
Department's determination. In a decision dated April 18, 
1990, an Administrative Law Judge affirmed the Department's 
decision. (See Appendix C) On May 16, 1990, Tasters filed an 
appeal from the decision of the Administrative Law Judge to 
the Board of Review. On July 10, 1990, the Board entered a 
decision (first decision) affirming the ALJ's decision that 
Tasters' demonstrators are not independent contractors but are 
Tasters' employees pursuant to Section 35-4-22(j)(5) [35-4-
22.3(3). (See Appendix D) On August 21, 1990, Tasters filed 
a Petition for Writ of Review with the Court of Appeals. On 
October 17, 1991, this Court issued its amended opinion 
remanding the matter to the Board to make additional findings 
of fact and to analyze each of the 20 factors enumerated in 
Section 35-4-22(j)((5) [35-4-22.3(3)]. (See Appendix E) On 
September 9, 1992 the Board issued a decision (second 
decision) consistent with the Court of Appeals Order, 
affirming the previous decisions that Tasters' demonstrators 
were not independent contractors but were employees. (See 
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Appendix F) On October 9, 1992 Tasters filed a Petition for 
Writ of Review with this Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Tasters is in the business of providing workers to 
brokers and manufacturer representatives for the purpose of 
demonstrating various products in grocery and department 
stores. Record at 180 (All notations hereafter prefixed by 
"R" refer to pages in the record and are set forth in 
numerical order in Appendix G.) Each demonstrator works on an 
on-call, part-time basis, with no guarantee of any pctrticular 
schedule or number of hours. R. 222 Jobs are usually only 
available however on weekends, the times when grocery and 
department stores are at their busiest. R. 145, 214 Each 
demonstrator is free to accept or decline offered assignments 
as he or she sees fit. R. 145, 151, 222, 223 
Tasters gives each demonstrator a two-page set of 
suggestions concerning the performance of their duties, 
including details such as attire, length of breaks, product 
display, and demonstration tactics. Demonstrators are 
advised not to have children present, smoke, read, or sit 
while on the job. (See Appendix H.) 
Orientation meetings are sometimes held for 
demonstrators, but attendance is not required. R. 218 
Sometimes training sessions are set up by Tasters on behalf of 
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brokers to give demonstrators instruction on a new product. 
R. 181, 182 Demonstrators are paid by the broker or 
manufacturer for those sessions. R. 158, 182, 185 Those who 
do not attend are not selected to demonstrate that specific 
product, but are not jeopardized in any other way. R. 186 
Once a demonstrator agrees to do a particular 
demonstration, he or she works according to a schedule 
communicated by Tasters. R. 161, 173 The store manager 
dictates hours of demonstrations, though the demonstrator can 
request minor adjustments in the time frame. R. 184 The 
demonstrator's performance in the store is not closely 
monitored by Tasters. In fact, there is little need to 
monitor performance as the task required of demonstrators is 
straightforward and nontechnical. R. 186 The store manager 
or the broker are aware of what the demonstrators are doing, 
however, and can and do make suggestions on how to display or 
sell the product. R. 146 
At the end of each demonstration, demonstrators are 
required to submit a report to Tasters detailing the amount of 
product sold. (See Appendix I) This information is collected 
for the benefit of the broker, but the printed report form 
also provides room for store managers to sign off on the 
demonstrator's performance. This is primarily to let Tasters 
know that the demonstration was in fact done, but managers can 
also make comments about a demonstrator's performance. In 
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this way Tasters gets feedback on whether or not the 
demonstrators performance was satisfactory, R. 147, 184, 240 
The demonstrators are either provided the supplies used 
in demonstrations or are reimbursed for the expense of 
supplies. R. 193, 228 Tasters approves or disapproves 
requests for expenses. R. 215, 232 The demonstrators provide 
equipment such as frying pans and card tables for the 
demonstrations. R. 162 Virtually all items used in the 
demonstrations are items the demonstrators already own so 
monetary outlay for each demonstrator in terms of equipment is 
minimal. R. 153, 188 Tasters sometimes provides microwave 
ovens and then charges its clients rental fees for their use. 
Tasters pays demonstrators by the job and not by the 
hour. R. 204, 209 However, each job is defined by how many 
hours the demonstration is supposed to last. On occasion, 
demonstrators have been allowed to leave when all of the 
product assigned to them is sold. R. 174 Generally speaking, 
however, if a demonstrator runs out of product, Tasters or the 
broker makes an effort to provide the demonstrator with enough 
product to keep on working until the time for the 
demonstration is over. R. 216, 233 The demonstration is 
considered complete when the time set for the demonstration is 
over, not when the product is all sold. 
Some demonstrators have delegated assignments to other 
demonstrators when the original demonstrator does not want to 
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or cannot do the demonstration he or she is assigned to do, 
and they are then paid for the work. R. 152 Other 
demonstrators, however, call Tasters to provide a replacement 
when they cannot complete a demonstration. R. 170, 171 
The demonstrators and Tasters are free to terminate their 
relationship with each other at any time. If Tasters has not 
paid an individual a paycheck for over a year, that 
individual's name is automatically dropped off Tasters' 
computer list of available demonstrators. R. 231 
Although they are free to perform services for other 
employers, none of the demonstrators advertise, maintain 
offices or obtain business licenses. R. 167 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Board of Review's findings of fact in this matter 
were complete and thorough, each based on substantial evidence 
in light of the whole record as required by the Administrative 
Procedures Act. There is not significant disagreement between 
the parties regarding the Board of Review's factual findings. 
Tasters' challenge of the Board's decision, rather, goes to 
the weight the Board of Review chose to give certain factual 
findings and the conclusions it reached from its application 
of certain facts to the twenty factors outlined in Section 35-
4-22(j)(5) [35-4-22.3(3)] of the Utah Employment Security Act. 
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Section 35-4-22(j)(5) [35-4-22.3(3)] gives the Commission 
a broad grant of discretion in deciding which factors are to 
be given significant weight in a particular fact situation. 
Utah case law supports the proposition that where the 
Industrial Commission has been given an express grant of 
discretion from the Legislature, a reviewing court will grant 
deference to the Board of Review decision and will apply the 
reasonableness standard of review, i.e. a reviewing court must 
affirm Board of Review determinations that are reasonable and 
rational. 
The Board's weighing of factors and granting significance 
to certain factors and insignificance to others is 
reasonable and rational in light of the facts of this case. 
The Board's determination that certain factors were not 
applicable was entirely in keeping with its statutory 
responsibility. The Board of Review's ultimate conclusion 
that Tasters' demonstrators are not independent contractors 
but are employees was reasonable and rational within the 
meaning of Section 35-4-22(j)(5) [35-4-22.3(3)]. 
Finally, the Board of Review did not exceed the authority 
of this Court's remand, as suggested by Tasters. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE BOARD OF REVIEWS FINDINGS OF FACT SHOULD BE 
UPHELD AS THEY ARE SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVI-
DENCE IN LIGHT OF THE WHOLE RECORD. 
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
The Petitioner in this case argues that the Board of 
Review's factual findings are inappropriate and should be 
overruled by the Court of Appeals since the Board of Review 
did not "review the whole record", but merely that portion 
which "supports its decision", (See Petitioner's Brief, page 
16.) To successfully challenge any finding of fact of the 
Board of Review on judicial review, however, Section 63-46b-
16(4)(g), Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended), provides 
that a party must demonstrate that the findings are "not 
supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the 
whole record before the court"• See Grace Drilling Company v. 
Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 67-68 (Utah App. 1989). 
"Substantial evidence" has been defined by this Court as 
"such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 
adequate to support a conclusion." Dept. of Air Force v. 
Swider, 824 P.2d 448 (Utah App. 1991), quoting Grace Drilling 
Company v. Board of Review, supra, at 67 In the Grace 
Drilling case, the Court noted: 
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Substantial evidence is "more than a mere 
scintilla of evidence . . . though 
•something less than the weight of the 
evidence'". 
Grace Drilling v. Board of Review, supra, at 68. 
A party seeking to overturn an agency factual finding 
has the burden of "marshalling the evidence". Grace 
Drilling, Id, at 68. The marshalling process requires that 
the party seeking to overturn an agency factual finding 
marshal the evidence in support of the 
findings and then demonstrate that despite 
this evidence, the findings are so 
lacking in support as to be inadequate 
under the applicable standard of review. 
Heinecke v. Department of Commerce, 810 P. 2d 459, 464 (Utah 
App. 1991). 
Even when the marshalling process of a party seeking to 
overturn an agency factual finding reveals evidence to support 
a differing version of the facts than that found by the Board 
of Review, it is not the province of the reviewing court to 
substitute even a credible, persuasive or reasonable version 
of the facts presented by an appealing party for that of the 
Board of Review. 
In undertaking such a review, this court 
will not substitute its judgment as 
between two reasonably conflicting views, 
even though we may have come to a 
different conclusion had the case come 
before us for de novo review. [Cites 
omitted.] It is the province of the 
lower, not appellate courts, to resolve 
conflicting evidence, and where 
inconsistent inferences can be drawn from 
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the same evidence, it is for the Board to 
draw the inferences. [Citations omitted.] 
Grace Drilling Company v. Board of Review, supra, at 68. See 
also Wurst v. Department of Employment Security, 818 P.2d 1036 
(Utah App. 1991). 
By arguing that the Board of Review erroneously failed to 
"review the whole record/' and looked only at that portion 
which "supports its decision," Petitioner suggests that the 
Board of Review must, in effect, "marshall the evidence" in 
reaching its decision. The Board of Review has no such 
responsibility. In a workers compensation case recently 
reviewed by this Court, the Court recognized that the 
administrative agency is the finder of facts and can choose to 
give more weight to certain evidence than other evidence: 
As we have previously recognized, the 
Commission is the ultimate fact finder in 
workers' compensation cases. As the fact 
finder, the Commission may choose to give 
certain evidence more weight than other 
evidence. See Mollerup Van Lines v. 
Adams. 16 Utah 2d 235, 398 P.2d 882 
(1965). In Mollerup, the court noted that 
"[i]t was both the duty and the 
prerogative of the Commission to view [the 
doctor's] entire testimony together and it 
could believe those statements which 
impressed it as being true, even though 
there may have been some seeming 
contradictions in other parts of his 
testimony." 398 P. 2d at 885 (citations 
omitted) . 
More recently this court has held that the 
Commission will not be reversed simply 
because it has chosen to rely on one 
portion of a medical panel report and to 
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reject other inconsistent portions. See 
USX Corp* v. Industrial Commission, 781 
P.2d 883, 887 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Virgin v. Bd. of Review of Indus. Com'n, 803 P.2d 1284, 1289 
(Utah App. 1990). 
B. THE BOARD'S FINDINGS OF FACT ARE COMPLETE 
AND SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN 
LIGHT OF THE WHOLE RECORD. 
While Tasters makes a show of disputing the Board's 
factual findings, the Board's findings of fact are not 
substantively different from those proposed by Tasters. 
Tasters' challenge of the Board's findings of fact, when 
examined factor by factor as outlined in Tasters' Brief, 
dispute only the weight the Board chose to give those facts 
in determining the existence of independent contractor status 
rather than whether crucial, relevant facts were not made part 
of the Board's findings of fact. 
A review of the proposed findings of fact made by 
Tasters set out in Appendix D, shows a list of facts that 
barely differ from the findings made by the Board of Review. 
The essential difference in Tasters' version of the facts from 
the Board's factual findings is that Tasters' facts are 
sometimes framed either as legal conclusions or imply 
conclusions drawn from characterization of the facts. For 
example, Petitioner's proposed Fact number 9 reads: 
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Belrose testified she was free to accept 
or reject any work and because of that she 
considered herself an independent 
contractor. R. 204, 205. 
This proposed finding of fact offers as fact a legal 
conclusion made by a demonstrator who was incompetent to draw 
such a conclusion. As such, the Board of Review could not 
accept that proposed factual finding. The witness' statement 
that she was an independent contractor because she could 
accept any work she wanted is of little value to the Board. 
Another example of Tasters1 posing legal conclusions as 
proposed findings of fact is Proposed Finding of Fact number 
23 which states: 
Demonstrators have the right to hire, 
supervise and pay other assistants. . . . 
This statement is both conclusionary and argumentative. The 
proposed finding is not based on a demonstrator's actual 
experience but the supposition that a demonstrator could hire, 
supervise, or pay assistants, if she chose to do so. Witness 
Colmere offered a conclusion of what she speculated might 
happen in certain circumstances. Obviously, this evidence is 
technically incompetent and also provides little probative 
value in determining whether the demonstrators are employees 
or independent contractors. 
While there are other examples of conclusionary 
statements in Petitioner's proposed findings of fact, it is 
unnecessary to attack each one. The point of this analysis is 
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that the Board of Review basically accepts the proposed 
findings of fact of Tasters insofar as those facts are not 
self-serving conclusions elicited by Tasters' counsel. The 
Department's characterization of the kind of business run by 
Tasters is essentially identical to that described by Tasters 
itself. If there is any particular instance where Tasters 
takes real issue with the Board of Review's factual findings, 
those findings are based on substantial evidence when viewed 
in light of the whole record and should be upheld by this 
Court. 
POINT II 
THE BOARD OF REVIEW'S DETERMINATION THAT 
TASTERS' DEMONSTRATORS ARE EMPLOYEES AND NOT 
INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS IS REASONABLE AND 
RATIONAL. 
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
Reviewing courts have consistently given deference to 
Board of Review decisions involving mixed questions of law and 
fact, affirming those decisions if they are reasonable and 
rational. See Depart, of Air Force v. Dept. of Emp. S€>c. , 786 
P.2d 1361, 1363 (Utah App. 1990); Johnson v. Department of 
Employment Security, 782 P.2d 965, 968 (Utah App. 1989); Pro-
Benefit Staffing v. Board of Review, 775 P. 2d 439, 44 2 (Utah 
App. 1989). Recent decisions have altered the traditional 
characterization of an issue as one of a "mixed question of 
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law and fact". Instead this Court and the Utah Supreme Court 
have found that a reviewing court must give deference to an 
agency decision if the agency has been given a "legislative 
grant of discretion" to make that decision* See Morton Int'l. 
Inc. v. Utah Tax Commission, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991); Tasters 
Ltd. v. Dept. of Employment Security, 819 P.2d 361 (Utah App. 
1991) . According to the reasoning of this Court in these 
decisions, when there is a statutory grant of discretion, 
deference to the agency's decision is required, and the 
reviewing court will uphold the agency determination if it is 
reasonable and rational. 
This Court has already held, in connection with this very 
case, in looking at Section 35-4-22(j)(5) [35-4-22.3(3)] of 
the Utah Employment Security Act, that the Legislature has 
explicitly granted discretion to the Commission: 
. . . in the statute at issue here, the 
legislature's use of the language "unless 
it is shown to the satisfaction of the 
commission," Utah Code Ann. Section 35-4-
22(j)(5) (Supp. 1989), "if the 
[Commission determines that the] weight of 
the evidence supports that finding," id.. 
and "considered [by the Commission] if 
applicable," id., indicates an explicit 
grant of discretion to the Board. 
The Board is given latitude under the 
statutory language to weigh and analyze 
the applicability of each of the twenty 
factors to individual facts. The language 
in the statute bespeaks a legislative 
intent to delegate interpretation of that 
statute to the agency. Given that the 
legislature granted discretion to the 
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agency in interpreting Section 35-4-
22(j)(5), it is in a better position than 
the court to give effect to the 
legislative intent, and therefore, we will 
not disturb the Board's decision unless it 
is unreasonable. 
Tasters Ltd., Id. at 364-365. (Citations omitted.) 
B. THE BOARD'S APPLICATION OF THE FACTS TO THE 
A-T FACTORS WAS REASONABLE AND RATIONAL. 
Tasters argues that there was clear error on the part of 
the Board of Review in the way the Board of Review ranked the 
significance of particular factors and the Board's 
characterization of some factucil information as more important 
than other information. Clearly, however, the Legislature 
intended that the Board of Review do exactly what the Board 
has done in this case. The clear language of the statute 
implies that the only reasonable way to approach the twenty 
point test is to acknowledge that some factors apply to the 
fact situation more than others and that therefore some of 
the factors are more significant than others. While Tasters 
obviously disagrees with the Board of Review's 
characterization of the significance of certain factors and 
whether the facts as applied to a particular factor tend to 
indicate employee status or independent contractor status, the 
Board of Review's application of the facts at hand to each of 
the factors is not unreasonable and therefore should be upheld 
by this Court. 
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Tasters also argues that the Board of Review's decision 
is unreasonable because the Board "changed its conclusion in 
the application of 11 of 20 factors between the First and 
Second Decision." (Petitioner's Brief page 12) Tasters fails 
to note, however, that characterization of certain factors 
changed in the second decision as a result of being analyzed 
individually for significance (as required by this Court) as 
opposed to being analyzed by grouping factors together as was 
done in the First Decision. 
Tasters takes issue with the Board of Review's treatment 
of twelve of the twenty factors, claiming that the Board 
reached unreasonable conclusions and/or incomplete findings of 
fact on these factors. This Brief will therefore address each 
of these twelve factors. 
1. Factor E. Factor E requires the Board to examine 
"whether the individual has the right to hire, supervise, and 
pay other assistants pursuant to a contract under which the 
individual is responsible only for the attainment of the 
result or the individual hires, supervises, and pays workers 
at the direction of the employers". In the Board's First 
Decision, Factor E was grouped into the "third category of 
factors" which the Board found related to the issue of whether 
"a continuing personal relationship between employer-employee 
has been established, or alternately whether the relationship 
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was merely a discrete, job by job arrangement, in which 
performance is enforceable under contract law." 
When viewing all of these factors together, the Board of 
Review held that this category of factors tended to show that 
the relationship between Tasters and the demonstrators 
resembles that of an independent contractor relationship. 
When Factor E was examined independently, the factor was not 
found to support an independent contractor relationship but 
was found by the Board to be "not helpful" in determining the 
legal relationship of Tasters with its demonstrators. 
The reason that this factor is not helpful is because 
while the record shows that Tasters' demonstrators sometimes 
delegate their demonstrations to others, there is no 
indication in the record, other than conclusionary statements, 
elicited by Tasters1 counsel, that individual demonstrators 
hire, supervise, or pay other assistants pursuant to a 
contract with Tasters. Factor E anticipates a factual 
situation which is not in effect in the relationship between 
Tasters and its demonstrators. Factor E anticipates an 
employer giving an assignment to a worker which is then broken 
up for completion by numerous individuals. There is no 
showing in the record that any of the demonstrator witnesses 
hired, supervised or paid assistants pursuant to a contract 
with Tasters for an assignment which Tasters expected to be 
broken down for completion by numerous individuals. 
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Tasters' analysis of this factor in its Brief on pages 18 
through 21 apparently sees no distinction between Factor E and 
Factor D, but there is a distinction. Factor E implies an 
express understanding between the individual and its hiring 
body that the individual will hire others to complete tasks 
that the individual could not do alone. Factor D merely asks 
whether assignments can be delegated. The Board's 
determination that this factor is not helpful in determining 
the legal relationship between Tasters and its demonstrators 
is certainly reasonable. 
2. Factor I» Factor I requires the Board to determine 
"whether the individual uses his or her own office, desk, 
telephone or other equipment or is physically in the 
employer's direction and supervision". Tasters acknowledges 
that the Board's findings of fact with regard to this factor 
are correct, that the demonstrators neither work at their own 
site of business or at Tasters' site of business. Tasters 
disagrees, however, with the Board's conclusion that this 
factor is not useful in determining whether the demonstrators 
are independent contractors or employees. Tasters argues that 
since the demonstrators are not physically within Tasters' 
direction and supervision, that this factor shows independent 
contractor status. This conclusion is unwarranted. Again, 
the unique work situation between Tasters and its 
demonstrators makes the application of this factor useless. 
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The factor requires an examination of whether the individual 
works at his/her own place of business or at the place of 
business of the employer. In this case, since the work place 
is at an independent brokers1 store, owned and operated 
neither by Tasters or by the demonstrators, the Board of 
Review reasonably concluded that this factor was not useful in 
determining whether or not the legal relationship between 
Tasters and its demonstrators was that of an employer-employee 
or whether its demonstrators were independent contractors. 
3. Factor J. Factor J requires the Board to determine 
"whether the individual is free to perform services at his or 
her own pace or perform services in the order or sequence set 
by the employer". Tasters points out that the Board of 
Review's First Decision held that Factor J indicated employee 
status and that in the Board's Second Decision the Board 
concluded that Factor J was "not helpful". It should be noted 
again that Factor J was grouped with several other factors in 
the Board's analysis in its First Decision and that only later 
when it was viewed alone, did the Board specify that the 
factor was not helpful in reaching its determination that the 
demonstrators were employees. 
Tasters argues that there is no evidence in the record 
that "there is no pacing", and cites several quotes from 
demonstrators saying that they set their own pace in 
performing their work. 
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As explained in its Second Decision, the Board of Review 
pointed out that it makes no sense to talk about the 
demonstrators pacing their work as the demonstrators are not 
given quotas for product dispersed and their work is not 
result-oriented. The demonstrators are required merely to 
hand out samples during a certain time period. It was not 
unreasonable of the Board of Review with the evidence in the 
record of what Tasters1 demonstrators do, to conclude that 
there is no pacing involved in the demonstrators1 work and 
that the factor therefore is not useful in determining whether 
the demonstrators are employees or independent contractors. 
This conclusion was not unreasonable nor was it based on 
insufficient factual information as it was based on the 
demonstrators' own account of their job. 
4. Factor S. Factor S requires the Board to determine 
"whether the individual may not be fired or discharged as long 
as he produces a result which meets contract specifications or 
may be discharged at any time". The Board of Review agrees 
with Tasters' marshalling of evidence under this factor. 
Tasters' contract with its demonstrators is a simple one. As 
long as a demonstration is completed, the demonstrator is 
paid in full. There is no indication in the record that 
Tasters ever stopped a demonstration after the first few 
hours and fired a demonstrator without paying the full 
demonstration fee. Since Tasters has no supervisors at the 
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work site, there is little to no chance that a demonstrator 
would be terminated prior to the completion of his or her 
contract period. It is for this reason that the Board 
concluded that Factor S is not useful in determining whether 
Tasters• demonstrators are independent contractors or 
employees. Again, the Board did not unreasonably change the 
characterization of this factor between its First Decision and 
its Second Decision. The Board merely clarified the lack of 
importance of this factor in its Second Decision when Factor S 
was viewed singly as opposed to being analyzed in a group of 
factors as was done in the Board's First Decision. 
5. Factor T. Factor T requires the Board to determine 
"whether the individual agrees to complete a specific service, 
and is responsible for its satisfaction or is legally 
obligated to perform the service, or may terminate his or her 
relationship with the employer at any time". The Board's 
analysis under Factor T is essentially the same as that under 
Factor S. Because of the short, very simple terms of the 
contract between the demonstrator and Tasters, mid-contract 
rifts never have and for all practical purposes are unlikely 
to occur. The Board of Review was reasonable in concluding 
that the facts as applied to this factor were not useful in 
determining whether the demonstrators were independent 
contractors or employees. 
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6. Factor A, Factor A requires the Board to determine 
"whether the individual works his or her own schedule or is 
required to comply with another person's instructions about 
when, where and how work is to be performed". Tasters agrees 
with the Board of Review's factual findings that 
demonstrators are free to turn down any demonstrations that 
they choose, but that if they agree to accept a demonstration, 
when and where that demonstration occurs is set not by the 
demonstrator but by the broker. By accepting a demonstration, 
the individual demonstrator agrees to demonstrate product for 
a certain period of time at certain hours. The demonstrator 
is provided with a list of "Very Important Things To Remember" 
from Tasters. Tasters argues that this list of "Very 
Important Things To Remember" are suggestions, not 
requirements and that, therefore, the Board of Review has 
unreasonably determined that facts analyzed under this factor 
tend to show employee status for the demonstrators. Any 
reasonable person, however, understands that when the entity 
that signs your pay check gives you written instructions, they 
are requirements of the job, not merely suggestions. Because 
the individual demonstrators are required to comply with 
either Tasters' or the broker's instructions about when and 
where the work is to be performed and because they are given 
specific guidelines about how the work is to be performed, it 
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was certainly reasonable of the Board of Review to conclude 
that Factor A tends to indicate employee status. 
7. Factor B. Factor B requires the Board to decide 
"whether the individual uses his or her own methods and 
requires no specific training from the purchaser, or is 
trained by an experienced employee working with him or her, is 
required to take correspondence or other courses, attend 
meetings, or by other means indicates that the employer wants 
the service performed". 
While Tasters does not make the classroom or seminar 
training it provides mandatory, Tasters does provide 
orientation training and specific product training for those 
demonstrators who want it. Tasters argues that since the 
brokers pay for this training, it (Tasters) does not provide 
training. Tasters also claims that since training is not 
mandatory, this shows the demonstrators are independent 
skilled workers who bring their own special previously honed 
techniques to their demonstrations. Both of these arguments 
are without merit. If demonstrators do not need a great deal 
of training, it is because the work required of them is risk-
free, simple, and non-technical so that most anyone can do it 
either without instruction or with only the instruction 
Tasters provides in its list of "Very Important Things To 
Remember." In the case of special new products, training is 
provided by Tasters, as Tasters is the provider and organizer 
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even though a broker pays for the training. It was 
* 
reasonable, therefore, for the Board of Review to conclude 
that the facts analyzed under this factor tend to show that 
Tasters' demonstrators are employees. 
8. Factor C. Factor C requires the Board to decide 
"whether or not the individual's services are independent of 
the success or continuation of a business or are merged into 
the business where success and continuation of the business 
depends upon those services and the employer coordinates work 
with the work of others". 
Tasters disingenuously argues that there is no evidence 
in the record to show that the success and continuation of 
Tasters' business depends on the demonstrators' services or 
that Tasters coordinates individual demonstrators' work with 
the work of others. Tasters' business is to supply 
demonstrators to brokers for use in the brokers' stores. Cohn 
testified that Tasters hires only a few office personnel to 
coordinate the work of approximately 2,000 demonstrators. 
Tasters directs individual demonstrators to go to specific 
stores and provide demonstrations. Tasters does nothing but 
coordinate the work of the individual demonstrators to cover 
the needs of their client broker stores. The success and 
continuation of its business is entirely dependant upon the 
demonstrators' services. It was therefore reasonable for the 
Board of Review to conclude that the facts as analyzed against 
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this factor weighed in favor of employee status for the 
demonstrators. 
9. Factor G. Factor G requires the Board to determine 
"whether the individual establishes his or her own time 
schedule or does the employer set the time schedule". There 
is no factual dispute with regard to this factor. The Board 
concedes that demonstrations are set by the broker stores for 
times of highest volume of consumer traffic in their stores. 
It is not the individual demonstrators who set the time for 
these demonstrations, but Tasters1 own client stores. While 
Tasters does not set the time frame for each demonstration, it 
is clear that the individual demonstrators do not either. 
Tasters' business is to provide demonstrators as needed to its 
customer stores. Providing this service in a timely fashion 
is something Tasters contracts to do for its clients. The 
clients' time demands are therefore assumed by Tasters in 
providing its service. Since Tasters' client stores set the 
time frame for demonstrations, it was reasonable of the Board 
to conclude that this factor tended to show employee status. 
Again, the Board of Review does not dispute Tasters' 
characterization of the facts that individual demonstrators 
can turn down any demonstration offered to them. Simply 
because they refuse individual jobs does not mean that they 
set the schedule for the demonstrations. Being a 
demonstrator for Tasters is convenient, flexible part-time 
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work because demonstrators can turn down individual 
assignments. They cannot, however, set their own 
demonstrations but work when there are demonstrations 
available at times that mesh with their own schedules, 
10. Factor M. Factor M requires the Board to determine 
"whether the individual accounts for his or her own expenses 
or is paid by the employer for the expenses". 
Employer witness, Cohn, testified on page 215 of the 
record: 
We were demonstrating tortillas that were 
simply to be warmed in a fry pan and 
lightly buttered, cut into serving pieces 
and sampled; and I got a call from a 
demonstrator in Kemmerer, Wyoming, who 
said she had used peanut butter and jelly 
and was concerned, would she get her 
supply money back; and we had talked about 
it and I said, "Well, did you sell 
tortillas?" and she said nobody would buy 
them because people in Kemmerer didn't 
know about tortillas at that time, but she 
decided to make peanut butter and jelly 
sandwiches and then she sold out; and we 
just kind of laughed about it and I said, 
you know, "I'm sending the bill. Of 
course, you'll be paid, why not?", but 
it's a very simple kind of a situation. 
What works for you, do it; and if you're 
successful, that's all we want is a 
successful demonstration for our store, 
for our client. . . . 
Cohn's testimony raises two interesting points. First, that 
the demonstrators are supposed to be demonstrating tortillas 
"warmed in a fry pan and lightly buttered, cut into serving 
pieces and sampled", indicates much more specific instructions 
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from Tasters to demonstrators than Cohn admitted to in other 
portions of her testimony. More importantly, with regard to 
analysis under Factor M, it is clear that Cohn acknowledged 
Tasters1 authority to approve or disapprove questionable 
costs. Also see record at 526. The fact that incidental 
items and expenses are paid by the broker or the store is not 
determinative to the Board in this instance because Tasters is 
the one who has control over whether its client pays for the 
expenses or not. It was therefore reasonable for the Board to 
conclude that analysis under this factor tends to indicate 
employee status. 
11. Factor 0. Factor 0 requires the Board to determine 
"whether the individual has a real, essential, and adequate 
investment in the business or has a lack of investment and 
depends on the employer for such facilities". The Board of 
Review does not dispute Tasters1 proposed factual finding that 
the demonstrators' equipment would cost between $50 and $200 
if purchased new. The demonstrators testified, though, that 
they had much of the equipment in their own households prior 
to working for Tasters. R. 153, 188. It was reasonable for 
the Board to find that the facts analyzed under this factor 
tend to show that individual demonstrators do not have, as a 
rule a real essential and adequate investment in the 
demonstration business. Tasters' calculations that the 
demonstrators' outlay for equipment is significant in view of 
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their income implies that most of the demonstrators spent 
$200 to get started up as demonstrators. This is not borne 
out by the record. Since the demonstrators do not have 
significant investment in the demonstration business, and 
since they depend on Tasters to send them to a facility where 
demonstrations can be performed, it was reasonable of the 
Board to conclude that the facts analyzed under this factor 
tend to show employee status. 
12. Factor P. Factor P requires the Board to determine 
"whether the individual may realize a profit or suffer a loss 
as a result of services performed or cannot realize a profit 
or loss by making good or poor decisions". 
Tasters presented no credible evidence that individual 
demonstrators enjoyed or had the possibility of making any 
financial gains working as demonstrators other than the wage 
they earned working the set hours prescribed for each 
demonstration. Tasters1 counsel did elicit testimony from a 
demonstrator, Colmere (R. 194), however, that she would be 
personally liable for an injury or accident resulting from her 
negligence while working as a demonstrator. Tasters argues 
that this testimony demonstrates that individual demonstrators 
could suffer a loss by making poor decisions, thereby 
indicating independent contractor status for the 
demonstrators. The testimony admitting personal liability is 
a legal conclusion on the part of the witness giving the 
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testimony, a conclusion the witness has not been shown 
qualified to make. Furthermore, Tasters1 argument on this 
point is circular: Individual demonstrators are independent 
contractors as shown by their willingness to assume personal 
liability in case of accidents and since individual 
demonstrators are personally liable for injury or accidents 
resulting from their work as demonstrators, they are 
independent contractors as analyzed under Factor P of the 
twenty factor test. 
Tasters' evidence on this issue is neither competent nor 
relevant in establishing that demonstrators can suffer losses 
by making poor decisions. The most significant facts as 
analyzed under this factor are that the record shows that the 
only remuneration individual demonstrators received from 
their demonstrations is their set fee figured on an hourly 
basis. They, therefore, enjoy no profits and suffer no loss 
as a result of the services they perform. The Board of Review 
was reasonable in reaching its conclusion that analysis under 
this factor tends to establish that individual demonstrators 
are employees. 
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POINT III 
OTHER FACTORS TENDING TO SHOW THAT THE BOARD OF RE-
VIEW* S DECISION WAS REASONABLE AND RATIONAL. 
According to the wording of Section 35-4-22(j)(5) 
[35-4-22.3(3)], all individuals who enter into agreement to 
perform services for wages are presumed to be employees. The 
reason for this presumption rests in the underlying objective 
of the Utah Employment Security Act: to provide financial 
stability to the economy itself and to workers who lose their 
jobs through no fault of their own, (See Section 35-4-2, Utah 
Employment Security Act.) For the beneficent results of the 
Act to be accomplished, the majority of workers must be 
covered by the Act. Therefore, for purposes of the Act, the 
employer-employee relationship, the one covered by the Act, 
is presumed unless it is clearly shown "to the satisfaction of 
the commission" another working relationship exists. If the 
Board is to err in either direction, towards employee status 
or independent contractor status, the Legislature has clearly 
guided the Board of Review towards erring in favor of finding 
employee status. Only in cases where independent contractor 
status is clearly shown is the presumption that an employer-
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employee relationship exists to be put aside and the Board to 
conclude that an independent contractor relationship exists.1 
POINT IV 
THE BOARD OF REVIEW DID NOT EXCEED THE SCOPE OF 
THE REMAND ORDER FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS, AS 
SUGGESTED BY TASTERS. 
This Court's objection to the Board's First Decision is 
that the Board of Review failed to provide enough factual 
information and analysis for the Court of Appeals to 
determine which factors were considered by the Board to be 
significant and which were considered to be insignificant. 
"No findings were made as to why some of the factors were 
insignificant, while others were considered significant. This 
1
 The Board of Review's ultimate decision that Tasters' 
demonstrators are employees is not inherently unreasonable, as 
claimed by Tasters. Tasters and other demonstration services 
that send workers to client stores which are not owned or 
operated by the demonstration service continue to argue to the 
Board of Review and to this Court that since the demonstrators 
are not on their property or under their direction and control 
while working, those demonstrators are independent 
contractors. But Tasters' arrangement with its demonstrators 
is very similar to temporary employment agencies who "lend 
their employees to other employers". 
Section 35-4-22.1(6) of the Act provides that when the 
temporary employment agency or loaning employer delegates its 
right to instruct and control its workers to the employers 
where the temporary workers work, the worker remains the 
employee of the temporary employment agency. Since a work 
situation similar to Tasters' arrangement with its 
demonstrators is outlined elsewhere in the Act with the 
statutory conclusion that those workers remain the employees 
of the loaning employer, this tends to indicate that Tasters' 
demonstrators are employees and not independent contractors. 
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analysis was in err.11 Tasters Ltd. v. Department of 
Employment Security, supra.. at 367. 
This Court therefore remanded the matter to the Board of 
Review to make "subsidiary findings made in sufficient detail 
on all necessary issues so that we may determine if 'there is 
a logical and legal basis for the ultimate conclusion1". 
Id., at 368. 
Tasters argues that the Board of Review did more than 
just make subsidiary findings of fact in its Second Decision 
and issued an entirely new decision in error. This is not the 
case. The Board of Review issued the same decision it made 
before, i.e. that Tasters1 demonstrators are employees and not 
independent contractors. The Board of Review gave a factor by 
factor analysis, however, in its Second Decision to explain 
what factors it considered significant and what factors it 
considered insignificant in reaching its ultimate conclusion, 
as directed by this Court. 
Tasters argues repeatedly throughout its Brief that the 
Board of Review's Second Decision is inherently unreasonable 
because factors were shifted with regard to significance 
between the First Decision and the Second Decision. Those 
shifts occurred, as already pointed out in this Brief, not 
because the Board of Review changed its mind with regard to 
particular factors, but because when viewed individually 
instead of as groups of factors, the factors were given 
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individual attention and accordingly given their appropriate 
significance. 
POINT V 
THE BOARD OF REVIEW CORRECTLY MADE ITS DECISION 
ON THE BASIS OF ITS APPLICATION OF SECTION 35-4-
22(j)(5) [35-4-22.3(3)] WITHOUT REFERENCE TO 
PREVIOUS IRS DETERMINATIONS, AS REQUIRED BY LAW. 
Tasters reiterates its old argument that the Board of 
Review's decision is inherently unreasonable because it 
contradicted an IRS ruling that the demonstrators were 
independent contractors. Tasters argues "it is unreasonable 
for a small business to be told by the State that when it uses 
the same test as the IRS (which the State followed in creating 
the test), that the State came to a different conclusion". 
(See page 46 of Petitioners Brief.) Tasters cites no law, 
rule, or precedential case suggesting the Commission is bound 
in any way by a previous decision by the Internal Revenue 
Service. The Commission is instead directed to review the 
facts as presented before the Administrative Law Judge and to 
measure them against the twenty factor test of Section 35-4-
22(j)(5) [35-4-22.3(3)]. This the Board of Review has done. 
Its decision disregarding any previous IRS ruling was 
reasonable and rational and should be affirmed by this Court. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Board of Review's application of Section 35-4-
22(j)(5) [35-4-22.3(3)] to the facts of this case was 
reasonable and rational. The Board of Review, therefore, 
respectfully requests that this Court affirm the Board's 
decision and that Petitioner's request for attorney fees be 
disregarded as frivolous. 
Respectfully submitted this day of February, 1993. 
EMMA R. THOMAS 
Attorney for Respondents 
Board of Review of the 
Industrial Commission 
of Utah, Department of 
Employment Security 
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APPENDIX A (Page 1) 
TITLE HI. 
REVIEW AND ENFORCEMENT OF ORDERS OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES, COMMIS-
SIONS, AND COMMITTEES 
Rule 14. Review of administrative orders: how obtained; 
intervention. 
(a) Petition for review of order; joint petition. When judicial review by 
the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals is provided by statute of an order 
or decision of an administrative agency, board, commission, committee, or 
officer (hereinafter the term "agency" shall include agency, board, commis-
sion, committee, or officer), a petition for review shall be filed with the clerk of 
the appellate court within the time prescribed by statute, or if there is no time 
prescribed, then within 30 days after the date of the written decision or order. 
The term "petition for review" includes a petition to enjoin, set aside, suspend, 
modify, or otherwise review a notice of appeal or a writ of certiorari. The 
petition shall specify the parties seeking review and shall designate the re-
spondents) and the order or decision, or part thereof, to be reviewed. In each 
case, the agency shall be named respondent. The State of Utah shall be 
deemed a respondent if so required by statute, even though not so designated 
in the petition. If two or more persons are entitled to petition for review of the 
same order and their interests are such as to make joinder practicable, they 
may file a joint petition for review and may thereafter proceed as a single 
petitioner. 
(b) Statutory and docketing fees. At the time of filing any petition for 
review, the party obtaining the review shall pay to the clerk of the appellate 
court such filing fees as are established by law, and also the fee for docketing 
the appeal. The clerk shall not accept a petition for review unless the filing 
and docketing fees are paid. 
(c) Service of petition. A copy of the petition for review shall be served by 
the petitioner on the named respondent(s), upon all other parties to the pro-
ceeding before the agency, and upon the Attorney General of Utah, if the state 
is a party, in the manner prescribed by Rule 3(e). The petitioner, at the time of 
filing the petition for review, shall also file with the clerk of the appellate 
court a certificate reflecting service upon all parties to the agency proceeding 
who have been served. 
(d) Intervention. Any person who seeks to intervene in a proceeding under 
this rule shall serve upon all parties to the proceeding and upon all parties 
who participated before the agency, and file with the clerk of the appellate 
court a motion for leave to intervene. The motion shall contain a concise 
statement of the interest of the moving party and the grounds upon which 
intervention is sought. A motion for leave to intervene shall be filed within 40 
days of the date on which the petition for review is filed. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
0... 
f Am. Jur. 2d. — 2 Am. Jur. 2d Administra- lar body to appeal reversal of its decision, 13 
the Law § 553 et seq. AL.R.4th 1130. 
A.L.R. — Court review of bar examiners' de- Judicial review of administrative ruling af-
pliion on applicant's examination, 39 A.L.R.3d fecting conduct or outcome of publicly regu-
tt* . . . lated horse, dog, or motor vehicle race, 36 
Standing of civic or property owners associa- A.L R.4th 1169. 
Son to challenge zoning board decision (as asr-
Utah 
Employment Security Act 
Chapter 35-4 
35-4-1 Short Title. 
This chapter is known as the "Employment Security Act." 
35-4-2 Public Policy. 
As a guide to the interpretation and application of this act, the public 
policy of this state is declared to be as follows: Economic insecurity due to 
unemployment is a serious menace to the health, morals, and welfare of the 
people of this state. Unemployment is therefore a subject of general interest 
and concern which requires appropriate action by the Legislature to 
prevent its spread and to lighten its burden which now so often falls with 
crushing force upon the unemployed worker and his family. The achieve-
ment of social security requires protection against this greatest hazard of 
our economic life. This objective can be furthered by operating free public 
employment offices in affiliation with a nation-wide system of employment 
services, by devising appropriate methods for reducing the volume of 
unemployment and by the systematic accumulation of funds during periods 
of employment from which benefits may be paid for periods of unemploy-
ment, thus maintaining purchasing power and limiting the serious social 
consequences of unemployment. The Legislature, therefore, declares that 
in its considered judgment the public good, and the general welfare of the 
citizens of this state require the enactment of this measure, under the police 
power of the state, for the establishment and maintenance of free public 
employment offices and for the compulsory setting aside of unemployment 
reserves to be used for the benefit of unemployed persons. 
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SECTION 35-4-10(1), UTAH EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT 
Appeals to Supreme Court. 
(i) Within ten days after the decision of the board of review has 
become final, any aggrieved party may secure judicial review by com-
mencing an action in the court of appeals against the board of review for the 
review of its decision in which action any other party to the proceeding 
before the board of review shall be made a defendant. In that action a 
petition which shall state the grounds upon which a review is sought shall be 
served upon a member of the board of review or upon that person the board 
of review designates. This service is considered completed service on all 
parties but there shall be left with the party served as many copies of the 
petition as there are defendants and the board of review shall mail one copy 
to each defendant. With its answer, the board of review shall certify and file 
with the court all documents and papers and a transcript of all testimony 
taken in the matter together with its findings of fact and decision. The board 
of review may also, in its discretion, certify to the court questions of law 
involved in any decision by it. In any judicial proceeding under this section, 
the findings of the commission and the board of review as to the facts, if 
supported by evidence, are conclusive and the jurisdiction of the court is 
confined to questions of law. It is not necessary in any judicial proceeding 
under this section to enter exceptions to the rulings of the commission or 
the board of review and no bond is required for entering the appeal. Upon 
final determination of the judicial proceeding, the commission shall enter an 
oTder in accordance with the determination. In no event may a petition for 
judicial review act as a supersedeas. 
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Localized Service Defined. 
0) (4) Service is considered to be localized within a state if: 
(j) (4) (A) the service is performed entirely within the state; or 
(j) (4) (B) the service is performed both within and without the state, 
but the service performed without the state is incidental to the individual's 
service within the state, for example, is temporary or transitory in nature or 
consists of isolated transactions. 
ABC Test of Employment. 
0) (5) Services performed by an individual for wages or under any 
contract of hire, written or oral, express or implied, are considered to be 
employment subject to this chapter, unless it is shown to the satisfaction of 
the commission that the individual is an independent contractor. The 
commission shall analyze all of the facts in Subsections (A) through (T) 
under the common-law rules applicable to the employer-employee relation-
ship to determine if an individual is an independent contractor. An individual 
is an independent contractor if the weight of the evidence supports that 
finding. The following factors are to be considered if applicable: 
G) (5) (A) whether the individual works his or her own schedule, or is 
required to comply with another person's instructions about when, where, 
and how work is to be performed; 
0) (5) (B) whether the individual uses his or her own methods and 
requires no specific training from the purchaser, or is trained by an 
experienced employee working with him or her, is required to take 
correspondence or other courses, attend meetings, and by other methods 
indicates that the employer wants the services performed; 
0) (5) (C) whether the individual's services are independent of the 
succsess or continuation of a business, or are merged into the business 
where success and continuation of the business depends upon those 
services and the employer coordinates work with the work of others; 
0) (5) (D) whether the individual's services may be assigned to ot hers, 
or must be rendered personally; 
0) (5) (E) whether the individual has the right to hire, supervise, and 
pay other assistants pursuant to a contract under which the individual is 
responsible only for the attainment of a result, or the individual hires, 
supervises, and pays workers at the direction of the employer; 
(j) (5) (F) whether the individual was hired to do one job and has no 
continuous business relationship with the person for whom the services are 
performed, or continues to work for the same person year after year; 
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35-4-22 
(j) (5) (G) whether the individual establishes his or her own time 
schedule, or does the employer set the time schedule; 
(j) (5) (H) whether the individual is free to work when and for whom he 
or she chooses, or is required to devote full-time to the business of the 
employer, and is restricted from doing other gainful work; 
0) (5) (0 whether the individual uses his or her own office, desk, 
telephone, or other equipment, or is physically within the employer's 
direction and supervision; 
0) (5) (J) whether the individual is free to perform services at his or 
her own pace, or performs services in the order or sequence set by the 
employer; 
(j) (5) (K) whether the individual submits no reports, or is required to 
submit regular oral or written reports to the employer; 
(j) (5) (L) whether the individual is paid by the job or on a straight 
commission, or is paid by the employer in regular amounts at stated 
intervals; 
0) (5) (M) whether the individual accounts for his or her own 
expenses, or is paid by the employer for expenses; 
(j) (5) (N) whether the individual furnishes his or her own tools, or is 
furnished tools and materials by the employer; 
0) (5) (O) whether the individual has a real, essential, and adequate 
investment in the business, or has a lack of investment and depends on the 
employer for such facilities; 
(j) (5) (P) whether the individual may realize a profit or suffer a loss as 
a result of services performed, or cannot realize a profit or loss by making 
good or poor decisions; 
0) (5) (Q) whether the individual works for a number of persons or 
firms at the same time, or usually works for only one employer; 
0) (5) (R) whether the individual has his or her own office and 
assistants, holds a business license, is listed in business directories, 
maintains a business telephone, or advertises in newspapers, or does not 
make services available except through a business in which he or she has no 
interest; 
(j) (5) (S) whether the individual may not be fired or discharged as 
long as he or she produces a result which meets contract specifications, or 
may be discharged at any time; and 
0) (5) (T) whether the individual agrees to complete a specific service, 
and is responsible for its satisfaction or is legally obligated to perform the 
service, or may terminate his or her relationship with the employer at any 
time. 
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35-4-22.1. Employing units. 
(1) "Employing unit" means any individual or type of organization includ-
ing any partnership, association, trust, estate, joint stock company, insurance 
company, or corporation, whether domestic or foreign, or the receiver, trustee 
in bankruptcy, trustee or successor of any of the foregoing, or the legal repre-
sentative of a deceased person, which has or subsequent to January 1, 1935, 
had one or more individuals performing services for it within this state. 
(2) All individuals performing services within this state for any employing 
unit which maintains two or more separate establishments within this state 
are considered to be performing services for a single employing unit for all the 
purposes of this chapter. 
(3) Each individual employed to perform or to assist in performing the work 
of any person in the service of an employing unit is considered to be engaged 
by the employing unit for all the purposes of this chapter whether the individ-
ual was hired or paid directly by the employing unit or by the person, provided 
the employing unit had actual or constructive knowledge of the work. 
(4) "Hospital9* means an institution which is licensed, certified, oir approved 
by the Department of Health as a hospital. 
(5) "Institution of higher education," for the purposes of this section, means 
an educational institution which: 
(a) (i) admits, as regular students only, individuals having a certificate 
of graduation from a high school or the recognized equivalent of a 
certificate; 
(ii) is legally authorized in this state to provide a program of edu-
cation beyond high school,; 
(iii) provides an educational program for which it awards a bache-
lor's or higher degree, or provides a program which is acceptable for 
full credit toward that degree, a program of postgraduate or postdoc-
toral studies, or a program of training to prepare students for gainful 
employment in a recognized occupation; and 
(iv) is a public or other nonprofit institution. 
(b) All colleges and universities in this state are institutions of higher 
education for purposes of this section. 
(6) (a) 'Temporary services employer" or "leasing employer** is an employ-
ing unit that contracts with clients or customers to supply workers to 
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perform services for the client or customer and directly or indirectly per-
forms the following functions: 
(i) negotiates with clients or customers for matters such as time, 
place, type of work, working conditions, quality, and price of the 
services; 
(ii) determines assignments or reassignments of workers even 
though workers retain the right to refuse specific assignments; 
(iii) retains the authority to assign or reassign a worker to other 
clients or customers when a worker is determined unacceptable by a 
specific client or customer; 
(iv) sets the rate of pay of the worker whether or not through 
negotiation; 
(v) pays the worker from its own account; and 
(vi) retains the right to hire and terminate workers. 
(b) If an individual or entity contracts to supply an employee to per* 
form services for a customer or client and is a leasing employer or a 
temporary services employer, the individual or entity is the employer of 
the employee who performs the services. If the individual or entity is not 
a leasing employer or a temporary services employer, it pays the wages as 
the agent of the employer. 
(c) In circumstances in which an employee is loaned from one employer 
to another employer, and direction and control of the manner and means 
of performing the services changes to the employer to whom the employee 
is loaned, the loaning employer shall continue to be the employer of the 
employee if the loaning employer continues to pay the employee, whether 
or not reimbursed by the other employer. If the employer to whom the 
employee is loaned pays the employee for the services performed, that 
employer is considered the employer for the purposes of any remuneration 
paid to the employee by that employer, regardless of whether the loaning 
employer also pays remuneration to the employee. 
History: C. 1953, 35-4-22.1, enacted by L. came effective on April 29, 1991, pursuant to 
1991, ch. 174, I 16. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1991, ch. 174 be-
nrrcnuiA ^rage s ; 
63-46b-16 STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL 
(b) The Utah Rules of Evidence apply injudicial proceedings under thia 
section. 
History: C. 1963,63-46b-15, enacted by L. according to the standards of Subsection 
1987, ch. 181, i 271; 1988, ch. 72, J 26. 63-46b-16(4r at the end in Subsection a J S 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend- and made minor stylistic changes, 
ment, effective April 26, 1988, deleted "except Effective Dates. - Laws 1987, ch lai 
that final agency action from informal a^judi- j
 3 1 6 m a k c a ^ ac t effective on Januarvi 
cative proceedings based on a record shall be 1933 * *• 
reviewed by the district courts on the record 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Function of district court the district court will no longer function as in* 
Section 63-46b-16(l) provides that all final termediate appellate court except to review in-
agency decisions through formal adjudicative formal adjudicative proceedings de novo pursu-
proceedings will be reviewed by the Utah Su- ant to Subsection (lXa) of this section. In re 
preme Court or Court of Appeals. Therefore, Topik, 761 P.2d 32 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
63-46b-16. Judicial review — Formal adjudicative pro* 
ceedings. 
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court oif Appeals has 
jurisdiction to review all final agency action resulting from formal acjjudica-
tive proceedings. 
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review of 
agency action with the appropriate appellate court in the form required 
by the appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court. 
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern 
all additional filings and proceedings in the appellate court. 
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial 
review of formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, except that: 
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten, sum-
marize, or organize the record; 
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and 
copies for the record: 
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to 
shorten, summarize, or organize the record; or 
(ii) according to any other provision of law. 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's 
record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substan-
tially prejudiced by any of the following: 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action 
is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied; 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any stat-
ute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law; 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-mak-
ing process, or has failed to follow prescribed procedure; 
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(0 the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a 
decision-making body or were subject to disqualification; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or 
implied by the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when 
viewed in light of the whole record before the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justi-
fies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a 
fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 
History: C. 1953,63-46b-18, enacted by L. appellate court" in Subsection (2)(a); and sub-
i(67f ch. 161, i 272; 1988, ch. 72, 5 28. stituted "appellate rules of the appropriate ap-
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend- pellate court" for "Utah Rules of Appellate Pro-
ment, effective April 25,1988, substituted "As cedure" in Subsections (2)(a) and (2Kb), 
provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Effective Dates. — Laws 1987, ch. 161, 
frurt of Appeals" for 'The Supreme Court or 5
 3 1 5 m a k e 8 t h e a c t effective on January 1, 
#ther appellate court designated by statute in jggg 
9ubsection (1); inserted Vith the appropriate 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
function of district court trict court will no longer function as intermedin 
Subsection (1) provides that all final agency ate appellate court except to review informal 
decisions through formal adjudicative proceed* adjudicative proceedings de novo pursuant to 
lags will be reviewed by the Utah Supreme i 63-46b-15UXa). In re Topik, 761 P.2d 32 
Court or Court of Appeals. Therefore, the dia- (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
63-46M7. Judicial review — Type of relief• 
(1) (a) In either the review of informal adjudicative proceedings by the 
district court or the review of formal adjudicative proceedings by an ap-
pellate court, the court may award damages or compensation only to the 
extent expressly authorized by statute. 
(b) In granting relief, the court may: 
(i) order agency action required by law; 
(ii) order the agency to exercise its discretion as required by law; 
(iii) set aside or modify agency action; 
(iv) enjoin or stay the effective date of agency action; or 
(v) remand the matter to the agency for further proceedings. 
(2) Decisions on petitions for judicial review of final agency action are re-
viewable by a higher court, if authorized by statute. 
History: C. 1953,63-46b«17, enacted by L. 5 315 makes the act effective on January 1, 
W87, ch. 161, ( 273. ' ' 1988. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1987, ch. i61, 
JOB 
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State of Utah 
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY 
of the Industrial Commission of Utah 
1234 South Main Street • P.O. Box 11800 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84147-0800 
(801) 533-2231 
August 31, 1989 
Tasters Ltd Inc. 
1381 East 2100 South #B 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105-3753 
Dear Ms. Cohn: 
This Declaratory Order is in response to a request for a ruling we 
received to determine the status of coverage for unemployment purposes of 
individuals performing services as in-store product demonstrators beginning 
January 1, 1989. 
This letter constitutes a formal determination in accordance with the 
provisions of the Utah Employment Security Act, Section 35-4-22(j)(5) (see 
attachment). It is the determination of this Department that Beverly Jean 
Nelson, Viola Coleman, Eve Baird, Effie Roberts, Pat Colmere, Elayne Belrose and 
Clara Ross are employees of Tasters Ltd Inc. as defined by the Utah Employment 
Security Act. Additionally, other individuals working under the same 
relationship as those above named would also be considered employees. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS; 
According to the information we received, Tasters is in the business of 
providing personnel on a part-time, on call basis for in-store product 
demonstrations. The demonstrators perform their services in retail grocery and 
department stores at the request of food brokers, food representatives, and food 
principals. 
Tasters provides orientation training for the demonstrators and 
provides general guidelines for their performance. The demonstrators are 
occasionally given specialized training at the request of the Tasters clients. 
Tasters retains the right to change the methods used by the demonstrators to 
conform to the clients needs. The demonstrators cure supervised by Tasters to 
insure that they perform their services satisfactorily. 
Tasters maintains a list of demonstrators who are willing to perform 
product demonstration services on a regularly scheduled basis. The demonstrators 
are free to accept or reject any offer of work. However, the demonstrators in 
essence are required to follow a routine or schedule established by Tasters, in 
that once a demonstrator accepts a job, Tasters dictates the time and place at 
which the demonstrator performs the services. 
Tasters doss not provide any materials or equipment needed by the 
demonstrator. The demonstrator is required to provide equipment and supplies 
Tasters Ltd. Inc. 
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such as a card table, electric frying pan, plastic table cloths, apron, tongs, 
spoons, knives, cutting board, can openers, extension cord, etc. Tasters 
reimburses the demonstrators for some of these expenses. It is understood that 
the demonstrators will perform their services personally and do not hire any 
helpers. 
The demonstrators perform their services in various retail stores on a 
part-time basis. They are paid on an hourly basis. They are not eligible to 
receive any benefits, but Tasters does carry worker's compensation insurance 
coverage on them. 
Tasters retains the right to discharge the demonstrators in that they 
will not contact the demonstrator for another job if the demonstrator does a poor 
job. The demonstrators retain the right to terminate their services at any time. 
The demonstrators do not have a financial investment in Tasters, or any other 
business of a similar nature. 
REASONING: 
Whether an individual is an independent contractor or em employee is 
determined upon consideration of the facts and the application of the law in each 
case. The twenty factors referred to in the section of the Utah Employment 
Security Act noted in the first paragraph of this letter (see attachment) are 
used to determine whether there is sufficient control present to establish an 
employer-employee relationship. Each factor is to be "weighted11 according to the 
degree of it's importance depending on the occupation and the actual context in 
which services are performed. 
If the relationship of an employer and employee exists, the 
designation or description of the parties as anything other than that of employer 
and employee is immaterial. Thus, if such relationship exists, it is of no 
consequence that the employee is designated as a partner, agent, independent 
contractor, or the like. Any verbal or written agreement which labels a worker 
in any of the above mentioned categories, when the relationship is essentially 
employment, effectively waives an individual\s rights to unemployment insurance 
benefits. Such agreements are considered void pursuant to Section 35-4-}8(a) of 
the Utah Employment Security Act. Also, the Utah Supreme Court has stated in 
numerous decisions that such agreements whether verbal or written are 
ineffective in removing an individual from the protection of the Utah Employment 
Security Act when by their own actions they bring themselves within (Leach vs. 
Industrial Commission 123 Utah 423 260 P.2d. 477 1953 and Creameries of America 
vs. Industrial Commission 98 Utah 571 102 P.2d. 300 1940). 
We have also reviewed the specific letter of exemption from the 
Internal Revenue Service concerning the services of Lynda Jones. Such a letter 
of exemption is of value to this Department in providing some direction in our 
review prior to the issuance of a Declaratory Order. However, in this case, as 
far as we can tell, the ruling has application to only one individual, it is 
dated in 1986 and there is no back-up information on file with the Internal 
Revenue Service for more detailed review. The ruling is issued based only on the 
facts presented to the Internal Revenue Service by the employer, without further 
research, follow-up questioning or field work. Such a ruling is classified by 
the IRS as "static" and subject to change at any time if or when additional 
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information is made available. In keeping with the intent of the Administrative 
procedures Act related to Declaratory Orders, it is incumbent upon the 
Department to conduct a full and proper investigation prior to the issuance of 
such an order. 
Based on our review of the information provided in the questionnaires 
completed by the demonstrators and by Tasters it is the conclusion of the 
Department that the services of the demonstrators are in employment because: 
The demonstrators are "... required to comply with another person's 
instructions about when where and how work is to be performed;11 and are 
"...trained by an experienced employee working with him or her..." because the 
demonstrators are given instructions by Tasters on the manner the work is to be 
performed, the location, date and time. Additionally, Tasters provides initial 
orientation training and general guidelines for performance of the demonstrators, 
35-4-22(j)(5)(A&B). 
The " success and continuation of the business depends upon those 
services..." because the demonstrators represent Tasters to the food brokers or 
representative. The services are performed for the food broker by Tasters Ltd. 
and not for the food broker by the individual demonstrator, 35-4-22(j)(5)(C). 
The services of the demonstrators "...must be rendered personally;" and 
the demonstrators do not "..[have] the right to hire, supervise, and pay other 
assistants...". It may be the intent of Tasters to allow the demonstrators such 
latitude, but the information we received indicates this does not happen, nor is 
it possible, 35-4-22(j)(5)(D&E). 
Oral and/or written reports are required of the demonstrators by 
Tasters, 35-4-22(j)(5)(K). 
The demonstrators are "...paid by the employer in regular amounts at 
stated intervals;" and are "...paid by the employer for expenses;" because they 
are paid on an hourly basis for the work performed and reimbursed for the 
expenses of supplies incurred in their work, 35-4-22(j)(5)(L&M), 
The demonstrators do not have "...a real, essential, and adequate 
investment in a business..." of their own nor do they have an investment in 
Tasters Ltd and, therefore, cannot assume the risk of realizing*a profit or 
suffering a loss either from the investment in their own business or an 
investment in Tasters Ltd. Additionally, the demonstrators make their services 
available through Tasters Ltd., in which they have no interest, 35-
4-22(j)(5)(0,P&R). 
The demonstrators "...may be discharged at any time;" by Tasters and 
the demonstrator "...may terminate his or her relationship with the employer at 
any time", 35-4-22(j)(5)(S&T). 
CONCLUSION: 
It is evident from the information received the demonstrators are free 
to perform services for other employers at the same time as their employment with 
Tasters, are free to accept or decline an offer of work, and are not employed on 
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a full time basis with Tasters. Additionally, the demonstrators furnish their 
own tools in the performance of their work. These are evidences of an 
independent contractor. However, the weight of the twenty factors clearly falls 
with the interpretation of employment. The freedom the demonstrator has to 
accept or reject work and to pursue other occupational endeavors could be deemed 
to be characteristic of this type of work. The tools furnished by the 
demonstrator are incidental to their service. They are tools common to most 
households and as such do not require a significant separate investment to obtain 
and maintain. Because of this, these evidences of independent contractor status 
are not weighted as heavily as those defining employment. 
If you are not in agreement with this determination you have the right 
to appeal. If you choose to appeal this determination, the appeal must be in 
writing, be received within ten (10) days of the date of this letter, and define 
the reason for the appeal and the relief requested. The appeal should be sent to 
PO Box 11800, Salt Lake City, Utah 84147. 
Sincerely, 
34:JL/jm 
c:tasrule.jl& 
John Levanger 
Status Supervisor 
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY 
Appeals Tribunal 
Decision of Administrative Law Judge 
Tasters Ltd., Inc. 
ATTN: Sandi Cohn 
1381 East 2100 South, Suite B 
Salt Lake City, UT 84105 
Employer No. 1-117373-0 
Case No. 89-A-4044-T 
APPEAL FILED: September 1, 1989 
APPEARANCES: Appellant, Department 
Representative, Witnesses 
ISSUE: 
DATE OF HEARING: January 30, 1990 
April 4, 1990 
PLACE OF HEARING: Salt Lake City 
The Department's declaratory ruling dated August 31, 1989 held food demonstrators 
to be employees for the purposes of unemployment insurance coverage. 
Sections 35-4-22(j)(1), 35-4-22(p) and 35-4-22(j)(5) of the Utah Employment 
Security Act are quoted on the attached sheet. 
Jurisdiction for this review is established in accordance with Section 35-4-
i:;r; c: tne Utar. Employment Security Act and tne Rules pertaining thereto. 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
Tne Utar: Department of Employment Security previously held food demonstrators 
working for Tasters, appellant, to be employees. The determination was upheld 
through the appeal process. The appellant began reporting tc tne IRS and the 
Department. The appellant then requested a ruling in regards to the status of 
food demonstrators. The appellant completed a SS-8 Questionnaire and submitted 
it to tne IRS along with a list of demonstrators. Based upon this information, 
the IRS determined the demonstrators to be non-employees. The IRS does not have 
copies of the questionnaires submitted by the appellant. The appellant did not 
keep a copy of the form which was submitted. The appellant maintained a working 
copy of a form which was used to complete the actual SS-8 which was submitted to 
the IRS. Pursuant to Section 530 of the Internal Revenue Code, once the IRS has 
determined a service to be exempt, the IRS is prevented from any other subsequent 
redeterminations. 
The Utah Employment Security Act underwent a change in 1989 eliminating the 
historical "AB" test of Section 3S-4-22(j)(5). It was replaced by language 
similar to the IRS regulation in regards to common law employment. Since the IRS 
exempted the demonstrators and the Utah Employment Security Act had been changed, 
the appellant petitioned the Department for a new determination. The Department 
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obtained a list of demonstrators from the appellant. From the list, the 
Department randomly selected some of the demonstrators and sent them a 
questionnaire regarding the services they performed for the appellant. After the 
Department received questionnaires submitted by the appellant and selective 
demonstrators, the Department issued a decision holding the demonstrators to be 
employees. 
The appellant operates a business of providing personnel (demonstrators) on a 
part-time on-call basis to perform food demonstrations, etc. within grocery 
stores, etc. The appellant contracts with food brokers, manufacturers, grocery 
stores, etc. to demonstrate food, various products, etc. The appellant maintains 
a list of individuals who are willing to perform the demonstrations. As the 
appellant obtains contracts, the appellant calls the demonstrators inquiring 
whether the demonstrator would be interested in performing a particular 
demonstration. The demonstrator is free to accept or reject the assignment. 
When a demonstrator accepts an assignment, the appellant furnishes the 
demonstrator with the information provided by the food broker, etc., as to what 
product is to be demonstrated, how, where the demonstration is to take place, 
etc. The demonstrator is often referred to grocery store managers or a food 
broker for instructions. 
The appellant pays the demonstrator $40.00 for an eight hour demonstration and 
$20.00 for a four hour demonstration. If the product being demonstrated sells 
out, the demonstrator is allowed to leave and receives pay for a full day. The 
grocery store or the food broker determines the hour and days of the 
demonstration and the location within the store for the demonstrator. The 
product is furnisned by the food broker or the store who contracts with the 
appellant. The appellant generally furnishes supplies sue)- as plates, napkins, 
toctnric/.s, cups, etc. tc be usee ir. tne demonstration. T^e appellant bills tne 
broKer for these supplies in addition for payments mace to the demonstrators. If 
the demonstrator incurs any expense for supplies, the appellant reimburses the 
demonstrator. 
The appellant furnishes the demonstrators a list of items of "Very Important 
Things To Rememoer". The appellant admonishes the demonstrators to read the list 
of things to rememoer and review "training materials often". The list also 
itemizes the equipment the demonstrators shouia nave and some "No-No's". 
Equipment needed generally consists of a folding table, table cloth, fry pan, 
utensils, apron, etc. which are commonly found in households. The appellant or 
food broker furnishes larger items such as microwave ovens and pizza ovens. 
The appellant provides the demonstrator with a report to be completed at the end 
of the demonstration. The store manager or equivalent must sign the report. In 
the report, the demonstrator reports various information concerning the 
demonstration. Occasionally, the food broker or manufacture representative will 
furnish the demonstrator with reports asking more detailed information concerning 
the demonstration. The food broker will also require the appellant to assemble a 
meeting with the demonstrators so that a representative can instruct and train 
tne demonstrators how the product is to be prepared and presented to the 
customer. The demonstrators receive pay for attending the meeting. The 
appellant conducts the meeting and the demonstrators practice demonstrating the 
product. The appellant provides training for those who have not previously 
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demonstrated or when a product to be demonstrated is new or different. During 
the meetings the broker or representative will instruct the demonstrator as to 
what dialogue is to be used, etc. 
The appellant has a field manager who visited the demonstrators to check in on 
the demonstration, deliver supplies, answer questions, etc. A representative for 
the broker will often visit the demonstration site checking the set-up, 
instructing the demonstrator as to presentation, etc. The store manager may also 
check on the demonstrator and often makes comments on the demonstrators report as 
to the demonstrators performance, etc., i.e. "great job, send her back". 
The demonstrators are free to work for other demonstration companies. Some of 
the demonstrators do so while others are content with working only for the 
appellant. If the appellant receives feedback from a store, broker, etc. that a 
demonstrator is unsatisfactory, the appellant ceases to provide that demonstrator 
with any future assignments. 
If a demonstrator is unable to keep a scheduled demonstration, the demonstrator 
either calls the appellant to obtain a new substitute or the demonstrator may 
arrange for a substitute. The substitute submits the report and the appellant 
pays the substitute. There are occasions when the demonstrator will pay the 
substitute. The demonstrator is free to hire helpers, however, there is only one 
example of such occurring, otherwise the helpers are primarily substitutes. The 
one exception is a demonstrator in Price. 
Of eight questionnaires completed by the demonstrators, all indicated that they 
were supervised or instructed and received training from either the appellant or 
food brokers. All indicated they worked under the appellant's business name. 
Question Ql of the questionnaire inquires whether the demonstrator performed the 
same services for otners. ?wc o: the eight answered "yes". Tne same two 
individuals also indicated mat they did not consider themselves to be self-
employed. Question Q2 of the questionnaire inquires whether they consider 
tneriseives self-employed. Four of the eight answered "yes", and the same four 
responded they do not perform similar work for others. All eight demonstrators 
reported that they worKed scheduled hours. Seven responded that they were 
required to personally perform the work and all responded they did not have a 
helper. None of the demonstrators responded that they have a business license, 
business cards, etc. 
REASONING & CONCLUSION OF LAW: 
The appellant alleges that the demonstrators are independent contractors. 
Although the appellant considers their, to be so, the actual service relationship 
determines the employment status rather than any label placed upon the individual 
performing the service. Any verbal or written agreement which labels a worker as 
an "independent contractor", when the relationship is essentially employment, 
effectively waives an individual's rights to unemployment insurance benefits. 
Such agreements are considered void pursuant to Section 35-4-18(a) of the Utah 
Employment Security Act. Also, the Utah Supreme Court has stated in numerous 
decisions that such agreements whether verbal or written are ineffective in 
keeping an individual without the purview of the Utah Employment Security Act 
when by their own actions they bring themselves within (Leach vs. Industrial 
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Commission 123 Utah 423 260 P.2d. 477 1953 and Creameries of America vs. 
Industrial Commission 98 Utah 571 102 P.2d. 300 1940). 
Payment for services may constitute a wage for employment. Wages are defined by 
Section 3-4-22(p) of the Utah Employment Security Act as any remuneration for 
personal services, including commissions. Employment as defined by Section 35-4-
22(j)(l) of the Utah Employment Security Act comprises any service performed for 
wages or under any contract of hire, written or oral, expressed or implied. The 
Utah Supreme Court in Blamires vs. Board of Review (Utah 584 P.2d. 889 1978) 
states "Contract of Hire" is "construed to include any agreement under which one 
person performs personal services at the request of another who pays for these 
services. In Fuller Brush vs. Industrial Commission (99 Utah 97 107 P.2d. 201 
1940) and also in Superior Cablevision vs. Board of Review (Utah 688 P.2d. 444 
1984) the court explained "if an individual renders personal services and was 
entitled to remuneration based on and measured by such personal services, the 
person performing the service was under a contract of hire". 
The demonstrators in question worked for the appellant performing a personal 
service. They received payment for their services. The demonstrators received 
pay of $40.00 for an eight hour day. This is essentially work based on an 
hourly rate of $5.00 per hour. However, in either event, paid by the day or the 
hour, the Tribunal finds the payment to be wages. In accordance to the 
definition of wages and employment as cited herein, the Tribunal concludes the 
demonstrator performed a personal service for a wage. 
Wages for employment are subject to unemployment insurance coverage unless the 
service or employment is specifically excluded by statute or the employer who 
employs the service in question can demonstrate the service is not employment 
under common law, as stated ir. Section 35-4-22(3) (5) of the Utah Employment 
Security Act. T n s sectior. Historically provided a two-prong "A£r Test, but was 
replaced by the common law standard used by the IRS as provided by the Internal 
Revenue Code and regulation. Tr,e IRS Code states tnat a service is employment if 
the employer directs and controls tne service or has the right of control. The 
Internal Revenue Regulations provide 20 factors as a common guideline in 
determining a common law relationship. The degree of importance of each factor 
varies depending upon the occupation involved and the factual context in which 
tne services are performed (Revenue Ruling 87-41, 1987-23 IR8.7). Tfius, a few 
factors which exhibit a common law employment relationship may outweigh the 
remaining factors. Therefore, one cannot simply say that 12 or more of the 
factors exhibit non-employment and De held so. 
The Utah Legislature changed the Unemployment Insurance Act such that it would 
more closely follow the guidelines of the IRS. Although the IRS uses the A-T 
factors only as guidelines, the Legislature, for whatever purpose, chose to list 
the guidelines as part of the law. However, in doing so, the law is silent as to 
how the guidelines or the A-T Test is to be measured and weighed in each 
instance. Despite this problem the language definitely implies that the factors 
are to be considered under the common law rules applicable to the employer-
employee relationship which would be consistent with the manner in which the IRS 
reviews possible employment relationships. In light of this, the Tribunal finds 
the employer's argument that the majority of the A-T factors are met is without 
merit. The test to be determined is whether a common law relationship exists and 
in determining such the 20 factors should be considered as guidelines. 
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The appellant argues since the IRS has issued a SS-8 ruling stating Linda Jones 
to be exempt and the refunding by IRS of employment taxes paid by the appellant, 
that the Department then should also exempt the demonstrators. The Tribunal 
finds this argument also to be without merit. The SS-8 ruling is conclusionary. 
It does not state the facts that were considered in the formation of the 
conclusion. The evidence the appellant has provided in support of the SS-8 
ruling is a work copy at best and must be considered hearsay wherein the contents 
of such are refuted by testimony of witnesses and information obtained from 
independent questionnaires submitted by the demonstrators whose services are in 
question. Further, the IRS determination may be faulty and the IRS, by their own 
law - Section 530, is prevented from reversing their determination. Although the 
IRS is bound by the ruling that they issue, there is no law, rule or otherwise 
which binds the Department of Employment Security to accept the SS-8 ruling when 
determining an employment relationship. 
A review of various revenue rulings and private rulings unquestionably portray 
the IRS considers food demonstrators to be employees. (Revenue rulings 68-367 
C.B. 1968-2, 435; 54-471 C.B. 1954-2, 235; 54-471, C.B. 1954-1, 348; 70-630, 
1970-2 C.B. 229; 8741, 1987-23 l.R.B. 7.) 
The Tribunal finds the aforementioned revenue rulings considerably more 
applicable to the services in question than the reverue rulings which the 
appellant provided as guidelines. The IRS has specifically referred to the 
aforementioned rulings in issuing private rulings concerning food demonstrators' 
services. (IRS letter rulings 8721108, February 12, 1987; 8830024, April 28, 
1988, 8838068, June 29, 1988; 8840015, July 8, 1988 and 8840019, July 7, 1988). 
Tne facts of these private rulings are remarkably similar, if not identical, to 
tne facts presented herein. Each of these private rulings specifically cites 
Revenue Ru.ir,c 7L-t3* wnerejr. ar employee ser\ice company provides services of 
temporary sales clerxs in retail stores. In this ruling the IRS held the sales 
clerks tc oe employees Tne Tribunal finds the facts and ideology of tnis case 
to be very conparaDle to the issue currently being considerea. Tnerefore, upor 
reviewing the facts of this case, in reference to the revenue rulings of the IRS, 
wnc uses the same A-T guidelines as provided in the Utah statute, the Tribunal 
concedes the services performed by the demonstrators, are performing a service 
for a wage constituting employment under common law. 
The TriDunal also makes additional remarks in regards to the application of the 
common law test as it pertains to this case. As previously stated, an individual 
is an employee if there is a common law relationship. The appellant has 
sufficient control and a right of control over the food demonstrators to hold a 
common law relationship. This is established by the appellant providing the 
demonstrators with training, instructions, etc. The appellant argues that the 
control comes through the broker or the store that requests the demonstrators. 
However, the appellant provides such entity with the right to control by virtue 
of the contract between the appellant and the broker. If the services are not 
performed as requested by the broker, the appellant is responsible for the 
demonstrator's services due to the contract the broker has with the appellant. 
Further, if the demonstrator's services are inadequate, the appellant effectively 
discrarges the demonstrator by no longer providing assignments to that particular 
demonstrator. 
I II If I M wl _ 00033^ 
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The appellant's business is not substantially different than SOS Temporary 
Service, Kelly Girls, Manpower, etc. However, like Accountemps and others, they 
specialize in providing personnel to perform a specific service, food 
demonstration. In that regard, the demonstrators are highly integrated into the 
appellant's business. Without the continual services of the demonstrators the 
appellant cannot operate her business. In the IRS Rulings previously mentioned, 
this factor was specifically addressed exhibiting the demonstrators were an 
integral part of the appellant's business rather than pursuing an independent 
trade or business of their own. In this case, this has been portrayed by the 
answers of the demonstrators who completed the questionnaires. Half of the 
respondents did not consider themselves as self-employed established in an 
independent trade of food demonstrating. The half that claimed they were, did 
not perform similar services for others nor had any indication of being self-
employed, i.e. having business licenses, business cards, etc. Each responded 
they worked under Tasters name representing the appellant rather than themselves. 
Even though some of the demonstrators may work for the appellant and the 
appellant's competitors, such does not make them an independent contractor any 
more than a worker who affiliates himself with and obtains work wherever 
available from SOS, Manpower, etc. 
The evidence provided revealed the possibility of one individual in Price who 
hires and pays individuals at a lesser rate and then obtains contracts or 
assignments from tne appellant and then reassigns the assignments to others. 
This may appear as a subcontractor. However, such may be constructive 
employment. The purported individual was not available for testimony and the 
evidence presented in regards to this individual is insufficient to determine her 
independence. It may be possible this individual would also be an employer. The 
Department needs to specifically investigate the circumstances of this particular 
individual if requested by the appellant. The Tribunal finds this individual to 
oe ar. exception to tne typical relationship of tne otner demonstrators working 
for tfie appellant as portrayed by the evidence herein. Further, the employer has 
the D-rder, tc provide evidence tc prove this individual's exclusion. The 
evidence in regarcs to this individual is inadequate for separate consideration 
apart from the other demonstrators being considered and has not been specifically 
addressed by the Department. Also, the fact a demonstrator may obtain a 
substitute is immaterial and does not, in itself, exhibit an independent 
contractor relationship. The appellant is aware of such and allows the 
demonstrators to obtain their own substitute alleviating a problem of the 
appellant having to obtain substitute demonstrators themselves. 
The Tribunal has given consideration to the A-T factors in conjunction with the 
common law relationship. Based upon the Findings of Fact of this case and in 
light of the revenue rulings aforementioned, the Tribunal concludes the 
demonstrators performed a service for a wage constituting employment at common 
law sucject to unemployment insurance coverage pursuant to Section 35-4-22(j)(5) 
of the Utah Employment Security Act. 
DECISION: 
Tne Tribunal affirms the Department's declaratory decision dated August 31, 1989 
holding food demonstrators who performed a service for the appellant did so for a 
000336 
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wage constituting employment under common law pursuant to Sections 35-4-22(j)(1), 
35-4-2?(p) and 3S-4-22(j)(5) of the Utah Employment Security Act. 
Note, the Tribunal believes one individual who works in Price may be excludable. 
Since the evidence in regards to this individual is insufficient to make such a 
declaration by the Tribunal, the appellant may, if desired, request the 
Department to investigate the status of this individual and issue a decision. 
Otherwise, without adequate evidence to the contrary, the Tribunal finds this 
individual to be no different than the other demonstrators discussed herein. 
77^ 0'/?j&?L\ 
Kenneth A. Marjor 
Administrative liaw Judge 
APPEALS tiOUNAL 
This decision will become final unless within thirty (30) days from April 18, 
1990, further written appeal is made to the Board of Review (P. 0. Bex 11600, 
Salt Lake City, Utan 84147) setting forth grounds upon which the appeal is made. 
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BOARO OF REVIEW 
The Industrial Commission of Utah 
Unemployment Compensation Appeals 
TASTERS, LTD. INC. 
Employer No. 1-117373-0 : 
: Case No. 90-A-4044-T 
: DECISION 
: Case No. 90-BR-167-T 
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY 
Tasters Ltd, Inc. appeals the decision of the Administrative Law 
Judge in the above entitled matter, which held Tasters to be subject to the 
Utah Employment Security Act with respect to its employment of "demonstra-
tors". Specifically, the ALJ ruled the demonstrators could not be classified 
as independent contractors under §35-4-22(j)(5) of the Act. 
After careful consideration of the record and Tasters' contentions 
on appeal, the Board of Review finds that the demonstrators 1n question do 
not meet the criteria of §35-4-22(j)(5) for independent contractors. The 
Board of Review therefore affirms the decision of the ALJ and holds the 
demonstrators to be 1n the employ of Tasters and subject to coverage under 
the provisions of the Utah'Employment Security Act. 
Based upon its review of the record, the Board of Review makes the 
following findings of fact: Tasters is in the business of providing workers to 
brokers and manufacturers* representatives for the purpose of demonstrating 
various products in grocery and department stores. Each demonstrator works 
on an on-call, part-time basis with no guarantee of any particular schedule or 
number of work hours. Each demonstrator is free to accept or decline offered 
assignments as he or she sees f i t . 
Tasters gives each demonstrator a two-page set of written instruc-
tions governing the performance of their duties, including details such as 
att ire, length of breaks, product display, and demonstration tactics. Demon-
strators are prohibited from having children present, smoking, reading or 
sitting while on the job. Orientation and other training sessions are some-
times held for demonstrators, but attendance is not required. Payment for 
attendance at such meetings is made by Tasters1 client brokers or manu-
facturers. 
Once a demonstrator accepts a particular assignment, he or she must 
report for work according to a set schedule. The demonstrators' performance 
in the store may be monitored by Tasters1 f ield representative or by Tasters' 
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clients. Vhile individualized supervision is not generally provided, the 
field representative and clients give instruction when necessary. At the end 
of each demonstration, demonstrators ar$ required to submit a report to 
Tasters. 
The demonstrators are either provided the supplies used in demon-
strations or are reimbursed for the expense of such supplies. The demonstra-
tors provide equipment such as frying pans and card tables at their own 
expense. Tasters sometimes provides microwave ovens, then charges its clients 
rental fees for their use. 
Demonstrators are paid on a "per day" basis. Occasionally, demon-
strators delegate assignments to other demonstrators, who then are paid for 
the work. Tasters carries warker's compensation insurance on the demonstrators 
but provides no other fringe benefits and does not withhold payroll taxes from 
demonstrators* paychecks. 
The demonstrators and Tasters are free to terminate their rela-
tionship with each other at any time. Demonstrators perform theiir services 
under Tasters1 business name. Although they are free to perform services for 
other employers, none advertise, maintain offices or obtain business licenses. 
In judging whether the foregoing facts substantiate Tasters' posi-
tion that its demonstrators are independent contractors, the Board of Review 
is guided by §35-4-22(j)(5) of the Utah Employment Security Act, which pro-
vides in material part as follows: 
Services performed by an individual for wages or under any 
contract of hire, written or oral, express or implied, are 
considered to be employment subject to this chapter unless it 
is shown to the satisfaction of the commission that the indi-
vidual is an independent contractor. The commission shall 
analyze all of the facts in Subsections (A) through (T) under 
the common-law rules applicable to the employer-employee rela-
tionship to determine i f an individual is an independent 
contractor. An individual is an independent contractor if the 
weight of the evidence supports that finding. The following 
ing factors are to be considered i f applicable. (Factors A 
through T follow, but have been ommitted due to their length.) 
Under §35-4-22(j)(5), above, wages paid to an individual for personal services 
are subject to unemployment insurance contributions unless the services are 
performed by an independent contractor. §35-4-22(j)|5] establishes 20 
separate factors for assessing whether status as an independent contractor 
exists, i t also recognizes that each factor may not be pertinent in every case 
and should be considered only i f applicable. To understand and apply 
§35-4-22(j)(5),s 20 factors, i t is necessary to understand their development 
in the Act. 
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Prior to April 24, 1989, §35-4-22(j)(5) used a two-part test to 
determine independent contractor status. First, the individual performing 
services must be free from control and direction from the party for whom the 
services were provided. Second, the individual performing services must be 
independently established in an occupation, trade or business of his own. 
However, because the Internal Revenue Service also made determinations of 
independent contractor status using only the test of Mcontrol and direction", 
a lack of conformity existed between determinations of the Department and 
Internal Revenue Service. To increase conformity, the Legislature repealed 
the two part test of §35-4-22(j)(5) and replaced i t with a test that relied 
upon 20 factors the IRS had identified as generally significant in determining 
"control and direction". In summary, §35-4-22(j)(5)ls two-part test of 
freedom from control and direction and independent establishment in business 
was replaced by a 20-part test focusing on control and direction. 
§35-4-22(j)(5) as amended recognizes that not each of its 20 fac-
tors (A through T) will apply in every situation. §35-4-22(j)(5) further 
recognizes the necessity of "weighing" factors according to their significance 
under the facts of a particular case. The Board of Review must therefore 
identify those factors which are signficant in the present case, then deter-
mine whether the evidence with respect to those factors establish the freedom 
from control and direction necessary to support a finding of independent con-
tractor status. 
Factors A, B, 6, J and K relate to the amount of direct control 
exercised over the individual in the performance of his or her duties. As 
the extent of control over details increases, an indiviudual will be more 
likely to be considered an employee. In this case, Tasters tells its dem-
onstrators when to report for work, when to leave, and how long to spend on 
breaks and lunch. I t tells them to remain standing, not to smoke, not to 
have children with them, and not to read. Demonstrators are instructed on 
proper dress and personal demeanor. The foregoing is only a sample of the 
detailed instructions Tasters gives its demonstrators. While Tasters is not 
staffed to the extent that such matters can be closely observed, Tasters has 
nonetheless exercised its right to give the instructions. The Board of 
Review concludes the foregoing factors strongly support a finding that Tasters 
exerts control and direction wer the demonstrators. 
A second group of factors, C, F, H, 0, P, Q and R, pertain to the 
degree of independence and separation existing between the individuals per-
forming services and the entity for which services are performed. A high 
degree of separation tends to establish an independent contractor relation-
ship while integration indicates an employment relationship. Due to the 
unique nature of Tasters1 business, the Board considers mary of the factors 
in this category to be of l i t t l e significance. For example, Tasters' business 
does not require full-time employees or a high degree of contact with its 
demonstrators. Nor does i t require or permit a substantial investment in 
equipment. However, the Board does consider factor R to be significant. The 
r\nn/\n/* 
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demonstrators had not taken the steps to estaablish independent business 
activity that an independent contractor would be expected to take. In con-
clusion, most factors in this category are not significant in evaluating 
Tasters1 control over its demonstrators, except factor R, which supports the 
finding that the demonstrators were not independent contractors. 
The third category of factors, items D, E, L, S and T, relate to 
the issue of whether a continuing personal relationship between employer and 
employee has been established, or alternatively, whether the relationship was 
merely a discrete, job-by-job arrangement in which performance is enforceable 
under contract law. Certain of the factors in this category are significant 
to this case and support a finding of independent contractor status* For 
example, Tasters permitted the demonstrators to delegate assignments to 
others and compensated demonstrators on a Hper job" basis. On balance, the 
nature of the legal relationship between Tasters and the demonstrators re-
sembles that of an independent contractor relationship. 
The last category of factors, items I, M and N,- focus on the demon-
strators' investment in equipment and the allocation of expenses between the 
demonstrations and Tasters. These factors are not useful under the circum-
stances of this case since equipment requirements are minimal and expenses 
are reimbursed by Tasters' clients. 
In sunnary, the 20 factors of §35-4-22(j)(5) have been evaluated by 
the Board of Review and classified into four general groups. The f irst group 
relates to the amount of direct control exercised by Tasters, while the 
second group pertains to the extent of integration of the demonstrators Into 
Tasters1 business. In light of the facts of this case, both categories 
indicate that the employment relationship between Tasters and Its demonstra-
tors is that of emplqyer and employees. While the third group of factors, 
pertaining to the legal relationship between Tasters and its demonstrators, 
favors a contrary conclusion and the fourth group, pertaining to allocation 
of expenses and investment, is neutral, the first and second categories are 
the most significant to this case. The Board of Review concludes that 
the weight of the evidence when viewed under the standards set forth in 
§35-4-22(j)(5) (A) through (T) does not support a finding that Tasters1 
demonstrators are independent contractors. The Board of Review therefore 
holds that they are in employment subject to the provisions of the Utah 
Employment Security Act. 
Two additional points in Tasters' appeal require brief discussion. 
First, Tasters argues that the questionnaire prepared by the Department and 
completed by Tasters demonstrators should have been excluded from the record 
because they lacked statistical validity, were not understood by the demon-
strators and contained questions which did not conform to the 20 factors set 
forth in §35-4-(22)j)(5). The questionnaires are insignificant to the Board 
of Review's decision in this matter, since the Board of Review relied instead 
upon the demonstrators' testimony from the appeal hearing, given under oath 
and subject to cross-examination. Even i f the questionnaires were removed 
from the record, the Board of Review's decision would remain unchanged. 
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The second point requiring response is Tasters' contention that a 
previous informal IRS determination that one of Tasters' demonstrators was an 
independent contractor should prompt a similar determination in the present 
case. However, the Board of Review must apply the provisions of the Utah 
Empl qyment Security Act according to the facts in the record before i t . 
Where the Employment Security Act and federal standards are the same, 1t is 
probable that the same result wil l be reached. Occasionally, differences in 
fact-finding will result in contrary decisions. In this case, the Board has 
had the benefit of exhaustive fact finding and active participation from the 
Department and Tasters. The Board of Review is unwilling to ignore such a 
complete record in order to adopt an informal opinion of the IRS which appears 
to violate the IRS' own precedents. 
This decision becomes final on the date i t is mailed, and ar\y 
further appeal must be made within 30 days from the date of mailing. Your 
appeal must be submitted in writing to the Utah Court of Appeals, Midtown 
Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102. To f i l e 
an appeal with the Court of Appeals, you must submit to the Clerk of the 
Court a Petition for Writ of Review setting forth the reasons for appeal, 
pursuant to §63-46b-16 of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act and 
Rule 14 of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, followed by a Docketing 
Statement and a Legal Brief as required by Rules 9 and 24-27, Rules of the 
Utah Court of Appeals. 
Dated this 10th day of July, 1990. 
Date Mailed: July 20, 1990 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing DECISION to be served upon each of the following on this £& — 
day of July, 1990, by mailing the same, postage prepaid, United States 
mail to: 
Tasters Ltd. , Inc. 
Attn: Sandi Cohn 
1381 East 2100 South, Suite B 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Gary E. Ooctorman 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Tasters Ltd. , Inc. 
50 West Broadway, Suite 400 
P. 0. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898 
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Tasters Ltd., Inc., 
Petitioner, 
v. 
Department of Employment 
Security, 
Respondent. 
AMENDED OPINION1 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 900451-CA 
F I L E D 
(October 17, 1991) 
Original Proceeding in this Court 
Attorneys: Gary E. Doctorman and Richard M. Marsh, Salt 
Lake City, for Petitioner 
K. Allan Zabel and Emma R. Thomas, Salt Lake 
City, for Respondent 
Before Judges Garff, Greenwood, and Jackson. 
JACKSON, Judge: 
Petitioner, Tasters Limited, Inc., seek review of a final 
decision of the Board of Review of the Industrial Commission 
finding that product demonstrators are employees for purposes of 
the Utah Employment Security Act. We reverse and remand. 
1. This opinion replaces the opinion of the same name issued June 
19, 1991. 
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FACTS 
Tasters is in the business of providing workers to demonstrate 
various products in grocery and department stores. Tasters 
maintains a list of approximately 2000 individuals who are 
demonstrators. Demonstrators are contacted by Tasters regarding 
the availability of demonstrations. Demonstrators may accept or 
reject any given demonstration. Once a demonstrator accepts a 
particular assignment, he or she is responsible for that 
demonstration and must complete the assignment or obtain a 
replacement. Tasters provides no formalized training but provides 
each demonstrator with a two-page instruction sheet outlining how 
the demonstrations are to be carried out. The instructions address 
how the demonstration should be conducted, what breaks the 
demonstrator may take, how the product should be displayed, and 
what attire should be worn. While orientation and other training 
sessions are occasionally held, attendance is not required. 
Demonstrators are paid by the job, and provide their own 
equipment. On several occasions, however, Tasters has provided 
demonstrators with microwave ovens. Demonstrators are reimbursed 
for incidental expenses such as toothpicks or paper products used 
in conjunction with a demonstration. Demonstrators must fill out 
a one-page report upon completion of a demonstration, indicating 
what product was demonstrated, how much of the product was sold 
during the demonstration, and any expenses incurred. In addition, 
demonstrators may include the responses of customers, and add their 
own comments on the report form. Store managers may provide 
feedback to Tasters on the report form. 
In 1989, Tasters sought a ruling from the Utah Department of 
Employment Security to determine whether demonstrators were to be 
considered employees or independent contractors of Tasters, based 
on recent changes in Utah Code Ann. S 35-4-22(j)(5) (Supp. 1989).2 
The Department found that under the Utah Employment Security Act 
(the Act), demonstrators were employees of Tasters, and not 
independent contractors. Tasters appealed to an Industrial 
Commission Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), who affirmed the 
Department's ruling. Tasters then appealed to the Board of Review, 
which affirmed the ALJ's decision. This petition followed. 
In its decision, the Board categorized the twenty factors set 
forth in section 35-4-22(j)(5) into four general categories. The 
2. The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 1991, rearranged and 
redesignated the definitions previously found in section 35-4-
22(j)(5). See Amendment Notes, Utah Code Ann. S 35-4-22 (Supp. 
1991). The definitions relevant to this case are now found in Utah 
Code Ann. S 35-4-22.3(3) (Supp. 1991). In this opinion we refer to 
the subsections in effect at the time the facts in the case arose, 
which appear in Utah Code Ann. S 35-4-22(j)(5) (Supp. 1989). 
2 
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Board then identified which of the factors were relevant to the 
present case, and determined whether the evidence with respect to 
those factors established "the freedom and control necessary to 
support a finding of independent contractor status." 
Tasters argues four issues before this court: (1) that the 
Board improperly interpreted the statute by categorizing the twenty 
factors into four broad groupings, and by giving more weight to 
some factors and less weight to others; (2) that the Board failed 
to analyze all of the factors set forth in the statute; (3) that 
the Board failed to make certain findings of fact when the 
uncontroverted evidence supports those findings; and (4) that the 
Board incorrectly determined demonstrators to be employees and not 
independent contractors. In addition, Tasters urges this court to 
review the record and make our own findings of fact based on 
Tasters's version of the evidence. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Board's application of section 35-4-22(j) (5) to its 
factual findings involves a mixed question of law and fact. 
McGuire v. Department of Employment Sec., 768 P.2d 985, 987 (Utah 
App. 1989) (citations omitted). In reviewing an agency's 
determination of mixed questions of fact and law, we have stated 
that flwe will not disturb the Board's application of its factual 
findings to the law unless its determination exceeds the bounds of 
reasonableness and rationality." Pro-Benefit Staffing v. Board of 
Review, 775 P.2d 439, 442 (Utah App. 1989). Although the Utah 
Supreme Court has also followed this approach in numerous cases,3 
that court recently conducted an in-depth analysis of the standard 
of review required under Utah Code Ann. S 63-46b-16(4) (1989) of 
the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA), and concluded that 
the Pro-Benefit Staffing approach was inconsistent with the 
analysis that should be applied. Morton Int'l v. Auditing Div. of 
the Utah State Tax Comm'n, 163 Utah Adv. Rep. 34, 36 (Utah 1991). 
In Morton Int'l. the Utah Supreme Court stated that 
it is not the characterization of an issue as 
a mixed question of fact and law or the 
characterization of the issue as a question of 
general law that is dispositive of the 
determination of the appropriate level of 
judicial review. Rather, what has developed 
3. See, e.g., Hurley v. Board of Review, 767 P.2d 524, 527 (Utah 
1988); Bennett v. Industrial Comm'n, 726 P.2d 427, 429 (Utah 1986); 
Big K Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 689 P.2d 1349, 1353 (Utah 
1984) . 
3 
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as the dispositive factor is whether the 
agency, by virtue of its experience or 
expertise, is in a better position than the 
courts to give effect to the regulatory 
objective to be achieved. 
Id. (citations omitted). The court concluded that "absent a grant 
of discretion, a correction-of-error standard is used in reviewing 
an agency's interpretation or application of a statutory term.11 
Id. at 36-37. S££ fllgQ Mor-Flo Ind. v. Board of Review, 166 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 17, 18 (Utah App. 1991). The Morton court however, 
qualified this conclusion by indicating that this analysis will not 
significantly affect review of agencies' interpretations and 
applications of their own statutes because "where we would 
summarily grant an agency deference on the basis of its expertise, 
it is also appropriate to grant the agency deference on the basis 
of an explicit or implicit grant of discretion contained in the 
governing statute." Morton Int#lf 163 Utah Adv. Rep. at 37 
(emphasis added)• Therefore, to determine the appropriate standard 
of review in this case, we must decide if section 35-4-22(j)(5) 
grants discretion to the Board to give effect to the statute. 
In utilizing statutory language such as "as determined by the 
commission," the legislature has explicitly granted discretion to 
some agencies. See id. & n.40. Grants of discretion may also be 
implied from statutory language such as "equity and good 
conscience." I£. & n.41. Similarly, in the statute at issue here, 
the legislature's use of the language "unless it is shown to the 
satisfaction of the commission,H Utah Code Ann. S 35-4«22(j) (5) 
(Supp. 1989), "if the [commission determines that the] weight of 
the evidence supports that finding," id., and "considered [by the 
commission] if applicable," id*, indicates an explicit grant of 
discretion to the Board.4 
4. Section 35-4-22(j)(5) provides: 
(5) Services performed by an individual for wages 
or under any contract of hire, written or oral, express 
or implied, are considered to be employment subject to 
this chapter, unless it is shown to the satisfaction of 
the commission that the individual is an independent 
contractor. The commission shall analyze all of the 
facts in Subsections (A) through (T) under the common-law 
rules applicable to the employer-employee relationship to 
determine if an individual is an independent contractor. 
An individual is an independent contractor if the weight 
of the evidence supports that finding. The following 
factors are to be considered if applicable: 
(A) whether the individual works his or 
her own schedule or is required to comply with 
another person's instructions about when, 
(continued.••) 
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4. (...continued) 
where, and how work is to be performed; 
(B) whether the individual uses his or 
her own methods and requires no specific 
training from the purchaser, or is trained by 
an experienced employee working with him or 
her, is required to take correspondence or 
other courses, attend meetings, and by other 
methods indicates that the employer wants the 
services performed; 
(C) whether the individual's services are 
independent of the success or continuation of 
a business or are merged into the business 
where success and continuation of the business 
depends upon those services and the employer 
coordinates work with the work of others; 
(D) whether the individual's services may 
be assigned to others or must be rendered 
personally; 
(E) whether the individual has the right 
to hire, supervise, and pay other assistants 
pursuant to a contract under which the 
individual is responsible only for the 
attainment of a result or the individual 
hires, supervises, and pays workers at the 
direction of the employer; 
(F) whether the individual was hired to 
do one job and has no continuous business 
relationship with the person for whom the 
services are performed or continues to work 
for the same person year after year; 
(G) whether the individual establishes 
his or her own time schedule or does the 
employer set the time schedule; 
(H) whether the individual is free to 
work when and for whom he or she chooses, or 
is required to devote full-time to the 
business of the employer, and is restricted 
from doing other gainful work; 
(I) whether the individual uses his or 
her own office, desk, telephone, or other 
equipment or is physically within the 
employer's direction and supervision; 
(J) whether the individual is free to 
perform services at his or her own pace or 
performs services in the order or sequence set 
by the employer; 
(K) whether the individual submits no 
reports or is required to submit regular oral 
(continued...) 
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The Board is given latitude under the statutory language to 
weigh and analyze the applicability of each of the twenty factors 
to individual facts. The language in the statute bespeaks a 
legislative intent to delegate interpretation of that statute to 
the agency. Morton Int'l, 163 Utah Adv. Rep. at 37. Given that 
the legislature granted discretion to the agency in interpreting 
section 35-4-22(j) (5), it is in a better position than the court to 
4. (...continued) 
or written reports to the employer; 
(L) whether the individual is paid by the 
job or on a straight commission or is paid by 
the employer in regular amounts at stated 
intervals; 
(M) whether the individual accounts for 
his or her own expenses or is paid by the 
employer for expenses; 
(N) whether the individual furnishes his 
or her own jtools or is furnished tools and 
materials by the employer; 
(0) whether the individual has a real# 
essential, and adequate investment in the 
business or has a lack of investment and 
depends on the employer for such facilities; 
(P) whether the individual may realize a 
profit or suffer a loss as a result of 
services performed or cannot realize a profit 
or loss by making good or poor decisions; 
(Q) whether the individual works for a 
number of persons or firms at the same time or 
usually works for only one employer; 
(R) whether the individual has his or her 
own office and assistants, holds a business 
license, is listed in business directories, 
maintains a business telephone, or advertises 
in newspapers or does not make services 
available except through a business in which 
he or she has no interest; 
(S) whether the individual may not be 
fired or discharged as long as he or she 
produces a result which meets contract 
specifications or may be discharged at any 
time; and 
(T) whether the individual agrees to 
complete a specific service, and is 
responsible for its satisfaction or is legally 
obligated to perform the service, or may 
terminate his or her relationship with the 
employer at any time. 
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give effect to the legislative intent, and therefore, we will not 
disturb the Board's decision unless it is unreasonable.5 
As to Tasters' challenge to the Board's factual findings, 
agency decisions regarding basic facts have historically been 
considered conclusive if they were supported by the evidence. Seg 
McGuire, 768 P.2d at 987 (citation omitted). This test allowed 
appellate courts to review only that part of the record which 
supported the Board's findings. See Grace Drilling v. Board of 
Review. 776 P.2d 63, 68 n.7 (Utah App. 1989). Proceedings which 
were commenced after January 1, 1988, are governed by Utah Code 
Ann. S 63-46b-16(4) (1989) of UAPA, and f,[w)e now review both sides 
of the record to determine whether the Board's findings are 
supported by substantial evidence." I£. MIn undertaking such a 
review, this court will not substitute its judgment as between two 
reasonably conflicting views, even though we may have come to a 
different conclusion had the case come before us for de novo 
review.11 !£. at 68 (citations omitted). 
ANALYSIS 
A. Application of the Statute 
Tasters first argues that the Board improperly interpreted the 
statute by utilizing an arbitrary categorization, and by giving 
more weight to some factors and less weight to others. 
The statutory test at issue in this case is set forth in Utah 
Code Ann. S 35-4-22(j) (5) (Supp. 1989). Prior to April 24, 1989, 
the statute utilized a two-part ("A-B") test to determine whether 
an individual was an independent contractor or an employee for 
purposes of the Act. That test required that the individual 
performing the services be "free from control or direction over the 
performance of those services" and be "customarily engaged in an 
independently established trade, occupation, profession, or 
business of the same nature as that involved in the contract of 
service." Utah Code Ann. § 35-4-22(j)(5) (1988). 
5. See algfi Salt Lake Citv Corp. v. Confer. 674 P.2d 632, 636 
(Utah 1983) (Where wording of legislation does not give any basis 
for preferring one interpretation over another, "we deem it 
preferable to defer to the interpretation adopted by the 
administrative body to which the Legislature committed the 
administration of this Act."). In Morton Int'lr the supreme court 
cited Salt Lafre City CQfP* with approval, stating that "[t]he 
approach used in Salt Lake Citv Corp. is consistent with [UAPA]." 
Morton Int'l, 163 Utah Adv. Rep. at 37. 
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The A-B test was replaced in April 1989 with a test that 
relied upon twenty factors which the Internal Revenue Service had 
identified as significant in determining independent contractor 
status.6 In reviewing the evidence, the Board grouped the twenty 
factors into four categories: factors A# B, G, J, and K were found 
to relate to the amount of control Tasters exercised over 
demonstrators in the performance of their duties (hereinafter 
Category One); factors C, F# H, 0, P, Q, and R were found to relate 
to the degree of independence and separation existing between 
demonstrators and Tasters (Category Two); factors D, E, L, S, and 
T were found to relate to the relationship between Tasters and the 
demonstrators (Category Three); and factors I, M, and N were found 
to relate to the investment and allocation of expenses between the 
parties (Category Four). Tasters challenges this categorization, 
arguing that because the statute does not expressly provide for 
such categorization, the Board had no authority to do so. 
M0n only one point as to the relative weight of the various 
tests is there an accepted rule of law: It is constantly said that 
the right to control the details of the work is the primary test." 
1C A. Larson# The Law of Workmen's Compensationf S 43.30 at 8-10 
(1990)[hereinafter Larson). The Restatement (Second) of Agency 
S 220 (1958) spells out a typical definition and summary of such 
tests, listing ten factors to be considered as part of the 
analysis. These ten factors, focusing on "right to control" and 
"nature of work#" are reflected in the twenty factors listed in the 
statute at issue here. 
Emphasizing "right to control" has historically been an 
integral element of Subsection (j) (5). In 1920, our supreme court, 
for the first time, defined an independent contractor as one who is 
6. The current version of Subsection (j) (5) of the statute at 
issue maintains the prior statute's presumption in favor of finding 
employment status: "Services performed by an individual for wages 
or under any contract of hire, written or oral, express or implied, 
are considered to be employment subject to this chapter unless it 
is shown to the satisfaction of the commission that the individual 
is an independent contractor." Utah Code Ann. $ 35-4-22(j) (5) 
(Supp. 1989). The presumption may be rebutted if "it is shown to 
the satisfaction of the commission that the individual is an 
independent contractor." J&. See also Superior Cablevislon 
Installers v. Industrial Comm'n, 688 P.2d 444, 447 (Utah 1984) (The 
Act "should be liberally construed in favor of affording 
benefits."); Singer Sewing Mach. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n. 104 Utah 
175, 134 P.2d 479, 485 (1943) (Subdivision (j)(5) is an exception 
or exclusion section excluding certain persons from receiving 
benefits.). 
8 
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under contract to render service or do work for another according 
to his own method, means, and manner of doing the work and without 
being subject to the control, direction, or supervision of such 
other, except as to the result of the work or service. Strieker v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 55 Utah 603, 188 P. 849, 850-51 (1920) (for 
purposes of the Workers's Compensation Act), In 1936, the Utah 
Legislature passed the Unemployment Compensation Act which read in 
pertinent part: 
Services performed by an individual for 
wages shall be deemed to be employment subject 
to this act unless and until it is shown to 
the satisfaction of the commission that — 
(a) such individual has been and 
will continue to be free from 
control or direction over the 
performance of such services, both 
under his contract of service and in 
fact; and 
(b) such service is either outside 
the usual course of the business for 
which such service is performed or 
that such service is performed 
outside of all the places of 
business of the enterprise for which 
service is performed; and 
(c) such individual is customarily 
engaged in an independently 
established trade, occupation, 
profession or business. 
Unemployment Compensation Act, S 19(J) (5) (Chapter 1, Laws of Utah 
1936, Special Session, as amended by Chapter 43, Laws of Utah 1937) 
(quoted in Creameries of America v. Industrial Comm'nf 98 Utah 571, 
102 P.2d 300, 301-02 (1940)). 
In 1986, Subsection (j)(5)(B) was deleted and former 
Subsection (j)(5)(C) was redesignated as Subsection (j)(5)(B), and 
in 1989, Subsections (A) and (B) were rewritten, and Subsections 
(C) through (T) were added as described supr^. In amending the 
statute in 1989, the legislature did not change the test's emphasis 
9 
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on "control and direction," or on "independent establishment in 
business."7 
The four categories designated by the Board—amount of 
control, degree of independence and separation, the status of the 
relationship, and amount of investment—reflect the test the 
legislature has traditionally dictated in determining whether an 
individual is an independent contractor or an employee. The focus 
on control and independence is the same focus which other 
jurisdictions apply in examining this issue. See Larson at § 43, 
and cases cited therein. The inclusion of a category which has as 
its focus "status of the relationship" indicates that the common-
law definition of employee is also meant to be examined, although 
not controlling. See generally id. "Amount of investmentH 
dictates a more narrow examination into factors such as equipment 
requirements and who supplies them, but still addresses the more 
general question of control and independence. 
"While the Commission's interpretation of this word is not the 
only reasonable interpretation that could have been adopted, it is 
well within the limits of reasonableness that confine judicial 
review of administrative decisions of this nature." Salt Lake City 
Corp. y. Confer, 674 P.2d 632, 636 (Utah 1983) (citing Utah Deo't 
of Admin. Serv. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 658 P.2d 601# 609-12 (Utah 
1983)). See also Morton Int'l v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 163 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 34, 36-37 (Utah 1991). We conclude that the Board's 
interpretation of Utah Code Ann. S 35-4-22 (j) (5)
 # grouping the 
factors into four categories, was not unreasonable. 
B. Failure to Make Requisite Findings 
Tasters next arguep that the Board summarily disregarded many 
of the twenty factors enumerated in Subsection (j)(5), and failed 
to consider the facts underlying those factors. Tasters contends 
that the language "shall analyze all of the facts" requires the 
Board to study each and every fact underlying each of the twenty 
factors, and then determine if the factor relevant to those facts 
is to be considered.1 
1. In amending the statute, the Utah Legislature expressed no 
desire to change the emphasis or focus of the old test, but merely 
attempted to clarify its application: "(the old version of the 
statute) created somewhat of a hardship especially on small 
businesses in that there were those outside the business area that 
didn't understand the difference between an independent contractor 
and a [sic] employee." Senate Proceeding on Senate Bill No. 164. 
8. To determine if an individual is an independent contractor, 
(t]he commission shall analyze all of the 
facts in Subsections (A) through (T) under the 
(continued...) 
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The Board stated at the outset of its decision that section 
35-4-22(j) (5) "recognizes that not each of its 20 factors (A 
through T) will apply in every situation." The Board then 
determined that most of the factors in Category Two, except "R," 
and all of the factors in Category Four were not significant in the 
present case. For some of the factors that were considered by the 
Board to be relevant, such as the factors comprising Category One, 
evidence relating to the factors was outlined. For other relevant 
factors, e.g., Category Three, the Board simply stated that those 
factors were significant to the case. For Category Four, the Board 
simply stated that ,f[t]hese factors are not useful under the 
circumstances of this case since equipment reimbursements are 
minimal and expenses are reimbursed by Tasters'[s] clients.M No 
findings were made as to why some of the factors were 
insignificant, while others were considered significant. This 
analysis was in error. 
We agree with Tasters that the Board cannot dismiss as 
inapplicable one or more of the factors listed in the statute 
absent some discussion as to their inapplicability. Subsidiary 
findings must be made in sufficient detail on all necessary issues 
so that we may determine if "there is a logical and legal basis for 
the ultimate conclusions.11 Milne Truck Lines v. Public Service 
CommLn, 720 P.2d 1373, 1378 (Utah 1986). "The importance of 
complete, accurate, and consistent findings of fact is essential to 
a proper determination by an administrative agency." !£. Without 
such findings, we cannot review the Board's ultimate conclusion 
that Tasters's demonstrators were employees. Therefore, it is 
necessary to remand to make additional findings of fact that 
resolve the issues which are relevant to its decision. 
C. Challenge to Factual Findings 
The Board also concluded that Tasters's demonstrators were 
employees, and not independent contractors under the Act, after 
reviewing the record, and making its own findings of fact. Tasters 
challenges this determination. Because we reverse the Board's 
determination and remand for entry of appropriate findings of fact, 
we do not reach this issue. 
8. (...continued) 
common-law rules applicable to the employer-
employee relationship to determine if an 
individual is an independent contractor. An 
individual is an independent contractor if the 
weight of the evidence supports that finding. 
The following factors are to be considered if 
applicable . . . . 
Utah Code Ann. S 35-4-22(j)(5) (Supp. 1989). 
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CONCLUSION 
The case is remanded to the Department of Employment Security 
to make additional findings of fact which are relevant to the 
determination of employee or independent contractor status. 
Norman H. Jacks on, *"Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
f
^Z&ts<£/' 
Regnal W. Garff, Judge w 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
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BOARD OF REVIEW SMJVKAIVERT/odra 
The Indus tr ia l Commission of Utah 
Unenployment Compensation Appeals 
TASTERS LIMITED, INC. 
BTployer No, 1-117373-0 
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY 
Case No. 89-A-4044-Z 
DECISION 
Case No. 92-ER-262-T 
The Board of Review prev ious ly h e l d that food demonstrators working 
for the enployer, Tasters, could not be c la s s i f i ed as independent contractors 
under Section 35-4-22(j) (5) of the Utah Employment Security Act. Tasters 
appealed the Boardfs decision to the Utah Court of Appeals. The Utah Court of 
Appeals remanded the matter t o the Board t o make additional findings of fact 
with regard t o each of the factors articulated as appropriate for consideration 
by the Board under Section 35-4-22(j) (5) in making a determination of 
independent contractor status. 
Based upon i t s review of the record, the Board of Review makes the 
following findings of fact: Tasters i s in the business of providing workers to 
brokers and manufacturers' representatives for the purpose of demonstrating 
various products at grocery and departanent s tores . Each demonstrator works on 
an on-cal l , part-time basis with no guarantee of any particular schedule or 
number of work hours. Each demonstrator i s free to accept or decline offered 
assignments as he or she sees f i t . 
Tasters gives each demonstrator a two-page set of written instructions 
governing the perfonnance of the ir duties , including details such as at t ire , 
length of breaks, product display, and demonstration tactics. Demonstrators are 
prohibited from having children present, smoking, reading or s i t t ing while on 
the job. Orientation and other training sessions are sometimes held for 
demonstrators, but attendance i s not required. Payment for attendance at such 
meetings i s made by Tasters1 c l i e n t brokers or manufacturers. 
Once a demonstrator accepts a particular assignment, he or she must 
report for work according to a s e t schedule. The demonstrator*s performance in 
the store may be monitored by Tasters1 f i e ld representative or by Tasters1 
c l i e n t s . While individualized supervision i s not generally provided, the field 
representative and c l i ents give instruction when necessary. At the end of each 
demonstration, demonstrators are required to submit a report to Tasters. The 
report indicates what product was demonstrated, hew much of the product was sold 
during the demonstration, and any expenses incurred for the demonstration. Ihe 
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worker may report the respoi-ises of customers and any comments the demonstrator 
may have. Store managers may a l so provide comments on the report form. 
The demonstrators are either provided the supplies used in 
domonstration or reimbursed for their expense of such supplies. The 
demonstrators provide equipment, such as frying pans and card tables, at their 
cwn expense. Tasters sometimes provides microwave ovens, then charges i t s 
c l i e n t s rental fees for t h e i r use. 
Demonstrators are paid for a l l demonstrations by Tasters on a per job 
bas i s . Occasionally, demonstrators delegate assignments to other demonstrators, 
who then are paid for the work. Tasters carries Workers Compensation Insurance 
on the demonstrators but provides no other fringe benefits and does; not withhold 
payroll taxes from demonstrators1 pay checks. 
The demonstrators and Tasters are free to terminate their relationship 
with each other at any time. Demonstrators perform their s^irvices under 
Tasters' business name. Although they are free to perform services for other 
employers, none advertise, maintain off ices or obtain business l icenses. Many 
have other full-time or part-time jobs. Some are hcmemakers and some are 
students. 
In judging whether the foregoing facts substantiate Tasters1 position 
that i t s demonstrators are irrieperctent contractors, the Board of Review i s 
guided by Section 35-4-22.3(3) [fomerly 35-4-22(j) (5)] of the Utah Biployment 
Security Act, which provides in material part as follows: 
Services performed by an individual for wages or under any 
contract of hire , written or oral, express or ijiplied, are 
considered to be employment subject to this chapter, unless 
i t i s shewn to the sat is fact ion of the expromission that the 
individual i s an independent contractor. The ooranission 
shall analyze a l l of the facts in subsections (a) through 
(t) under the common-law rules applicable to the employer*-
emplqyee relationship t o deteodne i f an individual i s an 
independent contractor. An individual i s an independent 
contractor i f the weight of the evidence supports that 
finding. The following fcictors are to be considered i f 
applicable: [Factors (a) through (t) follow, but have been 
omitted due to the ir length.] 
The Board has careful ly examined each of the factors enunciated by 
Section 35-4-22.3(3) in l i ght of th is particular factual situation. The Board 
determines that the following factors are significant in shewing that Tasters1 
demonstrators are employees rather than independent contractors: 
nnn«**:ft 
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Factor (a) requires the Boani to determine "whether the individual 
works his own schedule or is required to conply with another person's 
instructions about when, where, and hew work is to be performed". 
Although individual demonstrators can decide not to accept 
certain assignments, they are not free to decide when, 
where, and hew their work is performed. They receive 
specific instructions on hew and when the demonstrations are 
to be performed. Since the demonstrators are required to 
conform to another person fs instructions about vfoen, where, 
and hew the work is to be performed, analysis of this factor 
strongly indicates employee status for Tasters 
demonstrators. 
Factor (b) requires the Board to decide "whether the individual uses 
his or her cwn methods and requires no specific training from the purchaser, or 
is trained by an experienced employee working with him or her, is required to 
take correspondence or other courses, attend meetings, and by other methods 
indicates that the employer wants the services performed". 
While Tasters does not make mandatory the classroom or 
seminar training it provides, it does provide written 
instruction about hew the work is to be done. The facts as 
examined under this factor shew employee status for Tasters 
demonstrators. 
Factor (c) asks "whether the individuals services are independent of 
the success or continuation of a business or are merged into the business where 
success and continuation of the business depends upon those services and the 
employer coordinates work with the work of others". 
The sole purpose of Tasters1 business is to conduct 
demonstrations for brokers. The individual demonstrators1 
services are not independent of the success and 
continuation of the business. Therefore, since the 
demonstrator service is merged into Tasters1 business, this 
factor very strongly indicates that the demonstrators are 
employees. 
Factor (g) asks "whether the individual establishes his own time 
schedule or the enplqyer sets the time schedule". 
Testimony from demonstrators shews that while demonstrators 
have the opportunity to reject offers of work from Tasters 
they must go to work at the time cc»TTmunicated to them by 
Tasters if they decide to work. Even though Tasters does 
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not set the time frames for each demonstration, Tasters 
alleys the brokers and store managers to make this decision 
for the demonstrators. Since the individual demonstrators 
do not set their am hours
 # analysis of the facts of this 
case under factor (g) strongly indicates employee status for 
the demonstrators. 
Factor (k) asks lfwhether the individual submits no reports or is 
required to submit regular oral or written reports to the employer". 
The fact that demonstrators are required to submit detailed 
reports to Testers at the end of each demonstration strongly 
indicates employee status as opposed to independent 
contractor status. 
Factor (m) requires the Board to consider if applicable 'Whether the 
individual accounts for his own expanses or is paid by the employer for 
expenses". 
Demonstrators are either provided incidental supplies, such 
as toothpicks, napkins, caps, by the store or broker or 
submit costs to Tasters, for reiiiixirsement. Significant to 
the Board is the fact that Tasters has the right to apprcve 
or disapprove questionable costs to be paid to the 
denraistrators when the costs are submitted to than for 
reiihbursement. Analysis of the facts under this factor 
strongly indicates employee status. 
Factor (p) asks f,whether the individual may realize a profit or 
suffer a loss as a result of services performed or cannot realize a profit or 
loss by making good or poor decisions". 
Analysis of the facts under this factor strongly indicates 
employee status as no matter hew the demonstrator runs his 
or her demonstration, it has no effect on his or her 
eventual pay for the demonstration. The individual's 
performance does not alter his or her profit or loss frexn 
the venture. 
Factor (r) asks "vhether the individual has his cwn office and 
assistants, holds a business license, is listed in business directories, 
maintains a business telephone, or advertises in newspapers or does not make 
services available except through a business in vhich he or she has no 
interest". 
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Some Tasters employees work for other demonstrator 
companies, but working part-time for several employers in 
the same line of business does not mean that the individual 
who performs that part-time enployment has h is or her cwn 
business. There i s nothing in the look or nature of the 
kind of work that Tasters demonstrators do, nor in the way 
they organize thei r work, to indicate they run their cwn 
businesses. The demonstrators do not have their cwn 
offices, they do not have business licenses, they do not 
advertise, maintain business phones or l i s t ings in business 
directories. Demonstrators work for others \iho have 
businesses. Analysis under th i s factor strongly indicates 
enployee status. 
Factor (o) requires the Board of Review to determine lfwhether the 
individual has a real, essential, and adequate investment in the business or 
has a lack of investment and depends on the enployer for such facil i t ies '1 . 
Testers argues that thei r demonstrators have a business 
investment in being a demonstrator in that they irust buy a 
card table, frying pan and other u tens i l s . The Board notes 
that these items can be purchased a t minimal cost, which 
does not constitute a significant investment. These items 
are not specialized equipment unique to th i s business but 
are conmonly cwned by most people. As a consequence, these 
items cannot be viewed as a business investment. The Board 
determines that the facts weighed against t h i s factor tend 
to indicate enployee status. 
The following factors are applicable in the matter at hand and tend to 
indicate independent contractor status for Tasters demonstrators: 
Factor (1) asks lfwhether the individual i s paid by the job or on a 
straight oonrussion or i s paid by the enployer in regular amounts a t stated 
intervals". 
Tasters demonstrators are paid by the job for each 
demonstration oonpleted and not by a regular pay check that 
comes a t a regular interval. 
Factor (q) asks "whether the individual works for a number of persons 
or firms at the same time or usually works for only one employer11. 
While not a l l of the individuals work for others, many of 
them do. Viewed alone, analysis of th i s factor would 
i n d i c a t e independent contractor s t a t u s for the 
demonstrators but since the demonstrators tend to work as 
enployees for other companies or individuals in different 
types of businesses. Analysis of th is factor shews 
independent contractor status only very weakly. 
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Factor (d) asks "whether the individuals services may he assigned to 
others or must be rendered personally11. 
Evidence in the record suggests that the denonstrators in a 
few instances have assigned their duties to others. The 
fact that this possibi l i ty i s available to demonstrators 
does tend to indicate independent contractor status. The 
Board gives this factor minimal significance# hcwever, since 
individual demonstrators assign their duties to others only 
rarely. Furthermore, substitutes are not under the control 
of the demonstrator, but are under control of Tasters to the 
same extent and degree as the demonstrator would have been 
had she performed the work. 
Factor (h) asks "whether the individual i s free to work when and for 
whan he chooses, or i s required to devote full-time to the business of the 
enployer, and i s restricted frcm doing other gainful work11. 
This question has minimal applicability in that the very 
nature of Tasters1 business means that no one could bet a 
full-time demonstrator for Tasters since demonstrations eire 
only set up during peak traffic hours in stores. S t i l l , 
since many Tasters employees have other work, analysis of 
the facts under th i s factor would tend to indicate 
independent contractor status,, 
Factor (n) requires the Board to examine "whether the individual 
furnishes his cwn tools or i s furnished tools and materials by the employer". 
This factor is one of minor significance, since vrtiile the 
demonstrators furnish their cwn "tools," these "tools" are 
not the kind associated with an independent business 
venture. Ihe denonstrators purchase, have and use "the 
tools of their trade" mostly for personal use in their own 
homes. Therefore, while factor (n) applies to the matter at 
hand, i t i s of marginal significance in i t s indication of 
independent contractor status for the denoistrators. 
Finally, some of the factors enumerated under Section 35-4-22.3(3) are 
not helpful in determining whether the demonstrators are independent contractors 
or employees: 
Factor (e) requires the Board to examine ,fwhether the individual has 
the right to hire, supervise, and pay other assistants pursuant to a contract 
under which the individual i s responsible only for the attainment of a result or 
the individual hires, supervises, and pays workers at the direction of the 
enployer". 
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The record does not show that when a demonstrator does get a 
replacement there is any kind of a contract governing the 
replacement's work. Clearly that kind of a transfer of a 
deiTonstrator's job is not at all what is anticipated by 
factor (e) anyway because of the short term and untechnical 
nature of the work done by Tasters demonstrators. 
Therefore, this factor is inapplicable. 
Factor (f) asks "whether the individual was hired to do one job and 
has no continuous business relationship with the person for whom the services 
are performed or continues to work for the same person year after year". 
This factor again adds nothing to the determination of 
independent contractor status in that both halves of the 
factor appear to be true. There is no way to give greater 
weight to either the employee portion of the factor or the 
independent contractor portion of the factor. While 
demonstrators are hired for each individual job, a 
continuous business relationship can also be maintained if 
Tasters keeps calling and the demonstrator keeps accepting 
demonstrations. An analysis of this factor gives no useful 
information in determining whether or not a demonstrator is 
an independent contractor or an enployee. 
Factor (i) requires the Board to determine "whether the individual 
uses his or her cwn office, desk, telephone, or other equipment or is 
physically within the employer's direction and supervision". 
Tasters demonstrators do their work at stores cwned by 
others. Since neither the individual demonstrators nor 
Tasters cwns, operates or manages the sites where work is 
performed, this factor is inapplicable and of no use in 
determining whether the demonstrators are employees or 
independent contractors. 
Factor (j) requires the Board to determine "wliether the individual is 
free to perform services at his or her w n pace or performs service in the order 
or sequence set by the employer". 
Demonstrators work consists of handing out samples to those 
who pass by for a set period of time. There is no "pacing" 
involved in this kind of work and no ordered sequence of 
duties because of the nature of the work. This factor is 
therefore inapplicable to the present fact situation. 
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Factor (s) asks "whether the individual may not fce fired or 
discharged as long as he produces a result which meets contract specifications 
or may be discharged at any time". 
There i s no evidence in the record that Tasters has 
discharged a demonstrator in the middle of a shift , but 
Tasters does drop people from their computer l i s t i f they do 
not accept jobs often enough or i f they perform poorly. 
Since the termination of the work arrangement between 
Tasters and i t s demonstrators i s different than both of the 
scenarios anticipated by factor ( s ) , factor (s) i s not 
helpful in reaching a determination of whether the 
demonstrators are independent contractors or enplcyees. 
Factor (t) requires the Board t o determine "whether the individual 
agrees to corplete a specif ic service , and i s responsible for i t s satisfaction 
or i s legal ly obligated to perform the service, or may terminate his or her 
relationship with the employer at any time". 
This factor i s inapplicable for the same reasons discussed 
above in the analysis of factor ( s ) . Termination of the 
employment agreement between Testers and i t s demonstrators 
occurs merely by that person's name being dropped off the 
computer l i s t so that the individual i s not called to work, 
or by the individual declining assignments. 
In summary, a careful analysis of each factor articulated under 
Section 35-4-22.3(3) of the Utah Enployment Security Act reveals that the 
preponderance of the evidence weighs heavily against a ruling that Tasters 
demonstrators are independent contractors. The demonstrators are under the 
direct ion and control of Tasters, as evidenced by Tasters' detailed written 
instructions to the demonstrators, Tasters' requirement that dcanonstrators 
submit written reports of each demonstration completed, Tasters' review of the 
demonstrators' use of incidental supplies before approval of repayment can be 
made, and the fact that demonstrators cannot s e t their own time frames for work 
but must work the schedule set by the store as cxxrimunicated to them l?y Tasters. 
Furthermore, the demonstrators are not in business for themselves but 
are an integral part of Tasters' business, as evidenced by the fact that none of 
the demonstrators have a financial investment in the business, none can realize 
prof i t or loss from the manner in which they do their work, and none hold 
business l icenses , maintain business phones or cards or advertise, line Board of 
Review therefore affirms the decis ion of the Administrative Law Judge that 
Tasters demonstrators are not independent contractors within the meaning of 
Section 35-4-22.3(3) of the Utah Employment Security Act, but are employees 
within the meaning of the Utah Enployment Security Act. 
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Nelson: Yes. Yes. If I—if I was busy that weekend, I didnft have to, ah, do 
it; and she would ca—therefs her name, Patsy Buckmiller. 
Judge: Okay. Did you ever decline any work? 
Nelson: Yes. 
Judge: Was there any problems when you declined the work? 
Nelson: No. No, there wasn't. 
Judge: Did you work any particular hours? 
Nelson: Ah, ah, yeah, there was. There was either from, let me think. It was 
either from 10 to 5 or 11 to 6 and then sometimes there would only 
have an—an afternoon one, which would usually run about 12 to, ah, 6. 
Judge: Hew were these hours determined? 
Nelson: Ah, let me see. I think it was supposed to be an eight-hour work day 
on, ah, the main day, not the short day, the new one. And, ah, then 
we would get, ah, usually an hour off for lunch. 
Judge: Do you know who determined these hours? 
Nelson: I assume, ah, it was the grocery store. 
Judge: Why do you assume it was the grocery store? 
Nelson: Well, 'cause t—they would, ah, ah, from what I understood, they would 
call Tasters and say they wanted a demonstration done; and I as—so I 
assumed they were the ones that said what the hours were—that they 
wanted the demonstration done. 
Judge: Once you had received the hours you were to be present, were you 
required to be present throughout those scheduled hours? 
Nelson: Yes. 
Judge: Could you leave the premises at all during those—during those hours? 
Nelson: Ah, I did not. I do knew like if, ah, I know one lady she got seme 
stuff spilled on her clothes and she had to go heme and change; but 
then, when she came back, she did work, I think it was extra half an 
hour to make up for when she left. 
Judge: Okay. What is the basis of your pay? 
Nelson: Ahm, the basis of my pay. 
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Judge: Are you paid per jab, per hour, ocnitdssion? 
Nelson: It seems like it was per Job. I—it was, let me think. It was--oh, 
look at my papers here, what they were. I think it was $30.00 per 
day, if I remember right. 
Judge: And that's for an ei^it-hour day? 
Nelson: Uh-huh. 
Judge: If you worked, ah, the sh—just the afternoon denonstration, what was 
the basis of your pay? 
Nelson: Ah, new that I don't remember. I remember I did one. Let me see if I 
have that paper here—when I did it. I can't remember. I know it was 
less than $30.00. I remember that; so apparently it must have been on 
an hourly basis; 'cause I do know that on the short day it was less 
than the—the eight-hour day. 
Judge: Okay. Would anybody visit the demonstration to see what you were 
doing? 
Nelson: Yes. 
Judge: Who would that person be? 
Nelson: That was Patsy Buckmiller and sometimes the other lady who got me 
started, Debbie Henry. 
Judge: And what was the purpose of these visits? 
Nelson: Ah, the first few times was to come and make sure I was doing okay, 
beca—you know, 'cause I had just started; and then the other times 
was to see if there was anything that—that I needed that they could 
go and get for me and to see if, ah, there was enough product to 
demonstrate. 
Judge: Would anybody else check on you? 
Nelson: No. 
Judge: Was there ever occasion vtoere the store manager would check on you? 
Nelson: Ah, he oould have, 'cause I knew I saw him a lot. You knew, they— 
they'd walk by, so they oould have been diecking also. 
Judge: Okay. Would you[ explain exactly what you do in your demonstrations, 
hew—from the beginning to end, 
Nelson: Okay. I would go in and set up my table and, ah, we put the—the 
product out on the table in a display. We had our cooking pains there 
to cook the food if it needed to be cooked; and we would start up the 
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cooking—like, say if it was hot dogs, we'd start cooking them. We'd 
have napkins and, ah, or toothpicks there for the people to take i— 
you know, when they took the—the saxrple; and we had the sample set 
out on a plate or sometimes there were individual paper cups that they 
could take the samples and sample them. When the people would walk 
by, I would ask them if they would lite a sample and sane would say 
yes and sane would say no; and I would-~-when they would sample it, I 
would tell them about the product, how much it was and if it was on 
sale and if there was anything liJce no cholesterol or—or you knew, 
important little factors that pecple would like to knew, hew to fix it 
if they didnft know how to fix it. 
Judge: Okay. And what would happen at the conclusion of your work? 
Nelson: Ah, I would fold up my table and put it away. Ah, the packages fron 
the product I keep in a sack and I would count them and fill out a 
paper that we had that we kept inventory of what we had used and what 
was on the shelves and, ah, then the store manager would have to sign 
it and—or their manager of that departaient would have to sign it and 
okay everything. Ah, I would leave the empty sacks with them so that 
they knew what the count was. If there was any little bit of product 
left over, we was allowed to take that home. 
Judge: Okay. This report that you had indicated where you listed inventory, 
was that just for inventory or was there other information on the 
report? 
Nelson: Let's see. On the report was the name of the product, hew many cases 
there was to begin with, ah, how many there was after it was over and 
then hew many was used as sanples and then they kind of estimated hew 
many units were sold because of the demonstration. Ah, let's see, 
what else was on there. The name of the store is on there and, ah, 
ah, what the weather was like was on there; and they also had us fill 
out what the people said, conroents and th—where the store manager 
signed and also their comments. That—thatfs basically what was on 
the paper. 
Judge: Okay. Why did you obtain the store manger's signature? 
Nelson: Ah, I don't knew. I assume because it was their store and they had to 
okay the demonstration. I knew before we ever went in to demonstrate, 
we had to call and okay it with them that it was all right that we did 
this demonstration; and then I guess they, ah, it was part of their 
responsibility; and so they needed to sign it and okay it. 
Judge: All right. After you have the report ocnpleted, what did you do with 
the report? 
Nelson: I would mail it to Tasters at—let's see. I would—there was two 
copies. I would, ah, give one to the store, the manager of the 
department and then, ah, I would take the other one, if I remember 
right, and send it to Tasters. 
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determined that your work for them was unsatisfactory and they had, 
ah, terminated the relationship, would you feel that they would have 
had any liability as far as you were concerned? 
Nelson: I don't think so. 
Levanger: Okay. That's all the questions I have. 
Judge: Counsellor, do you have sane questions? 
Doctorman: I do. Beverly, my name is Gary Doctorman. I'm an attorney and 
represent Tasters, Inc. I—I will have a few questions for you. 
Nelson: Okay. 
Doctorman: If Tasters asked you to, say, go to Provo to do a demonstration, would 
you feel free to turn them dcwn? 
Nelson: Oh, yes. They, ah, called and asked me to go to, ah, Castledale one 
day; and I told them no, that I didn't want to travel that far to go 
and do a demonstration. 
Doctorman: So would it be true th—then where do you generally perform your 
demonstrations? 
Nelson: I generally do it here in Price. 
Doctorman: Is that your place of choice? 
Nelson: Yes. 
Doctorman: And if Tasters asked you to perform a demonstration at a time that was 
inconvenient to you and you didn't want to perform it at that time, 
would you feel free to turn that dcwn? 
Nelson: Yes. 
Doctorman: And would there be any repercussions for, ah, that? 
Nelson: No, there wasn't. 
Doctorman: So you effectively could select the time and place with which you 
wanted to work by either accepting or rejecting, ah, available 
demonstrations. Is that correct? 
Nelson: Yes. 
Doctorman: Did Tasters ever tell you specifically hew to perform the details of 
your demonstration or were the details left to you to determine? 
Nelson: The details were left to me to determine. 
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Doctorman: You never attended any training session in Salt Lake put on by 
Tasters? Is that correct? 
Nelson: That's right. 
Doctorman: Did Tasters ever tell you that you could not assign your services to 
any other person? 
Nelson: No. 
Doctontan: Did Tasters ever tell you that you could not hire an assistant, if you 
s — 
Nelson: No. 
Doctorman: If, ah, for instance, you had scheduled yourself for a—an all-day 
session and you determined that, after you had scheduled that session, 
that you could only work half that time, would you have considered 
hiring or using someone else to work the other half of that shift? 
Nelson: Yes, we—we did that. Ah, if one of us had to go someplace, ah, they 
would call one of the other ladies that would also do demos, and they 
would cone in and fill in for them. 
Doctorman: Did Tasters tell you when you could take lunch breaks? 
Nelson: No, they did not. I knew that we had a lunch break, but they did not 
say at what time we had to take then. 
Doctorman: Did Tasters tell you at what time you could take breaks during the 
day? 
Nelson: No. 
Doctorman: Did Tasters monitor your breaks or your lunch breaks? 
Nelson: Not that I know of, they didn't. 
Doctorman: And, if you wanted to have left the store at any time for the day, for 
your personal reasons or for an emergency, did you have to report to 
Tasters? 
Nelson: No, I did not. 
Doctorman: Did Tasters have a requirement on the pace of your work? And by that 
I mean hew many people that you contacted in the store, hew—hew many 
products that you demonstrated or get o—or gave out or any o—any of 
those factors? 
Nelson: No, they didn't. 
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Doctorman: And it's clear that Tasters didn't provide any equipment, and you 
provided all your own equipment. 
Nelson: Yes. I provided al my own equipment. 
Doctorman: What, ah, do you believe your investment in that equipment to be? 
In dollar figures. 
Nelson: Dollar figures. Ah— 
Doctorman: Ycu can either add it up—however you want to do it. You can do it 
out loud or—wh—piece by piece or as a whole, whatever you'd like to 
do. 
Nelson: Oh, let's see. I had the card table and a table cloth and frying pan, 
utensils. I guess around $40.00, $40.00-$45 00. 
Doctorman: You can buy a card table and frying and utensils for $40.00 in Price? 
Nelson: (Laughing) Let me think of it. Card tables are usually $20.00, and 
frying pans are usually around $20.00. Now, a table cloth would 
probably run around $5.00. I guess it would be more than $40.00. 
Doctorman: Okay. 
Nelson: Probably, ah, between 45 and—probably more like $50.00. 
Doctorman: All right. Do you know whether- Tasters used the, ah, document that 
you submitted to them for their own internal purposes. Do you know 
why they use that document that you sent to them at the end of the 
day? 
Nelson: Ah, I a—I assumed— 
Doctorman: I don't want you to assume. 
Nelson: Oh. 
Doctorman: I want you just to tell me whether or not you knew. 
Nelson: I don't knew. 
Doctorman: Okay. Thank you. And do you knew whether or not Tasters was 
reimbursed by the food product demonstrator for your expenses? 
Nelson: No, I don't knew. 
Doctorman: If, ah, di—did you fry foods there? 
Nelson: Yes. 
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Doctorman: I'm just looking at my notes here for a second, I'm sorry for the 
delay. 
Nelson: That's okay* 
Doctorman: Who asked you to work with Dynamic Demos? 
Nelson: Ah, Patsy did. 
Doctorman: Okay. This is the same Patsy Buckmiller that also wor—also visited 
you when you were working for Testers? 
Nelson: Yes. 
Doctontan: Okay. Did—do you know i f you paid Patsy any fee for, whether your 
work was at TfeTters or Dynamics? 
Nelson: No. 
Doctorman: You don't knew vrtiether or not a fee was paid? 
Nelson: I don't know. I don't think I did. As far as I knew, I didn't. 
Doctorman: Okay. And finally, I understood at the—at the end of your 
questioning frcm the Judge that you understood Tasters to somewhat be 
a middleman between the brokers—the food brokers and yourselves. 
Nelson: Yes. 
Doctorman: Let me just shortly consult with my client and see if she has any 
questions, and then I'll— 
I have no further questions, Your Honor. 
Judge: Okay. Thank you. I have one question for clarification here. You 
indicated that if there was a need for you to take time off a 
substitute would be arranged. Did this ever incur to you? 
Nelson: Did I—to, ah— 
Judge: Did you ever have a substitute? 
Nelson: No. Wha—no. Didn't. 
Judge: Okay. Mr. Levanger, any further questions? 
Levanger: No. I do not believe so. 
Judge: All right then. Thank you for your time and we'll excuse you. 
Nelson: Okay. Thank you. 
Judge: Good-bye. 
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Judge: Okay. Do you recall entering any—into any, ah, written or oral 
contract? 
Baird: I don't think so. I don't think so. I did get a letter from them 
saying I would be th—ah# s—ah, self-enployed, that I'd be liable for 
self-employment tax. Ah,— 
Judge: All right. 
Baird: That's it. 
Judge: Is it my understanding that work you performed then was demonstrating 
food products in grocery stores? 
Baird: Yes. 
Judge: Did you perform any work outside of that parameter? 
Baird: No. No, other than going into meetings in Salt Lake, ah, and being 
paid for that. We received $10.00 for going to instructional meetings 
in Salt Lake, but that's all. Other than that, the only work I did 
for them was in grocery stores. Yes. 
Judge: And hew were you paid for your work you performed in the grocery 
stores? 
Baird: By check. 
Judge: Okay. Were you paid by the day, by the hour? What was the basis? 
Baird: By the day. 
Judge: Hew much were you paid? 
Baird: Ah, it was $5.00 an hour, so it was, ah, we were paid for—well, 
usually I worked th—it was seven hours and i—I was there for eight 
hours, but I had half an hour for lunch and two 15-minute breaks. 
Judge: How often would you come to Salt Lake for a meeting? 
Baird: Oh,not very often. Ah, once in—probably once in six months, 
something like that. 
Judge: And what was the purpose for the meeting? 
Baird: Just to show, ah, just for us to learn the procedure that we needed to 
follow in—in demoing a particular product. 
Judge: And hew would you learn of the meeting? 
Baird: They would go through the— 
Judge: Excuse me, how did you knew that the meeting was— 
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Baird: —that we needed to know and# ah, then someone would demonstrate hew 
we would—hew we would, ah, promote that particular product. 
Judge: How would you knew that a meeting was to be held? 
Baird: Hm. Do you remember if I got a letter or if that was, ah, I don't— 
Judge: Okay. Ms. Baird, a*e you speaking with somebody else there? 
Baird: Yes. My husband is right here. 
Judge: Okay, just give your testimony to the best of your recollection and— 
and don't consult with anybody else. 
Baird: Okay. I really—I really don't remember. I believe it was by— 
through the mail, and notice through the mail; but I—I don't remember 
and I don't have anything on hand— 
Judge: Okay. 
Baird: —to verify that. 
Judge: That's fine. Were you required to attend the meeting? 
Baird: No. I don't believe so. 
Judge: So it was le-left up to your discretion vftiether you'd come into the 
meeting. 
Baird: I wasn't, ah, I wasn't, ah, punished in any way or deprived from work 
by not attending. 
Judge: All right. Who would be present at the meetings? 
Baird: Pardon me? 
Judge: Who would be present at the meetings? 
Baird: Ah, oh, a great many of the other demonstrators. I think, ah, the 
demonstrators that went to the meetings were the ones that 
demonstrated the product. 
Judge: Where was the meeting held? 
Baird: In a location in southwest Salt Late. I don't recall the location of 
it at the moment. It was up east of Highland Drive and, ah, about 
40th South. 
Judge: Okay. Was it in a commercial building, in a heme? 
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Judge: Who determined those hours of work? 
Baird: I don't knew. I don't know. They were just, ahm, a information sheet 
I received when I was told where to go and—and what I was—would be 
demoing and, ah, let's see, Sandi signed it. 
Judge: Okay. Yo—are you saying then that you received same* type of 
correspondence in the mail exxrarning the demonstration? 
Baird: Yes. 
Judge: Okay. What would be in that information you'd receive? 
Baird: I didn't hear you. 
Judge: What would be in that information you would receive from Ms. Ochn? 
Baird: Oh, let's see. I have a sanple here. I'll read it. Now this isn't 
signed by anybody. It's from Taster^ Inc., ah, Sandi Oohn, at the 
top of the letterhead: dem—"Demonstration Report", for instance, 
this time I did Albertsons. I was report-to report to a particular 
person and, ah, the times were from 11 to 7 and 10 to 6, ah, on Friday 
and Saturday. From, ah, let's see, vtoat else di—was your question? 
Judge: Okay. Ah, that would cover it. 
Baird: Okay. And then on this same for we—we gave back the information of 
how it went, how much we sold, that type of thing. 
Judge: Did you oonplete a report on the conclusion of every demonstration? 
Baird: Yes. 
Judge: And do you knew the reason for the report? 
Baird: It was, ah, for the pr~for the producers or the manufacturers to knew 
hew much was sold and then we also sent a copy in to the main office. 
Judge: To who's main office? 
Baird: Tasters. 
Judge: Okay. Did anybody supervise you vrfiile you were performing your 
demonstrations? 
Baird: No. Occasionally one of the girls from the main office, ah, would 
cane and—would come by and see hew we were doing and—but we—no, we 
weren't—there wasn't somebody there all the time. 
Judge: Who would come by to visit? 
Baird: I don't really remember the names of the other girls. I think there 
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was a Bonnie and, ah, hm, there were about three, ah; and they just 
come by to see how we were doing and—and, ah, help us if there was 
some way they could shew us how to do it better. 
Judge: Okay. You mentioned they were from the main office. How do you knew 
they were from the main office? 
Baird: Well, because they worked with Sandi. They were there at the meetings 
when—when we had—they were part of the one—they were seme of the 
people that shewed us how to do—hew to demonstrate a product. 
Judge: Okay. Did you furnish your own equipment? 
Baird: Yes. 
Judge: Did Tasters furnish you with anything? 
Baird: Ah, something like a—a micrcwave or a, ah, or a fry pan, something 
like that; but usually it was my own—ray own equipment, spatulas and— 
and all the things I needed. Ihey furnished us with aprons. We paid 
$10.00 for the aprons and—and, ah, so they sold us those, but, ah, 
no. It was primarily ray own equipment. 
Judge: Was there any logo on the apron? 
Baird: Yes, Tasters. 
Judge: Okay. Do you perform this type of work for anybody else? 
Baird: No. Not during the period of time I was working for Tasters. No. 
Judge: Were you free to accept or decline any of the jobs? 
Baird: Yes. 
Judge: Did you receive a questionnaire from the Department? 
Baird: Yes. From—you mean from— 
Judge: From the Department of Employment Security. 
Baird: Yes, I did. 
Judge: Did anyone instruct you in the manner in which the document was to be 
completed? 
Baird: No. 
Judge: Did you on—answer the, ah, questions honestly in the bes—and to the 
best of your ability? 
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Levanger: 
Baird: 
Levanger: 
Baird: 
Levanger: 
Baird: 
Levanger: 
Baird: 
Levanger: 
Baird: 
Levanger: 
Baird: 
Levanger: 
Baird: 
Levanger: 
Baird: 
Doctorman: 
Baird: 
Doctorman: 
rxurii^  this time, did you have an office? 
No. 
Do you have a business license? 
No. 
Are ycu listed in alhy kind of business directories? 
No. 
You donft—do you, ah, maintain a business telephone? 
No. 
Do you advertise in the newspapers? 
No. 
Was there any time during this period of time that, ah, you incurred 
any loss or liability as a result of the type of work that you do? 
Ah, let me think. No. No. 
There was no occasion that you recall, for exairple, that you may have 
spilled something on a customer or something of that nature, a frying 
pan falling on somebody's toe? 
No. 
Okay. Thank you. That's all the questions I have. Thank1 s Eve. 
Okay, Counsellor, do you have some questions you'd like to ask? 
Yes, Your Honor. 
Eve, my name is Gary Doctorman; and to clarify the record! for the 
Judge, I had thought that I had known you. I told him before we 
called, but— 
I can't hear you, Gary. 
I will speak up. I apologize. 
Eve, my name is Gary Doctorman. I'm an attorney. I represent Tasters 
in this hearing, and before the hear—before we called you on the 
telephone, I'd represented to the Judge that I knew you; but after I 
had—just from the name, I think I have a mistaken identity. D—we 
don't knew each other, do we? 
Baird: Ah, no. Not—I don't believe so. 
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Baird: Ah, to see how sales were going and see how—i—I—if I were doing the 
job the way it was supposed to be done and to—for optimum sales, ah, 
th—I—and their appearance helped roe to do the j—once th—once or 
twice they just, ah, took seme of the demo material and—and, ah, 
showed me—n~-didnft show me how to do it, but just went up to 
custcmers and—and, ah, I suppose, helped me. 
Doctonnan: As a general rule, were you at the store alone or were yc^ji there with 
a supervisor from Tasters? 
Baird: Alone. 
Doctonnan: And it was only on a couple of occasions that somebody from Tasters 
appeared at the store? 
Baird: Oh, no. No. It was much more than that. I worked for them for, hm, I 
think, what, two years—a year-and-a-half or two years. I donft 
recall. 
Doctorman: Do you knew whether or not the people who appeared at the store were 
directly frcro Tasters, or were they fron the food manufacturers such 
as Proctor and Gamble or Budget Gourmet, things of that nature? 
Baird: Ihey were from Tasters. 
Doctorman: Okay. But the details of the work, the hour-to-hour work, was left to 
you to determine how to do. 
Baird: Yes, after we were told how to do it. 
Doctorman: Did Tasters ever tell you that you were—that you had to perform the 
services personally? 
Baird: Oh, no. Why would they do that if they contacted me. Ihey informed 
me by letter of—no. Ihey didn't tell me that I had to do it 
personally; but I wouldn't send ray husband to do it. 
Doctorman: Okay. But that would be your decision. Tasters didn't tell you you 
couldn't send your husband to do it, did they? 
Baird: No. 
Doctorman: Did Tasters ever tell you that you did not have the right to hire 
assistants to assist you in your demonstration? 
Baird: No. It di—it never came up. It didn't occur to me. If I am 
supposed to do a job, I do it myself. 
Doctorman: But if, ah, perchance, that you had agreed to take a job and then 
southing came up and you could only work half the job, ah, did 
Tasters ever tell you you couldn't hire somebody to do the other half 
of the job? 
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Baird: That didn't come up either. 
Doctorman: Okay. It just wasn't an issue for you then? 
Baird: No. 
Doctorman: All right. That's fine. If a time schedule did not work for you, say 
they--Tasters wanted a demonstration frxm 12 midnight 'til 6 in the 
morning, you didn't feel you could work at that time, could you turn 
that down? 
Baird: That's hypothetical. I don't, ah, I don't think that's relevant. I ~ 
it—that never came up, I — 
Doctorman: Okay. If any time schedule was inapprop—or inappropriate because you 
wanted to visit a neighbor or take a vacation, ah, did you feel free 
to turn it down? 
Baird: Ah, yes, I think so. 
Doctorman: Okay. 
Baird: I don't think I turned down very many, but, ah, if any; but I would 
have felt free to, ah, a—to ask them, yes. 
Doctorman: Okay. Did Tasters ever tell you that you had to work only for 
Tasters? 
Baird: Only for Tasters? 
Doctorman: Yes. 
Baird: No. 
Doctorman: You were free to work for other peqple? 
Baird: That's right. 
Doctorman: Okay. What sort of investment did you have in the equipment that you 
purchased? 
Baird: Oh, it was mirdmum^ I think. I paid about $40.00 for the fry pan and 
$10.00 for the apron and, ah, table cloth from time to time. Ah, 
that's about it; and the gas to and from was—sometimes amounted to 
something, but— 
Doctorman: What about the card table? That— 
Baird: Oh, yeah. But that's scmething~-everybody has a card table. That's— 
my husband just put a legs on it and it worked great. 
Doctorman: Okay. And the serving pieces? Ah, were those something that had to 
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Baird: No, it's not. 
Doctorman: Did Tasters set a paoe for you? In other wards, what I'm asking you, 
did they tell you how many people to solicit or hew many products to— 
that you had to demonstrate in the course of a day, or was that left 
to you? 
Baird: That was left to me, of course, the more we demonstrated, the more we 
sold; and I tried to sell the very most I could. 
Doctonnan: Okay. 
Baird: They—they determined the product and the—and the method of demoing 
and— (inaudible). 
Doctorman: Did Tasters ever tell ycu you were paid by the hour or did you just 
take the job rate and divide it by the hour? 
Baird: They didn't tell me when to take a break. I would take it when it was 
not as busy, and sometimes I didn't take one at all; so that's—that 
was at my discretion. 
Doctorman: Ah, I th— 
Baird: Told me the hours. They gave me the written time to work, 11 to 7, 10 
to 6, that type of thing. 
Doctorman: Ah, you—this speaker phone may not, ah, be the best, ah, medium and I 
appreciate your answer, but I di—that wasn't the question that I 
asked, an— 
Baird: Oh. 
Doctorman: And so, let me—th—let me just confirm th—the answer that you gave 
was another question I was going to ask, and that was that Tasters 
did not tell you when to take lunch breaks or when to take, ah, any 
other break during the day. Is that correct? 
Baird: That's right. 
Doctorman: And the question that I—that I previously asked was concerning your 
pay. 
Baird: Yes. 
Doctorman: Did yo—you'd said once in your testimony you were paid by the job and 
then at another time you said you were paid by the hour. Did— 
Baird: (inaudible). 
Doctorman: Did you—le—let me just get the question out if I could, please; ah, 
and I—I don't mean to interrupt you, but I—I do have a specific 
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question. Did you take the job rate and divide it by the number of 
hours you worked, ocme up with the hourly rate? 
Baird: No. No. They paid me $5.00 an hour. However, if I sold everything 
that the store had in; and they could not get any more in, then that 
was—that was my job for the day and they paid me for the full day; so 
that's why I—that's why I didn't always work the full—the full 
second day, because I had sold everything out. 
Doctontvan: And—and that day you went heme early, but still got a full day—a 
full— 
Bairxi: Yes. 
Doctorman: —pay. 
Baird: Uh-huh. 
Doctorman: Okay. And was that your understanding, if that occurred on a repeated 
basis, that you would be paid the amount for—for a full-day 
demonstration even though you ran out of product and went home earlier 
in the day? 
Baird: I—that didn't come up until—well, I was delighted when I first did 
that and they paid me for the full amount. 
Doctorman: Okay. 
Baird: I didn't knew that. 
Doctorman: It came up on one occasion then? 
Baird: Oh, on quite a few occasions. Ah, but I didn't knew it until I had 
worked for than—oh, I don't knew, six months or so. 
Doctorman: Hew many occasions did that occur on? 
Baird: Oh, golly, I have no i—I don't knew. 
Doctorman: More than three? 
Baird: Yes. 
Doctorman: Okay. Less than 20? 
Baird: Yes. 
Doctontvan: Okay. Neighborh—round—just an estimate of hew many times; that you 
ran out of product and were given a full, ah, deraonstra—a full fee 
for an entire demonstration day and— 
Baird: I couldn't give an estimate on that. 
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Oolmere: With Tasters? 
Judge: Uh-huh. 
Colmere: Ah, demonstration, selling the product of the broker. 
Judge: All the work you did involved demonstrating products? 
Oolmere: Right. 
Judge: Where did you perform the work? 
Colmere: In grocery stores. 
Judge: All the work you performed then was in grocery stores? 
Oolmere: Right. 
Judge: Were—were you paid by the hour or by the day? What was the basis for 
your pay? 
Colmere: I never figured it as an hourly wage. I just received for the two 
days work that I received, I received the amount of $70.00. 
Judge: Were there occasions where you'd work less than two days? 
Colmere: Sometimes it was just a Saturday job, yes. 
Judge: Hew nuch would you get paid for the Saturday job? 
Oolmere: $35.00. 
Judge: Hew many hours would you work? 
Oolmere: Ah, from 10 to 6, half-an-hour lunch. 
Judge: Who scheduled the hours? 
Colmere: Tasters. 
Judge: And why would the hours be scheduled from 2 to 6? 
Colmere: That usually, in the grocery store, the traffic is the most prcminent 
frcm 10 in the morning until 6 in the afternoon. That is vtoen the 
traffic is more prominent in the grocery store. 
Judge: Oculd ycu take more than a half-hour lunch if you decided to do so? 
Colmere: No. 
Judge: Why oould^t you? 
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Coliaare: I never thought about it. I always just—half-an-hour lunch. 
Judge: Okay. Who told you you could take a half-an-hour lunch? 
Colmere: Pardon me? 
Judge: Who told you that you were only afforded a half-an-hour for lunch? 
Oolmere: Tasters. 
Judge: Do you recall in particular who the iniividual was? 
Oolmere: No. 
Judge: Okay. 
Oolmere: There's many people at Tasters, many girls. 
Judge: Did you ever participate in any training? 
Oolmere: No. I was already trained front my previous demonstration job. 
Judge: Did you ever attend any meetings? 
Colmere: When the broker requests an item that he has to put into the grocery 
store that needs special attention to sell th—that product, yes. 
Judge: So these meetings would be required by the broker. 
Oolmere: Correct. I—Ifm selling his product. 
Judge: Okay. Ah, were you free to decide whether you would attend the 
meeting or not? 
Oolmere: Pardon me? 
Judge Could you decline to go to the meeting if you desired to? 
Oolmere: Oh, yes. Oh, yes. If I didn't want to do that product, I didn't 
have to go to the meeting nor do the demonstration. 
Judge: Well, let's say, for instance, you wanted to do the product— 
Oolmere: Okay. 
Judge: —but do not want to attend the meeting. 
Colmere: Oh, you don't have to attend the meeting. 
Judge: So you could do the demonstration without— 
Oolmere: Right. 
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Judge: —the meeting. 
Colmere: Right. 
Judge: Were you paid while you attended the meeting? 
Oolmere: Yes. 
Judge: Hew much were you paid for your attendance? 
Colmere: $10.00. 
Judge: What would take place at the meetings? 
Oolmere: The broker would be there. He would request hew he wanted 
represented, ah, what we were to say to present this product, ah, shew 
us the product, what the product tastes like. 
Judge: You mentioned here he would tell you what to say. Would they give you 
a dialogue? 
Colmere: Yes. They would—they wanted you to put a presentation of th~the 
product that you're selling to the public, so theyfd tell you vrtiat to 
say. 
Judge: And this would be the broker? 
Colmere: Uh-huh. 
Judge: Would he verbally tell you or would he give you a written format for 
yo to follow? 
Oolmere: Ju—just, you know, he would—he would tell us what—what he would 
request us to say. We could put it in our cwn words, but he wanted 
that presentation brought to, you knew— 
Judge: He would give you the general ideas. 
Colmere: Right. 
Judge: Did you furnish anything outside of the frying pan, card table, table 
cloth, utensils and that type of thing? 
Oolmere: No. I furnished them. 
Judge: Okay. That would be the extent of the things you would furnish? 
Colmere: Uh-huh. 
Judge: Would Tasters ever furnish you with anything? 
Colmere: A micrcwave oven if it was needed. 
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Colmere: Hu-uh. 
Judge: Okay. Did you ever incur any particular problems during the: course of 
your demonstration that you oouldnft handle? 
Colmere: No. But if there was, I would have to take that up with the store 
manager. The—the minute—the way that I see it is, when I walk into 
this grocery store, I have to follow their rules of the way the store 
is run and handled; and I think that that store manager is—does then 
beocme my boss for the two days that, ah, I am there. If a problem 
should cone up, I ha—I more than likely would take it up with the 
store manger. 
Judge: Okay. What interaction would you have with the store manager? 
Colmere: Well, the—the first thing that I do is I go and ask him where he 
would like me to set up; and he will say here or there; and if there's 
a product, if he111—if my—if lfm standing beside my product or if 
I'm not, he'll say, "Would you like to go stand by your product or 
would you rather be further away frcm the product that you're 
demonstrating?" And usually I'll say, "No. I like to be standing 
beside it." And he'll say, "Okay, that's fine. What wet'11 do is 
we'll just move the product down to \ibere you are standing,," And he 
sets it up so I'm right there by the product that I'm demonstrating. 
Ah, if there's anything I—I need, such as maybe a long extension 
cord, which I do not carry. I carry an extension cord, but if I do 
need a long one, then I usually go to the store manager and say, you 
knew, could you find me one or would you help roe and— 
Judge: Okay. Would anyone ever assist you in your work? 
Colmere: No. 
Judge: Ah, did you ever have somebody substitute for you? 
Colmere: No. 
Judge: What reports would you ccnplete? 
Colmere: Ah, I'm sent a fact sheet on every job. It would be hew much product 
I have before I started work, how much product I had for the 
demonstration and how much product did I sell; and then I would have 
it signed by the store manager. 
Judge: Okay. What was the purpose of having the store manager sign the 
report? 
Colmere: To verify that I was there for the two days. 
Judge: Okay. While performing this work for Tasters, did you do this type of 
work for anybody else? 
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Colmere: No. 
Judge: Did you seek to do it for anybody else? 
Colmere: Yes, they—I have demon—other demonstrators call me during the week 
to do other jobs; but, ah, I don't like to work with over one; so I 
usually stick with Tasters; because they're good. They're fair to me, 
and I just stick with Tasters; and yet, I do have other demonstrators 
calling me; but I don't—I don't accept the jobs. 
Judge: Why do you prefer just to be one—be—be with one? 
Colmere: Because it's more dif—it's difficult to have more than—than one; 
because then, you knew, you're—you're looking at your date book or 
your calendar and you're figuring out, okay, which company am I 
working for this weekend, ah, vdho's paying me this weekend or, you 
know, what company am I working for; so I just generally stay with 
Tasters; and they've been very fair with me. 
Judge: Have you ever considered going directly to the manufacturers to do the 
demonstration? 
Colmere: No. 
Judge: Mr. Levanger, do you have any questions? 
levanger: Just a few questions in clarification mostly. I'm John Levanger. I'm 
the individual that sent you that terrible form you had to fill out. 
You indicated earlier that you, ah, from time to time you attended, 
ah, training meetings, ah, with various food brokers in which, ah, at 
which time you received training on hew to demonstrate certain 
products. Is that correct? 
Colmere: Right. 
Levanger: You also indicated you were paid for those meetings, $10.00. 
Colmere: By the broker. 
Levanger: The broker paid you the $10.00. 
Colmere: Right. 
Levanger: Okay. Ah, you also< indicated, ah, they were not a required meeting. 
Is that correct? 
Colmere: No. You didn't have to go. 
Levanger: Were there any occasions when you failed to attend, ah, one of these 
training sessions for any reason and then, subsequent to that, ah, 
demonstrated the product for the broker? 
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Colmere: No. I—if I wasnft at the training of that, I did not do the product; 
but then I usually did a different product that I was familiar with, 
Levanger: Okay. Who instructed you on, ah, on when to go to work? 
Colmere: They would cadi me. 
Levanger: When you say "they", who do you mean? 
Colmere: Tasters would call me. 
Levanger: Who would instruct you on where to go to work? 
Colmere: Tasters. I always figured that Tasters really was not my boss. 
Tasters was a middleman for me, because I was—Testers is in between 
the broker and roe. I am selling the product of the bro—broker. 
Tasters was not my boss. Tasters is a middleman for me. 
Levanger: If that were the case, why is it then the broker didnft call you to 
tell you when to go to work? 
Colmere: Well, because brokers have more to do than just call girls for 
demonstrations. I' ve always— (laughing). 
Judge: You've indicated you've done this type of work on prior occasions 
before you started working with Tasters. 
Colmere: Uh-huh. 
Judge: So you consider yourself a, basically, trained in all the procedures 
involved in, ah, in, ah, how—how this work is to be performed. Is 
that correct? 
Colmere: Yes. Ah, all women, I feel, know how to cook a hanburger or a—or a 
hot dog, which is, ah, all—all women know how to feed people. 
Doctorman: How about us men? 
Colmere: Well, you're the worst of the lot. 
(Laughing) 
Doctorman: I apologize, Your Honor, I shouldn't have interrupted. 
Judge: That's all right. 
Levanger: Ah, that statement made me loose my train of thought. (Lau^iing). 
Doctorman: These hearings can use a little humor new and then. 
Levanger: I know. Ah, were there any occasions when you received instructions 
from an individual for Tasters in hew to do any of your 
demonstrations? 
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Doctorman: Your Honor, just for the clarity of the record, Pat's gonna—her— 
voice goes up and down a little bit, and if I could request an 
instruction to the witness to be sure that she speaks loud enough so 
we get it on the tape. 
Judge: It should be recording, but be sure you do speak loud enough that it 
can be heard. 
Levanger: You've indicated that there are reports that you must submit as to the 
work that you perform. Is that correct? 
Oolmere: Yes. 
Levanger: To your recollection, has there been any occasion when, ah, you have 
submitted a report that has been returned to you? 
Oolmere: No. 
Levanger: The equipment that you furnish, card table, frying pan, spatulas, 
these—this is equipment that you have purchased? 
Oolmere: Right. 
Levanger: Did you have any of this fquipment on—equipment on had prior to your 
association with T&sters? 
Oolmere: Yes, seme. Home—heme use things that I had in my home before I 
started with Tasters. 
Levanger: So it's equipment you used at home prior to your working for them? 
Oolmere: Right. 
Levanger: Do you use this equipment at home? 
Oolmere: No. 
Levanger: You—you reserve it for work just with Tasters? 
Oolmere: For—for the demonstration. If therefs a product that I need during 
the course of that year, like say a—a frying pan or a table or, you 
know, scitething that I need to purchase, ah, I purchase it with my own 
money. I then, ah, save the receipt; then—I then take it to my tax 
auditor and she, as the supplies for my demoing job. 
Levanger: Do you have a business license for the work that you do? 
Oolmere: No. 
Levanger: Are you listed in any business directory? 
Oolmere: No. 
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Doctorman: And does Tasters financially reward you if—if—if you're a great 
demonstrator or— 
Colmere: No. 
Doctorman: —for exceptional performance? 
Colmere: No. 
Doctorman: Do—does Tasters punish you if your performance is poor? 
Colmere: No. 
Doctorman: When, ah, you submit your expense vouchers to Tasters, do you know 
whether or not Tasters is paying the expense vouchers or whether or 
not the food broker is actually paying your expense? 
Colmere: The food broker is paying the expense. 
Doctorman: Hew do you knew that? 
Colmere: I—I—I figure that the—the—like the toothpicks, napkins, paper 
tcwels or whatever, when I purchase them with my own money, send that 
receipt in with my fact sheet, that fact sheet and receipt is then 
sent to the broker and he reimburses me for the—the product—the—and 
what I have purchased to bring that product cane across. 
Doctorman: Okay. So Tasters is still the middleman. 
Colmere: That's h—that's—I—Tasters is not ray boss. 
Doctorman: Did you have, ah, any problems with the questionnaire that was sent 
out by the Department? 
Colmere: I can't even remember sending a questionnaire or even signing one. I 
guess I must have, but I can't—I can't remember doing it. 
Judge: Let's ask her about this at the moment now that you brought it up, 
Counsellor. 
Doctorman: That's fine. 
Judge: Is that your signature on there? 
Colmere: That is true. 
Judge: Okay. Do you recognize that questionnaire? 
Colmere: Ye—that's true. 
Judge: Did you ccnplete this questionnaire? 
Colmere: I did. 
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Judge: And did anyone instruct you hew to oatplete the question? 
Oolmere: No. 
Judge: Did you freely and honestly, ah, answer the questions? 
Oolmere: I did. 
Judge: Did you have sane, ah, problems understanding any of the questions? 
Oolmere: No. 
Judge: Okay. And, ah, is this a typical report that you would submit to 
Tasters and the broker? 
Oolmere: Yes. 
Judge: All right. Go ahead and continue, Counsellor. 
Doctorman: What do you estimate your investment into your equipment to be vihen 
you add up your card table, your trying pan, your table cloths, ah, 
whate—all the other things that—that you use? 
Oolmere: I usually let ray tax auditor do this. Ah, approximate, $150.00. 
Doctorman: Okay. Thatfs dollars a year? 
Oolmere: Yes. Thatfs with the table and the frying pan. 
Doctorman: Okay. If—and youfre not reimbursed that at all by Tasters? That's 
yo— 
Oolmere: No. 
Doctorman: That's your expense. 
Oolmere: Personal. Right. 
Doctorman: If, ah, the equipment was lo—was damaged in a demonstration, say 
you'd dropped the frying pan or your card table leg broke for seme 
reasons, is—whose expense is that? 
Oolmere: Mine. 
Doctorman: Okay. If you were to negligently hurt somebody or damage something, 
say by spilling something on their clothing or burning them with some 
grease or, ah, something of that nature and it was determined that it 
was your fault, who should pay for that loss or damage? 
Oolmere: Me. 
Doctorman: Let me just review one set of notes, Your Honor. I have no further 
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Doctorman: —and your discretion? 
Belrose: Right. 
Doctorman: And you're free to select the time and places where you work? 
Belrose: Reject or accept. 
Doctorman: Okay. 
Belrose: Yeah. 
Doctorman: What—w—we know that you use equipment at your—at your 
derconstration, which may include, and I don't know whether it includes 
a trying pan, a card table, a table cloth, serving pieces amd perhaps 
even other things that you might remind me of. What are those things, 
and v*iat is your investment in those items? 
Belrose: A monetary investment? 
Doctorman: Uh-huh. 
Belrose: I would not think it would exceed, ah, $50.00. 
Doctorman: Okay. Do you expense, ah, that equipment on your tax forms as a 
business expense? 
Belrose: I have not filled out a tax form yet. You mean a — a — 
Doctorman: Since you started work—working for Tasters you haven't— 
Belrose: Right. I have been 1—here less than a year. 
Doctorman: Okay. If, ah, your equipment is damaged in the course" of your 
demonstration, who is responsible for that—that—that financial loss? 
Belrose: I am. 
Doctorman: Are you paid by the job or are ycu paid by the hour? 
Belrose: The job. 
Doctorman: And you've checked here that you consider yourself an independent 
ccxitractor. 
Belrose: Right. 
Doctorman: Can you tell me why that is. 
Belrose: I can either accept or not accept the jobs that are offered to me. I 
can, if I'm unable to meet the appointment at a late date, I can 
substitute, ah, someone else who is knowledgeable. I take care of my 
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cwn taxes, my own expenses. 
Doctornvm: Have you had occasion to substitute someone else? 
Belrose: No. 
Doctorman: But you—you feel you have the right to do that. 
Belrose: Right. 
Doctorman: Do you feel you have the right to hire soneone else if you so choose 
and pay them for a portion of our demonstration. 
Belrose: Right. 
Doctorman: Vlhen you are at the store performing you demonstration, can you 
perform your demonstration at your c*m pace, meaning, when I talk 
about pace, the—the amount of people you contact, the amount of 
product that you display or are specific requirements set forth on 
your pace by Tasters? 
Belrose: My cwn pace. 
Doctorman: If you fail to report your expenses to Tasters, ah, v*io pays for those 
expenses? 
Belrose: I would. 
Doctorman: Okay. I have no further questions, Your Honor. 
Judge: Okay. A little formality here. I refer you to this document that has 
been labelled as Exhibit Ten, and do you recognize that document? 
Belrose: I can recognize nothing without these, up close. Yes. 
Judge: Did you complete that questionnaire? 
Belrose: Uh-huh. 
Judge: Okay. And is this your signature here on Ten D? 
Belrose: Yes. 
Judge: All right. Then have you also submitted this, ah, list of about 14 
items on Tasters letterhead and the aocotpanying demonstration report. 
Did you provide those with—with the questionnaire? Did you sen— 
Belrose: To him, you mean? 
Judge: To the Department. Did you send those in? 
Belrose: I remember this one. 
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then they tell us, yes, no, well, can't we negotiate a little bit on 
that price; and we come up with a price. 
Doctonnan: okay. And hew is the fee paid? Hew is the fee determined for the 
demonstrator? 
Oohn: Oh, in much the same way. Ah, there really, you knew, as far as the 
types of demos, it's pretty straightforward. There are certain kinds 
of demos the hours are dictated by the stores and—and by the numbers 
of people in the stores at the time; and so when we bid the job with 
our client, we knew what percentage of that would go to the 
demonstrator; and basically we know how nuch it costs us to run our 
office, to make a profit, pay the bills and we—we generally know the 
amount of money that we need to make; and, therefore, what we can pay 
the demonstrator plus what we want to make determines the price of the 
demo. 
Doctonnan: Does—so it's—it's a ne—both sides are negotiated? 
Oohn: It's negotiated and it's kind of established by the area. Like in Las 
Vegas, we can't get people to work for the same amount that they work 
here. They'll tell us, "No. We won't work for that." or such and 
such another company pays us so nuch more; and so we have different 
rates for different areas and different types of demonstrations. 
Doctorman: Are demonstrators paid by the hour? 
Oohn: No. They're paid a demo fee for their type of demo. They can—they 
can divide it up any way they want. I mean I've had demonstrators 
say, "Well, do—I get paid for lunch when I work for another cewpany." 
and I say, "Well, if you want to take the amount of money we pay you 
and divide that up by two hours or ten hours, I don't care." I pay 
them a demo fee and they can say whatever they want as far as hew 
their paid. 
Doctorman: Does Tasters review the performance of the demonstrators? 
Oohn: No. And, in fact, occasionally we'll get a report or a call from a 
client who will say, you know, the demonstrator didn't get the manager 
to sign or didn't—there was no cement about the demonstrator; and we 
send the reports in as we get them. We send them in to our client. 
We have a three-part survey of the demo; and that's so that our client 
knews that that demonstration was done; and we ask the demonstrator to 
keep one copy in case the other get lost in the mail caning to us. We 
keep another copy in case it gets lost going to our client; and many 
times they'll call and say well, they misplaced this or that form and 
part of the reason they like working with Tasters is that we have a 
copy of everything that goes out. For tax purposes, we're required to 
keep a copy of the receipt for the product; and so there's never a 
doubt that if anything gets misplaced or lost, we can always have a 
backup and send it to them; and they will not pay us without having 
the report and the receipts for merchandise or supplies; and, ah, we 
even have to send them—if we have to send things out UPS, we have to 
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Whoever it is, I'm forwarding. (?) 
Go ahead and continue. 
Doctorman: Does Tasters determine the time at which the demonstrations shall b 
performed? 
Oohn: No. 
Doctorman: Who does? 
Oohn: 
Oohn: The client. 
Doctorman: And why—do you know v*iy the client selects certain times for the 
performance of demonstrations? 
Well only that those are the times that seem to be established 
industry-wide when there are the most shoppers in the store. A—a 
demonstrator can go to the store or—or when she confirms her 
demonstration with the department manager, he might tell her# "Well, I 
don't want you to come in at 10. Our store is a night store. Ccme in 
at noon and work until 8.ff If she wants to do that# she will. If she 
can't do that, she'll call and say, "Well, I can't do that demo and I 
have a party at my house." It's—it's, ah, it's just all arranged 
with the best thing for the store. If it's better for the store to 
have a half-a-day or a whole day, ah, many times a store won't buy as 
much product as the manufacturer wants them to buy, so they'll give 
them a half-day demo. That's generally the reason there's a half day 
or a whole day. If one chain buys a thousand cases and another has 
only seven stores and buys 500, then they don't get as many demos; and 
it's just strictly controlled with what the client offers to the store 
when they buy the product. 
Can the demonstrator determine the time in vrtiich they work by either 
accepting or rejecting various times that are offered? 
Oh, yeah, because, ah, we have all kinds of jobs; and sometimes we 
start out on a Monday morning with jobs for the next three or four 
weeks to offer people; and they cadi us. We tell them what we have, 
when the hours are, ah, if we just took in a run of jobs for 20 
stores, the first person who calls us, or the first person we call 
could take any one of those 20 stores or the ones in their area that 
they wanted to go to. 
Doctorman: So th—the demonstrator can also determine their location by—vfoere 
they're gonna work by selecting what's available. 
Oohn: Definitely, or by selecting the hours. If there are half-day jobs and 
whole-day jobs, there are people vdio only work Saturdays or only work 
Fridays or, you know. It just depends on what they want to do. 
Doctorman: 
Cohn: 
Doctorman: It's up to the demonstrator? 
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Cohn: 
Oohn: 
Uh-huh. Is it up to Tasters as to where and when a particular 
demonstrator works? 
No. She accepts a job or declines. 
Doctorman: While the demonstrator is at the store, who determines the details of 
hew the demonstration is performed? 
Cohn: I would say the demonstrator, unless the—the manager—our clients 
don't like us to use pretzels as an exanple; because if it's a hot 
dog, the pretzel has extra salt; but we have a number of meat managers 
who don't want toothpicks lost on the floor; and they'll say, "In ray 
store, you use pretzels." So in that store she'll use pretzels; and 
it's—it's a snail thing, but, you know, it—it's—they do vrtiat the 
manager wants. 
Doctorman: Ah, y—when we discussed your testimony, you—you'd given me an 
exairple about a tortilla denonstration. Can you recall that? 
Cohn: It's one of my favorites. 
Doctorman: Why don't you tell us about that. 
Cohn: We were demonstrating tortillas that were siirply to be warmed in a fry 
pan and lightly buttered, cut into serving pieoes and sanpled; and I 
got a call from a demonstrator in Renroerer, Wyoming, who said she had 
used peanut butter and jelly and was concerned, would she get her 
supply money back; and we had talked about it and I said, "Well, did 
you sell tortillas?" and she said nobody would buy than because 
people in Kammerer didn't know about tortillas at that time, but she 
decided to make peanut butter and jelly sandwiches and then she sold 
out; and we just kind of lau^ied about it and I said, you knew, "I'm 
sending the bill. Of course, you'll be paid, why not?", but it's a 
very siirple kind of a situation. What works for you, do it; and if 
you're successful, that's all we want is a successful demonstration 
for our store, for our client. The demonstrator wants to do a good 
job generally. 
Doctorman: So in seme locations butter on tortillas makes sense but in other 
locations, peanut butter and jelly makes sense. 
Cohn: That's the way it goes. It's cxmrnon sense. Whatever works, do it. 
Doctorman: And Tasters doesn't determine that. That's up to the demonstrator to— 
Cohn: Ric£it. 
Doctorman: —to do that. 
Cohn: Right. 
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Doctontan: Does Tasters supervise the demonstrator in the stores in any way? 
Cohn: Not in any way. 
Doctonnan: You were sitting here th—vith the testimony of a nuntoer of your 
workers v*x>—one or two of than said that someone fran Tasters came to 
the store to, ah, and was at the store with them. Were—why were 
those Tasters employees in the store? 
Cohn: Well, we have one person in Utah that we call an area rep. Her name 
in Bonnie Jeffs. Bonnie goes to the store, if itfs a new person who 
just took a job and needs a report. We tell the people, "If ycu donft 
have a report, write on a plain piece of paper where you work, what yo 
did, how it went, sign it, have the manager sign it. It's as good as 
a report." And we get a lot of those. If we can and if we have the 
time and obviously because we do so many demos with one person, there 
is no way we can supervise, but Bonnie will take the cups and forks. 
She'll take a report; and if the demonstrator thinks that Bonnie is 
supervising her, that's in the demonstrator's mind. What may happen 
is that our client will go around, ah, when we have these big 
promotions with Proctor and Gantole or General Mills, as I said before, 
they have unlimited resources apparently, and they will send people 
out; but even they cannot check all the demos; because it's just 
physically impossible to get to that many locations and supervise 
every demonstrator. Ah, they may hit a quarter of than or a half of 
them depending on how many there are in a given weekend; but, ah, 
there's no way to supervise these people sufficiently. Ah, there's no 
way that Tasters could make any money if we had to send a supervisor 
to every job.. 
Doctontan: Does Tasters issue written reports of s—of performance to 
demonstrators? 
Cohn: You mean like critique on their work? 
Doctonnan: Yes. 
Cohn: No. 
Doctorman: Does tasters have an eatployee review of—of a dononstrator on a 
periodic basis? 
Cohn: Absolutely not. 
Doctorman: Is there—does Tasters require the demonstrator to perform 
demonstrations in a certain way or manner or does Tasters give general 
guidelines? 
Cohn: We give general guidelines: be there, do a good job, return your 
report and, ah, that's about it. 
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experienced demonstrators? 
Oohn: Oh, no; but the demonstrators working in the store# sometimes they're 
three or four companies represented there; and they do talk a lot and 
trade ideas. We hear a lot of that, that they met demonstrators from 
other companies and—but we don't ask anyone to stand over another 
demonstrator and train them. 
Doctorman: And if someone on a questionnaire had answered, ah, that that did in 
fact happen, what would be your explanation for that? 
Oohn: Well, it was not at Tasters request. 
Doctorman: Are demonstrators required to take any correspondence courses on how 
to demonstrate? 
Oohn: No. 
Doctorman: Are they required to attend any sales meetings? 
Oohn: No. 
Doctorman: May a demonstrator's services be assigned to others? 
Oohn: It happens all the time. 
Doctorman: Give us some exanples. 
Cohn: 
Doctorman: 
Cohn: 
Ah, I talk to people who are new mothers. They want to work, but 
they can only work half a day, and they split their demo with a friend 
or—we have nursing mothers who trade jobs. We have husband and wife 
teams. We don't even know, ah, when one takes over from another; and 
in fact, two days ago I had a call from a person up in Treananton who 
called to inquire what we pay; and, you knew, it was just a "Hello, 
tell me how much you pay." And I didn't know if it was a client or 
somebody wanting to demonstrate, so I asked who it was and why they 
wanted to know; and she told me that she had been doing demos for us 
for a long time. We didn't know she did demos for Tasters, because 
the person that got her into doing demos apparently took the job, gave 
it to her, the other person got paid and paid her a portion of what 
she was paid; and she said she caught on to that, that Tasters didn't 
know anything about her; and she wanted to work directly for us, 
•cause she felt she'd get more of her pay; and I said, "Well, that's 
really interesting and I'll put you on the list. We'll call you." 
Does Tasters have any objection that there was a middleman involved in 
the—the work performed? 
Well, no, because I think it happens a lot, just as indicated by the 
Patsy Buckmiller testimony earlier who—Patsy is in Price and she 
takes jobs and she gives them to other people. I really didn't know 
that Debbie Henry also did that. I had no idea they were going in the 
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Doctorman: And do you have demonstrators that, say, work only onoe a—onoe a 
year? 
Cchn: Well, we have demonstrators who will only work the Smith's Food Shew; 
and we'll have demonstrators who, ah, I'll call—they1!! tell us 
they111 call Tasters when they want to work, you knew, don't bother 
calling them in between because they may only want to work new and 
then; and then we'll have demonstrators who want to work every 
weekend and they'll call us and they'll say, I'm available for this 
and this and this week. If we have jobs, we'll line them up. If not, 
we'll put them on a list and call them vtaen we do. They'll call back, 
"I still don't have a job for the first week in March." It depends on 
the aggressiveness of the demonstrator; and it's really gotten to the 
point where I would say 80 per cent of our jobs are filled by 
denonstrators calling tasters; and, ah, these people v/ho demonstrate 
generally don't want to work during the week; and it's even hard to 
reach them; and that's why we can have a person work a half a day, 
because the best time to reach people is, let's say, between 8 and 
noon; so that person in our office is on the phone constantly all 
morning just talking to people, people who call us or people that we 
call. 
Doctorman: And what's the ratio of people—of demonstrators calling in for work 
as opposed to you soliciting them to—to work? 
Oohn: Oh, I would say 80 per cent of them call us. 
Doctorman: Do you have demonstrators that work in multiple cities? 
Oohn: Oh, yeah. We have, ah— 
Doctorman: Why don't you give us seme examples. 
Cohn: We have sane people who, ah, because they know we work in six states, 
we have a gal whose husband lectures and he—when he goes to Reno, she 
calls and says, "I want to work in Reno in two weeks because my 
husband's gonna be there." or "I'm going down to Bullhead City for 
the su—for the winter, certainly not for the sunnier, 
people who responded to this questionnaire, I think, 
right now, and she'll work there. Or— 
Ah, one of the 
is in Bullhead 
Doctorman: Who is that? 
Cohn: Vi Coleman. 
Doctorman: Okay. 
Cohn: And she'll work in Las Vegas. It-—it's just, ah, an interesting 
thing; and if people move, they say, "Well, I'm gonna be in Boise, you 
knew, I'm moving to Boise. Call me for jobs in Boise." and that's the 
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way it works. 
Doctontan: Now as I understand i t , Vi Oolaian works in Salt Lake, Bullhead City 
and Tucson? 
Cohn: Uh-huh. 
Doctorroan: As—as her travel schedule determines. 
Cohn: Rictfit. And she t e l l s us \*en. We donft pay for her travel. We don't 
pay for her phone ca l l s . I t f s what she likes to do. 
Doctontan: She works vfoen—where she wants to work. 
Cohn: Definitely. 
Doctontan: Okay. Can the demonstrator establish their own time schedule? 
Cohn: Yeah. Many times they do. If they want to leave early because they 
have an engagement, the/ tell the store manager, "I'm cooing in front 
10 to 6." even if wefve said it's from 11 to 7; and if itfs okay with 
him, it's fine with us. Most of the time we don't knew all of these 
things that are going on; and we hear about them in much the same way 
we heard about Debbie Henry an—supervising in Price today. 
Doctontan: Is the demonstrator free to work vAien and for vtficm he or she chooses? 
Cohn: Oh, yes. 
Doctontan: Can they work for multiple companies? 
Cohn: Yes. 
Doctontan: Do you have people vrfx> hold dewn full-time jobs? 
Cohn: Ah, yes, we do. 
Doctontan: In addition to their demonstration work. 
Cohn: We have teachers. We have nurses. We have gentlemen. We have 
retired men. We have people v*x> go to school and then they schedule 
their Fridays and Saturdays free so that, you knew, they're only in 
school Monday through Thursday. Ah, we have teachers v*x> tell us they 
make more doing demos than teaching. 
Doctontan: Thatfs unfortunate. Hopefully the legislature will do something about 
that this session. 
Does the demonstrator—so a demonstrator's not restricted from doing 
other work. 
Cohn: Absolutely not. 
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Doctorman: Are datcnstrators paid at the same time you pay other accounts 
payable? 
Cahn: Yes. 
Doctorman: And what do you—do you consider theirs—what do you consider your 
payment f ran Tasters to a demonstrator to be? 
Cohn: It's a payable. We—we pay them when we pay our bills. 
Doctorman: Is it a wage? 
Cohn: 
Doctorman: 
Cohn: 
No. It's a demo fee. We also work with other demo companies. If a 
client calls and gives us 40 denes and three of them are in New 
Mexico, Testers doesn't work in New Mexico, but we have affiliates 
there, ah, and we call them and say, "We have three demos. Can you 
handle it in Albuquerque?" and then we'll pay Elite Presentations just 
as we pay the denonstrator. She sends us the report, and we pay her 
oonpany vAien we pay the demonstrators. 
So there may be occasion where you'll 
middleman to—to get to the demonstrator. 
need to use yet another 
Oh, many, yeah, 'cause we don't work in Billings, Montana; and we get 
jobs there. Sane jobs we do as an aooomrtodation to our client. New, 
in Billings, we make a few dollars on that job; but the person that we 
use in Albuquerque charges more than we do; so it's strictly a service 
to our client. We're glad to have the 37 jobs, and it's easier for 
him if we send them to Albuquerque than for he; and, you knew, I'll 
tell them, "Well, I can give you the name of a cocpany there." and he 
says, "No. Just take care of it." So, we do that; and it's a 
business accenmodation most of the time. 
Doctorman: Is the—are the demonstrators required to pay all of their own 
expenses up front? 
Cohn: Oh, yes. 
Doctorman: Okay. Are the demonstrators reimbursed for all or part of their 
expenses? 
Cohn: Well, oily for supplies like napkins, toothpicks, paper tcwels, the 
supplies that it takes to do the deno; but if a demonstrator sends us 
a bill for a paring knife or an apron or a table cloth, we don't pay 
it; and we just cross it off the receipt. 
Doctorman: Who—who is ultimately responsible for the payment of the expenses for 
the serving of the food, the toothpicks and napkins, whatever? 
Cohn: The client. 
Doctorman: Testers does not pay for that out of its overhead. 
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submit this and have-
Judge: I'll receive that as Exhibit Fifteen. 
Doctontan: —have you look at Exhibit Fifteen, Sandi; and is this the Exhibit 
that was prepared by your office? 
Cohn: Yes, it was; and it's just a partial list of people that, ah, the 
office staff renerabered and recalled that, yes, these people had said, 
"Well, I can't work this week. I'm working for Dynamic11 or "I'm 
working for Classic." whatever. We don't keep a record of it, and we 
don't really care. 
Doctontan: If, ah, a demonstrator's producing a good result, are they 
terminated? 
Cohn: Not unless they tell us. We never terminate anybody, which means take 
them off the list unless they say, "I'm moving to Oklahoma and I won't 
be there." or, ah, you know, just for v*xatever reason, "I'm taking a 
full-time job." Mostly they don't even tell us; and then we keep 
calling; and maybe at the end of the year, they've never worked all 
year, the ootputer will just automatically dunp anybody that's never 
received any pay. 
Doctontan: But if they were to call you, ahr and say, like the 80 per cent of the 
people V*K> do that call you and say they wanted to work, what would 
you do? 
Cohn: Well, we try to keep anybody who wants to work working. Those v*x> say 
"Yes", they're obviously the ones who work. 
Doctontan: Who is responsible for the satisfactory completion of the 
demonstration? 
Cohn: The demonstrator. That's from start to finish. 
Doctorman: Is the demonstrator obligated to perform a satisfactory demonstration 
as a condition preceding for their payment? 
Cchn: No. They would be paid unless they walked off the job or didn't 
ootplete it or in seme really—I can't imagine why they would— 
Doctontan: Maybe you didn't understand my question. Is the—is the—must the 
demonstrator satisfactory complete the demonstration in order— 
Cohn: Yeah. 
Doctontan: —to get paid? 
Cdhn: Yeah. She has to do the job, get the manager to sign that she was 
there, return her report and then she's paid. 
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Doctorman: Does pa—does Tasters pay a car allowance or milage? 
Oohn: No. 
Doctorman: Does Tasters provide an office or a place to work— 
Oohn: No. 
Doctonnan: —for the demonstrators? 
Cohn: Absolutely not, 
Doctorman: Does Tasters pay the—any overhead of the demonstrators other—per— 
does Tasters personally pay any of the overhead of the demonstrators? 
Cohn: No. Nothing. 
Doctorman: Does Tasters have a personnel name? 
Cohn: No. 
Doctorman: Did tha—for demonstrators? 
Cohn: No. We have some incidental things like "Fourteen Things to 
Remember". We have a suggested list of what you need and then itfs 
common sense. If you're doing cheese and crackers# you donft need 
three quarters of the things on the list; but people cadi us and ask 
us questions; and we've gotten to the point where rather than answer 
every question, we'll just zip that out; just in the same way we have 
a little form letter that says, "Your receipt was not included with 
your report. Therefore, we cannot reimburse you for supplies." And 
it's just easier to send that, since we do so many, than to sit and 
write little notes to everybody. We just have a file with things that 
are appropriate and that's what we do. 
Doctorman: Can demonstrators earn vacation pay? 
Cohn: No. 
Doctorman: Can demonstrators earn side pay? 
Cohn: No. 
Doctorman: Are there any career opportunities for—for demonstrators within 
Tasters? 
Cohn: No. Only that, ah, if we needed someone in our office, and someone 
said, "I'd like to change and do office work.", we have had two people 
who came into our office from being demonstrators. 
Doctorman: But the— 
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Oohn: 
Cdhn: 
That's just incidental. 
Doctorman: Okay. And itfs clear that Tasters doesn't monitor the performance of 
demonstrators with supervisors. 
No, we do not, nor could we. 
Doctorman: May a demonstrator take a trip or leave on vacation without giving you 
notice? 
Oohn: 0h# they do all the time. 
Doctorman: Does Tasters exercise control over the detail of the work within the 
store by the demonstrator? 
Oohn: Not at all. 
Doctorman: Does Tasters inspect the sales presentations by the demonstrators? 
Oohn: No. Not unless required by our client, who then pays for that 
service; and generally they do that themselves. 
Doctorman: That's the exception. 
Oohn: The exception. 
Doctorman: Okay. As a general rule, is there any contact between Tasters and the 
demonstrator while the demonstrator is at the store? 
Oohn: Only if supplies are necessary; and, see we generally send—to an—any 
place out of Salt lake, we mail the supplies and charge our client 
freight and for the supplies. If itfs within the area and they're not 
too many people, generally it's last minute stuff that Bonnie 
delivers, jobs that were set up late and they require supplies. Ah, 
we've even had her run up, you know, to—to Ogden or somewhere if it's 
last minute. Ah, if it's iitpossible for us to get supplies there, 
then we let the demonstrator purchase them vtaerever she can; and it's 
usually at a higher expense to our client; so we try to help our 
clients out by providing a case of spoons that we can deliver rather 
than the demonstrator buying 25 spoons in a box for, you knew, 69 
cents multiplied by 500. It's just more expensive. 
Doctorman: That's a service for the client? 
Oohn: Ri^it. Which is another reason they call us instead of other people 
that—that don't offer that service. 
Doctorman: What—during a calendar quarter, what's the amount of unenployment 
tax that you pay to the Department of Encplqyment Security? 
Oohn: It usually runs between $450.00 and $500.00 per quarter to Utah 
Department of Unemployment Securities. 
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Oohn: Only if the client said— 
Levanger: And if that's the case, isn't— 
Cohn: —"I don't want to pay you." It just never happened. 
Levanger: Weren't you dealing out sane sort of reprimand if they weren't being 
paid for that service? 
Oohn: I guess that would be an ultimate reprimand. It just doesn't happen. 
Levanger: Well, you indicated earlier that it does happen. 
Oohn: Well, not where we don't pay thorn or reprimand them. We discuss it. 
I had a demonstrator who onoe told a customer she was too fat and 
didn't need another sairple; and I was just rather shocked; and when I 
asked her about it, she said, "Golly, I knew I shouldn't have said 
that." But she has worked for us sinoe then. Ah, whenever she says 
"yes", she works; and she, I hope, doesn't insult customers. 
Levanger: You indicated also a little earlier a situation with, ah, with the 
individual at Tremonton, apparently doing sane demonstration work that 
you were not aware of? 
Cohn: Not aware at all. The person who gave her the job gave her our 
report, but then that person signed her name, Lori Herdalgo; and her 
name is on this list, because she works—she sets up demos for three 
or four other conpanies. 
Levanger: So you have no concern whether this individual is really qualified to 
do the demonstration at least in fact representing Tasters? 
Oohn: As long as she does her job well and the manager writes, "good job" or 
no conment at all and sends that form back, Tasters is satisfied. 
Levanger: You would have no concern then that this individual might be like the 
other individual you talked about for—that needed to be in a 
sheltered workshop, that she too might need to be there? 
Cohn: No, because the managers always write back and say, "job well done" or 
"send her back" or "okay". The number on canment we get fran managers 
in Utah is "She done good." And if she done good, and I don't mean to 
be facetious, but that truly is the number one comment that we get. 
Levanger: So you would receive a report back fran—from the person you weren't 
aware of in Tremonton, that was doing the work? Would they not be 
some indication there also that somebody else was assisting her? 
Cohn: No, we didn't know at all. 
Levanger: Well, one of the ladies today gave testimony, a lady from Price, and 
I'm sorry I can't recall her name, that there were occasions when a— 
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that to our $25.00; and that's how we ocrae up with a fee to our 
client. 
Levanger: So if I want to think through it and I say, cikay, I'm working ei^ht 
hcurs at $35.00, I'm being paid the equivalent of $4.75 an hour. 
Oohn: Right. 
Levanger: And frun that I need to deduct my FICA and my, ah— 
Oohn: Right. New, this other demonstrator says, "I only work seven hours, 
because I took my lunch and my breaks; and I'm making $5.00 an hour.11 
I don't tell them hourly. We never ever discuss hourly and— 
Levanger: All right— 
Cohn: —you can see the reason we don't is because we're following the 
guidelines of an independent contractor. 
Levanger: I'm—I'm— 
Cohn: Never discuss hours. 
Levanger: I'm there with that card table and I've been cooking the chicken and 
all of a sudden the leg falls out from under the table and the pan 
falls on the floor, hits somebody on the toe, it splatters than with— 
with grease all over a $300.00 pants suit and it breaks her toe. What 
happens? 
Cohn: The demonstrator has a problem. 
Levanger: What if I tell you I'm not going to pay for it? 
Oohn: We have never had that happen. 
Levanger: Okay. It's happening now. I'm telling you I'm not going to pay for 
it. 
Oohn: We're going to tell you that you're an independent contractor and that 
you signed a contract that you're independent and you're responsible. 
Now, we do have liability insurance. We have never submitted a claim 
on our liability insurance; so yew're inventing a situation that could 
happen; and I'm saying whenever anybody gets hurt, anything could 
happen, They could sue T&sters, they could sue the demonstrator, they 
could sue Costco, they could sue the chicken people. We don't knew 
what they will do; and until they do it, we're saying we have never 
had a claim. We have had one demonstrator cut her finger cit a food 
shew and we've had one claim to workers compensation that we knew of. 
Levanger: I guess that's really my point. That this i s — 
Cohn: And it's not risky business. 
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TASrrERS LTD. , INC. - 4 - Case No. 89-A-4044-Z 
EMPLOYER NO. 1-117373-0 Case No. 92-BR-262-T 
not set the time frames for each demonstration, Tasters 
allows the brokers and store managers to mate this decision 
for the demonstrators. Since the individual demonstrators 
do not set their own hours, analysis of the facts of this 
case under factor (g) strongly indicates enployee status for 
the demonstrators. 
Factor (k) asks "whether the individual submits no reports or is 
required to submit regular oral or written reports to the enployer*. 
The fact that demonstrators are required to submit detailed 
reports to Tasters at the end of each demonstration strongly 
indicates enployee status as opposed to independent 
contractor status. 
Factor (m) requires the Board to consider if applicable "whether the 
individual acxxunts for his own expenses or Is paid by the aiployer for 
expenses11 • 
Demonstrators are either provided incidental supplies, such 
as toothpicks, napkins, cups, by the store or broker or 
submit costs to Tasters, for reintxKsement. Significant to 
the Board is the fact that Tasters has the right to approve 
or disapprove questionable costs to be paid to the 
demonstrators when the costs are submitted to then for 
reiiitxinsenent. Analysis of the facts under this factor 
strongly indicates enployee status. 
Factor (p) asks "whether the individual may realize a profit or 
suffer a loss as a result of services perfonaad or cannot realize a profit or 
loss by making good or poor decisions". 
Analysis of the facts under this factor strongly indicates 
enployee status as no matter how the demonstrator runs his 
or her demonstration, i t has no effect on his or her 
eventual pay for the demonstration* The individual1 s 
performance does not alter his or her profit or loss from 
the venture. 
Factor (r) asks "whether the individual has his own office and 
assistants, holds a business license, is listed In business directories, 
maintains a business telephone, or advertises in newspapers or does not make 
services available except through a business in which he or she has no 
interest". 
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SindiCohn 
TASTERS LTD., INC. 
1381 East 2100 South, Suite B 
SilbteOty, Utah 84106 
(801)4664366 
(80U466-DEMO 
VERY IMPORTANT THINGS TO REMEMBER! 11 
MOST IMPORTANT THING TO REMEMBER: CALL YOUR STORE NOV AMD THEN CALL AGAIN 
ABOUT THREE DAYS BBFORE TO CONFIRM YOUR DEMO I till 
lease read this before you go to work, and go through your training 
materials often. 
Dress appropriately. Look professional. Please wear an APRON 1 
Be on time. 
Always set a beautiful table and use a neat tablecloth. 
Take a careful inventory of your product and write the numbers 
on your report sheet. 
Serve a SAMPLE site serving of your product. 
ALWAYS use the product name. 
Try to sample every person that comes Into your store. 
Keep an accurate count of the units used for your deao. 
Keep your area clean and do not eat at your deao table. 
0. Take *j hour lunch and two 15 minute breaks. Try not to have 
all of the demonstrators go to lunch at the same time. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
SMILE!!! Have fun and be creative. 
Be AGCRESSIVE and try to SELL OUTM11I 
Complete your report sheet, filling in every section. Attach a receipt 
if you have any expenses, we cannot pay you without It. Sign It and 
have your manager sign too. 
14. MAIL YOUR REPORT ON YOUR WAY HOME AT THE END OF YOUR DEMO! 11 
PLEASE DO NOT MENTION THE NAME OF ANY OTHER STORE WHEN YOU ARE AX WORK. YOU 
ARE REPRESENTING ONLY THE STORE THAT YOU ARE IN ON THE DAY OF YOUR DEMO AND IT 
WOULD BE IN VERY POOR TASTE TO EVEN MENTION ANOTHER COMPANY. THE SAME GOES FOR 
THE PRODUCT THAT YOU ARE SELLING. IT IS THE VERY BEST AND THERE IS NO NEED TO 
COMPARE IT, BY NAME, TO ANY OTHER ITEM. 
2/87 TIC|VJV3 ry^jnij 000039 
/ n _ r » 1381 East 2M» South, &Ae 
TASTERS LTD.. INC. $*ukea* U U ^ 
($01)456-3366 
(801) 4 66-DEM 
PACKING YOUR BASKET 
A good nights sleep 
You - All neat and clean 
Folding Table 
Tablecloth 
Electric frying pan 
25 Foot extension cord 
Roll of vide masking tape 
Wastepaper sack (from the store only) 
Spatula 
Sharp knife 
Serving fork 
Nice platter 
Smock or apron 
Small cutting board 
Grease can with lid 
Moist cloth (in plastic bag) 
Scissors, pen, marking pen and tape 
Toothpicks, paper towels and napkins (save receipts) 
Borrow a plant from the produce department (always ask) 
Report form and envelope 
HO - NO's 
NO children (yours) 
NO smoking on the job 
NO chairs 
NO books 
TIP'^v 
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TASTERS LTD., INC. 
1381 East 2100 South, Stitel 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8410 
(801)4664366 
(801)466-DEM( 
DEMONSTRATION REPORT 
CALL STORE NOVOOCONFIRM 
DaleCaled:-
AVAILABILITY OF PRODUCT AND AGAIN 2 DAYS BEFORE DEMO 
Nam* of Manager caltd to verify demoe _ 
Project* 
Store # 
it, 
SunQ MonQ 
ol Dtmoe //^ *-? 
T ~7 Cy7 SunQ onO UmQ VMQ*tomQ fJBtSajt 
S t o i t r W J k ^ ^ & S ^ TI«r«o«Democ//-7 W ? - g 
^ / Telephone *&£S'-»%Qf Dept: M O Meaj)^ ProduetO 
Address:. 
Please, specify # of units] j ercas .^2^ . , . Aneyoureportingjnunits , . j _ — 
Product 0ertK>re>Tate4^^yu^^t/<^C/-^?r>-- ^fi^>^9n 
Beginning Inventory: ^ c2(l6A4*& , . i i  t : 
Lest Ending Inventory: 
Equals Ibtal 
Less Samples Used For Demo: 
Amount Sold /
 v > > 
Regular Price 3/l'rf) 
Total Expenses Of any) 
r2QdfW4 
IH&I. <s&T ^ ^MdUti^fL 
•Receipt must be a t t a c h for RetofaaWmeet. / 
SAVE EMPTY DEMO WRAPPERS FOR 
COUPONS: At start of D « m a r 3 ^ 1 _ i = ^ N u m b t f Distributed -£> - ] JlttlUP extra COUpOfli lO MMtm 
Use this credit form. MM D NoJSJ^ 
If yes. throw empty wrappers away after counting. 
II no. leave empty wrappers with department manager. 
Leave yeDow copy with department manager MttO 
Credit Expense incurred 
(Do not Include Items paid lor) 
CREDIT MEMO 
NoQ EXHIBIT 10 
& 
(Si 
Position o(\bur Demo 
List ALL other Demos Going on UL 
Store Traffic: Light Medium JuH 
Number of Fmons Sampled Mi 
O ^ a s u m e r R e s p o n s r ^ ^ 
Comments by Demoi 
Managers Comments * 
Managers Signature 
te&te jpittfuc?-^fri^Z 
*&£. . 3 /^JLi/ujj^f^u-rxy 
QrJe Days Worked Sun Mon Tue Wed Thun/fnJVSaD 
Demonstrator's Signature 
.  
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Our sales sre*growing and the demand for our services is ever expanding. Thanks to you 
for your great work 
Tn ordtr to keep our great reputation, ve need to do an even better job of reporting. 
Pltaae be extra cartful with your reporte. Fill in EVERY lined I We must know: Vhat yot 
beginning inventory is, ending Inventor, UNITS USED FOR SAKPLES and your expenses, if any 
If you are doing more than one product, such as beef 4 meat franks, list both on your the« 
and count them separately. Your receipt must ba attached for reimbursement. Don't hold • 
co chem and 'send them in a few weeks later, aa we bill our client and then cannot add cha 
at the later date...and we can't gat paid until we submit all of your forms. 
Keep track of the product you uss by placing tha empty demo wrapper in a bag marked with 
name we enter on your report under: Save Empty demo wrappers for: leave this bag with you 
department manager. 
Put the regular and ssle price in end fill in ths remainder of the font M$ we need to kno< 
as much aa possibls about your demo. Please make comments!!! We love comments!!! In the 
consumer response section, tell us what the shopper really aald about the produce. Your 
comment should be about the product, your day, the store, etc. 
If your form is late in getting to you, or you do not have one at all, please make up a p 
of plain paper wich the same information. If we have confirmed a job with you by telepho 
and your form is lste, the job is ON unless we call you. It really helps if you will 
jot all the information down when you are called. 
THE CREDIT FORM: Thie la the aection outlined in black. Do not include items that you 
have paid for in this section, such aa toothpicks, napkins, etc. Do lint items used for 
your demo that you do not pay for. 
The credit form is only used for a few clients, and will ba checked e^it when it la 
necessary. The following is an example: 
U M this cre<*< form Y t s V N o O Do noc inckidt fttms you have paid lor. 
Crtdii Eaptnsts incurred: /y f v f w Total 
9% /&, frS~ 
Leave the yellow copy of our report with your manager when you use thia credit aection. 
How the fun part—get your manager to make a comment too. Be aura that you both sign the 
bottom of the form. If you ahare a Job with someone ba aura both of you algo so we can 
pay you correctly. There la always someone who can sign your sheet. If you want your 
manager to sign and you know that ha or aha will ba leaving befort you do, make srrangeoe 
with them in advance. If you do sell out»wrlte SOLD OUT on your report* It isn't 
necessary to enter the time you leave on your report when you aell out. Send ua your 
personal messages on another piece of paper as the reports goes In to our clients, and 
chey are not interested in our "other stuff". 
'**•. 11 in your report sheets carefully, completly & legibly. Return your signed report on 
".he day your demo is completed and do keep the pink copy for your records. 
" F.N ;JO SELL! I'SELL! !'SELL!!! «.»».**»«>••_ V 
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